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I.—ON TRUTH AND PRACTICE.

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We all, I presume, have been hearing the sound of a new gospel in philosophy.¹ The exact nature of this I cannot state, for I have so far failed to understand it. But it loudly advertises itself as the destroyer of Intellectualism, and it claims to find the being and the truth of things in will and in practice. And, sweeping away the feeble obstacle of senile theories and teachers,² it promises to bring into the world,

¹This paper was written in the early summer of 1903, and has been left much as it was. The renewed and repeated "manifestoes" of the protagonist of *Personal Idealism* (even *Personal Idealism*, it seems, was an "audacious manifesto") do not to my mind show any serious endeavour to deal with their subject. And to my mind they betray no consciousness of some difficulties which are so well known as even to deserve the name of traditional. I have however since that date made acquaintance with the interesting volume called *Studies in Logical Theory*. There is much in the position taken here by Prof. Dewey and the other writers which seems to me to be suggestive and valuable. On the other hand that position as a whole has not become clear to me. I agree that there is no such existing thing as pure thought. On the other side, if in the end there is to be no such thing as independent thought, thought, that is, which in its actual exercise takes no account of the psychological situation, I am myself in the end led inevitably to scepticism. And on this point I have so far failed to gain any assistance from Prof. Dewey. The doctrine that every judgment essentially depends on the entire psychical state of the individual and derives from this its falsehood or truth, is, I presume, usually taken to amount to complete scepticism. This is a matter which doubtless Prof. Dewey has considered, and a discussion of it by him would I am sure be welcomed.

²"The ancient shibboleths encounter open yawns and unconcealed derision. The rattling of dry bones no longer fascinates respect nor

perhaps even outside philosophy, youth daylight and happiness. It is in vain that I reflect that as a man grows old he has earned the right to be sceptical, since he has been forced to hear of so many novelties which after all were not new. For on the other hand it is too certain that age makes us stupid, and of that in my case no Personal Idealist was needed as a witness.¹ Of that I had (so the phrase goes) the witness in myself. Still, reflecting thus, I went on to think that there is a use even for senility. For a new gospel does not speak merely to the hopes of the young, or merely teach those others who, if they have ever learnt, are able as easily to unlearn. It has to meet prejudices which, if it is to succeed, must be silenced or dispelled. And so perhaps, because I myself am sunk in prejudice, I may be the better able to point out or at least to exemplify the obstacles in the way of truth. And my very defects may after all indirectly qualify me to assist, without understanding and even without faith, at this new birth of philosophy.

I will therefore forthwith assume that it is better for me to speak, and I will state why in my opinion the ultimate criterion cannot be merely practical. I will then set down some objections to any gospel of practice for the sake of practice. And finally I will give the senses in which I am able to understand this claim of all truth to be practical. In thus recalling what for the most part is old and familiar, I may hope to show to others, though not myself, the real glory of the new light.

(I.) In maintaining that truth essentially does not consist in the mere practical working of an idea, I would first of all remove a probable misunderstanding. For myself I have always held that at the beginning of its course the intellect directly subserves practice, and that between practice and theory there is as yet no possible division. I have expressed this belief long ago,² and I have repeated it since, as I believe, unequivocally and plainly. Again I hold that in the end theory and practice are one. I believe in short that each is a one-sided aspect of our nature. And for me the ultimate reality is not a mere aspect or aspects, but it is an unity in

plunges a self-suggested horde of fakirs in hypnotic stupor. The agnostic maunderings of impotent despair are flung aside with a contemptuous smile by the young, the strong, the virile."—*Humanism*, p. viii. This is certainly young, indeed I doubt if at any time of life most of us have been as young as this.

¹ In *MIND*, N.S., No. 42, p. 211.

² *Principles of Logic*, pp. 459-460. On the position of practice in life see further the note at the end of this article.

which every distinction is at once maintained and subordinated. On the other hand, wherever the word truth has its meaning, that meaning to me cannot be reduced to bare practical effect. And at our human level, and throughout at least some tracts of our life, the words true and false have to me most certainly a specific meaning. The nature of this I cannot here attempt to point out, but I hold that it is other than the mere fact that an idea works or fails practically. It is on account of this denial, I presume, that I am to be termed an "intellectualist," and this denial I will now proceed to justify. The view that truth everywhere subserves practice directly seems to me contrary to fact; but, even where this is the case, truth itself is not merely practical. This distinction appears, as I have said, to be often ignored. At an early and unreflective stage of mind no idea will be retained unless it works practically, or unless at least it practically satisfies me. We can have at this level no reflexion on disappointment failure and falsehood. And hence I agree that here there is no truth except where an idea works practically. But to go from this to the conclusion that truth's essence even here lies wholly in such working, is a further step which to me seems not permissible. The idea works, but it is able to work not simply because it is there and because I have chosen it. It is able to work because, in short, I have chosen the right idea.

Everywhere in conation and will there is an idea which is opposed to existence. And this existence nowhere is characterless, but it is a determinate being. And the character of this being again is not something inert. On the contrary it is an element in the whole situation, and it dictates to my idea as well as submits to dictation. If my idea is the right one, and if it works, this, we may say, is because the nature of the whole situation selected it. My idea, I agree, then reacts, and I agree that it then makes the situation to be different. But to speak as if the entire nature of the situation were first made by the idea seems really extravagant. If my idea is to work it must correspond to a determinate being which it cannot be said to make. And in this correspondence, I must hold, consists from the very first the essence of truth. I will proceed to show this first on the positive side, and then again where in failure and in falsehood we meet the opposite of truth. But I shall take our experience now at a level more removed from its lowest point, and shall consider it at a stage where reflexion is possible.

(a) The fact which first offers itself is the case of finding

means to a positive end. I desire, let us say, to cross a stream in order to gather fruit. The stream is swollen, and there is hence a gap between my idea and its reality. On this let us suppose that I retain my general idea of crossing, and that other ideas as to the particular manner of crossing are suggested. This is in the main what we understand by finding means to an end. Now these ideas, I agree, may all be said to be practical ideas. My end will remain my crossing somehow, and the means will probably consist in my doing something so as to cross. But these means surely must correspond to the actual nature of the stream, and surely to suggest that my ideas manufacture that correspondence is absurd. The stream is wider lower down, so that there I may wade. The stream is full of rocks higher up, so that there I may leap. If I will only wait quietly the stream is falling of itself. If I will only sit still, my companion has promised that he will come with a float. My end is practical doubtless, and my means still are the idea of myself doing something—if at least you stretch that so as to include my waiting till something happens of itself or is done by another. But when you ask what it is which makes each idea right or wrong, you cannot exclude its agreement or its discord with fact other than my will. And to ignore this aspect of the case, or to treat this aspect as if it were something somehow immaterial, to my mind, I must repeat, is wholly unprofitable. In selecting my means I am forced to consider their relation to the facts, and, if my idea works, it is because of this relation which is not made by my idea. And it is in this relation that we have to seek the distinctive nature of truth. Or we may say that the whole situation, inward and outward, dictates to me the selection of such an idea as can work, and that hence to treat this *congé d'élire* merely as my act on the situation is a foolish pretence. Let us take again the case where I go hunting and where my end is the capture of some beast. I obviously here may have to reflect carefully on the nature of the means. Where the animal is, and what it is likely to do under certain conditions, all this I may have to infer from a general knowledge of its nature and from a variety of indications that I gather from facts now perceived. And, if others are to co-operate, I have to take account also of their natures and of their probable conduct. The whole of this is fact to which my idea has got first to correspond. It has, that is, first to be true as a condition of its working. On the other side doubtless the idea of the means is dependent on the end, and doubtless, if you remove the end, you remove at one stroke

the idea and its truth. But from this you cannot logically conclude that the entire truth was made by your end and your ideas. It would be as rational first to insist that without the given facts there are in fact no ideas and no truth, and then go on to infer that in the end truth and will consist barely in what comes to my mind.

(b) I shall be charged, I do not doubt, with idle insistence on the obvious. But where I understand little more than that there is a denial of what to me are plain facts, no course is possible to me except thus to insist on the obvious. And so I proceed to view the facts from their negative side. When, at a certain mental stage, I fail, I do not at this stage merely try again and again, but I retain my failures and use them to determine my conduct. My being carried away by the stream if I attempt to cross here, my falling amongst the rocks if I try to cross there, my being captured by my enemies if I remain where I am—these ideas remove possibilities and they qualify the situation by narrowing it. They are practical ideas, and in the end they may subserve another idea which actually works. But, taken in and by themselves, you can hardly say that they work directly. On the other hand, however indirectly, they do seem to make an assertion about things which are other than my will. And taken as ideas of my 'doing' they have to fall under the head of 'avoiding'. But that avoidance is based, I submit, on what things do to me. It depends on a character in things which hinders me or even actively makes me suffer. For we are not to say, I presume, that I avoid evils merely because of my desire to do something in the way of avoidance. We may see this more evidently where I am not engaged in any positive pursuit, but where a danger threatens me from which terrified I desire to escape. It is dusk and the man-eating tiger will be coming, and I do not know how to avoid him whether by this course or by that. And surely, in order to find some idea which will 'do,' I must before all things consider his nature and what he on his side is likely to do. The same thing is evident again where my enemies are human. My end is practical, but surely my ideas about the means—must be dictated to me by something which is clearly not myself. And this forced agreement of my ideas with a nature other than my volition is, I presume, that which in general we understand by truth.

And there are moments when nothing works and where every idea fails. I am starving, but I am helpless for I cannot climb to reach the fruit. I am dying of thirst, but my legs are broken and I cannot move to reach the water. I am

tortured by an internal pain which I can do nothing to assuage. And here I need not idly repeat my futile efforts until exhaustion and stupor supervene. I may realise my fate and I may become aware that this now is my doom.

✓ The nature of that which is opposed to my will has triumphed. Or I may see my companion in the jaws of some inevitable danger where I am impotent. This to me is true, it has whatever truth belongs to death pain and evil, but I hardly know in what sense it is an idea which works. You may possibly reply that suffering and death are undeniably practical, and that my idea at any rate exactly meets the practical situation. - But to me there is more sense in the old view that my idea meets the situation theoretically and not practically. The idea of a failure in another or of failure in myself surely here does not itself produce the failure, and, if it did so, surely that would be the worst failure of all. And to make here the agreement of my idea with facts into a practical success, would be the mark of insanity rather than of philosophy or common sense. The idea of avoidance is here an idea which obviously cannot carry itself out. And the reflexion that failure is but the deferred and assured coming of triumph, if such an idea were suggested to creatures in these straits, might seem to them the one idea which above all others neither works theoretically nor practically.¹

¹ It may be said that every idea, even of failure, works successfully in producing a corresponding attitude or other change in my body or some part of it. I agree that, to speak in general, an idea tends thus to express itself emotionally. This in brief is one aspect of an idea's general tendency to realise itself. But this way of realisation in emotional expression is not to be confounded with the other specific ways which we call thought and will. Every one, we may say, in practice would distinguish a gesture or a blush from a volition or a judgment. The mere emotional expression of an idea is in short not my act, and you cannot attribute it to my will. Again this emotional expression of the idea, if for the sake of argument we assume it everywhere to exist, cannot possibly, I presume, be more than generic. It must therefore fail to correspond to the individuality of the idea. And again it depends so much upon the psychical liveliness of the idea, that an idea counted false may possibly express itself more forcibly than an idea which is taken to be true. We should in short here have a doctrine in principle the same with Hume's theory of belief, and open to the objections which seem fatal to that theory. The emotional expression of an idea or of one aspect of an idea is, we may say, a mere incidental result from the strength and dominance of that idea or its aspect. Any attempt to find in it the specific essence of truth and falsehood in the end must break down. But in any case, so far as what is called Pragmatism is concerned, to fall back on such a doctrine would be suicidal. For this emotional expression is plainly not will. It is the working of an idea on me, and it is not my working. We have here a psychical effect and not properly an act of mine. It would (to pass to another point) be interesting to know how our new gospel conceives its

There is indeed an ancient doctrine for which no power in the end is mere force, and which finds no evil in the world except for self-will. And the self that can apprehend all force and all suffering as in the end will and love, does itself thus succeed and does triumph even in its own anguish and despair. And the way to this end, however hard, is at least familiar, for it is the open secret that has been revealed by the Teachers of the East, and, whatever you like to say against it theoretically, it is a faith which certainly can work. But this is the way which our new gospel of personal individualism seems to advertise as henceforth closed. At least if my ideas and my will, or the will and the ideas of any man or set of men, are to be the measure of truth, then, so far as I see, the reality cannot lie beyond the private ends of individuals. And to realise the self by self-surrender to the supreme will, must, I presume, be set down as at once irrational and immoral. For there is not, I understand, and there ought not to be any will which is supreme, and really sole master of the world, and lord of suffering and of sin and of death. And again in no possible case could any will which is quite external to my own become really and in truth something personal to myself.

But at this point our new gospel, it seems to me, begins to falter, and it seems evasively to point to an ambiguous way of escape. If the world and its power which confront me are the funded accumulations made by striving beings (MIND, N.S., 45, p. 94), then after all the world can be no force which is alien to my will. But such a plea to my mind sounds like trifling or like mockery. For to view ourselves as insects on a coral reef is hardly a solution which works. If the world in fact is hostile to my will, then it does not cease to be hostile because others like myself have had the same or a different experience before me. They have altered the world, I know, and they have improved it, if you will, but they have not altered it so that it does not oppose me.¹ No gratitude

relation to Dr. Bain's theory of belief. It might seem to have taken that theory, and, without considering the objections to which it is liable, to have gone beyond it by simply writing 'truth' for 'belief'.

Every idea of course works by inhibiting so far the action of other ideas. And, since these other ideas may be practical, every idea, if you please, is practical negatively. But on the other hand surely it is clear that the meaning of truth is something positive. Truth surely can never be barely negative, nor can you find its essence in its mere prevention of the happening of something else. In fact here, as everywhere, it is in the end nonsense to take anything as consisting merely in inhibition.

¹ I shall deal lower down with the apparent claim that my world has thus been actually made and not merely altered.

of mine for past efforts will transform the living fact, and no belief in some happier future, when I am past, can serve to change the actual present. If indeed to me there were no force in the world but the veiled love of God, if the wills in the past were one in effort and in substance with the one Will, if in that Will they are living still and still so are loving, and if again by faith, suffering, and love my will is made really one with theirs—here indeed we should have found at once our answer and our refuge. But with this we should pass surely beyond the limits of any personal individualism. For this we must have more than the mere accumulation of several efforts. We cannot rest in a God who is no more omnipotent than one of ourselves, and who, though animated, I dare say, by the best intentions, cannot answer for the unknown force which confronts himself and us.¹ And, as I understand, the remedy is for us to discard such perverted wants and such unnatural desires. We shall find our glad tidings in the unfailing advertisements of the new way in philosophy, where every doubt and all disease has found its certain cure, and where at last every tub can stand upright on its own bottom.

(II.) I will pass on to consider another aspect of the case. We often hear a cry which seems to set forth the virtues of practice. But, when before all things I seek to understand in what this practice consists, then I scarce can apprehend a word which to me is intelligible. And, since my ignorance and perhaps my bias is not peculiar to myself, I will venture without apology once more to lay bare the nakedness of my mind.

A young man frequently hears it said, why cannot you take up something practical? Why cannot you, in other words, place your first end in what is called a comfortable life, and seek to eat and to drink and to reproduce your species, while enjoying the social consideration and the amusements of the average man? And the young man may reply that, so far as he sees, this would not bring him happiness. He prefers to place his chief end perhaps in art or in science, or again in the excitement of the chase or of gaming or amours, or possibly, it may even be, in some form of mystical religion. And to seek my happiness, he would

¹ Instead of 'a God' I should perhaps have written 'a God or a set of gods'. Our new gospel seems not to have decided at present whether monotheism or polytheism is to be the creed of the future. I should be inclined to agree that from a religious point of view the difference in this case has no importance.

exclaim, however far away from what the world calls practical, how can there be for me any course more practical than this?¹ And evidently here there is a failure to use words on each side with a common meaning. Our confusion may be further heightened when we reflect on the one hand that everything in our lives must be practical. For conduct is practical, and nothing that we are and do can possibly, it seems, be external to conduct. But on the other hand in at least some men we seem to discover non-practical wants. We seem to find a desire for the cultivation of truth or beauty for their own sakes, or even a longing for the contemplative absorption in the eternal. And thus while on the one side every desire and every want must be practical, on the other side some practical aims seem to entail the subordination of practice.

These familiar doubts, idle to those minds which have risen far above doubt, to other minds have suggested serious questionings. And I will go on briefly to state that which has served as perhaps a sufficient answer. My practice may be called in general the alteration by me of existence inward and outward, and 'existence' we may understand as what happens or as the series of events. And since, whatever else it is, my whole life certainly is a process in time, certainly everything which I am or do has, or may have, this practical aspect. Our being is realised, we know, by maintaining ourselves and our race against natural accident and decay. We have to eat and to drink and to multiply our kind. Then again there is our life in the family and in society. We are born into and enter into wholes wider than ourselves, and in these the individual finds his own self in its connexion with other men, and has his being in their consideration and also their love for him. But now let us suppose further that a man is able to go even beyond this. Let us suppose him capable of pursuing and of enjoying truth and beauty for themselves, and able to find his own nature realised in the unselfish love of these objects. Such a supposition, I am aware, is in principle contrary to individualism, but our discordance with individualism (by whatever new name it likes to call itself) has begun long before such a point had been reached. However that may be, let us suppose that a man can in fact desire and can enjoy for its own sake what is beautiful and true. These objects on one side exist for his theoretical activity, and they involve obviously and necessarily an alteration of his personal existence. They and their pursuits are therefore practical, how intensely practical

¹ Cf. Prof. A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 317.

is known to all who have experience of the facts.¹ Alteration of existence is implied inseparably in the being of truth, but truth, to confine ourselves here to truth, has another side also. And, when you take in this side, you cannot say that the essence of truth consists in a change made in or made by this or that individual. The angles of a triangle may, you will, not exist outside of the geometer's head, but their equality to two right angles is hardly nothing but a present change made in him. The laws of the planets and stars, we believe, in part revealed themselves truly to Newton, but the revelation, if so, was something more than a mere personal event. It is only in poetry that America rose from the waves at the will of Columbus, and even in poetry the America which appeared was a thing found as well as done. There is for us no truth, we may say, save that which discovers itself to us. The finding of truth is on one side an alteration of the world, but this alteration on the other side does not contain the truth itself which is found. It is impossible to make the truth a mere deed and a mere outcome and a mere adjective of the person who discovers or enjoys it. As my theoretical activity it is a practical change in my existence, but as my object it has another character and a different purpose. Its essence cannot lie merely in that which I do either to myself or to the world.

The gospel of practice for the sake of practice and everything else for the sake of practice, makes, I doubt not, a good cry. But it will satisfy in the end only those who have not asked what practice is. Practice we have found to consist in my alteration of existence. Now, if we take this as our end, we seem to place the end in mere quantity of being and change. Our end must be being and doing, maintained and reproduced, without regard to any quality possessed by it, except of course so far as difference in quality goes to subserve quantity. But such an end is hardly what in general men seek or can desire, and it will, I think, be obvious to any one that in his own case he would not care for mere increase of being apart from quality. We might of course set up mere pleasure in abstraction as our end, and we might endeavour to subordinate consistently every other aspect of our being to this one reality. Truth and falsehood would in this way become mere increase and decrease of pleasure. And these characters would be no facts to be ascertained by an independent intellect, since the whole of their truth and

¹ There is an admirable passage on this subject in Balzac's *Cousine Bette*, which is, I hope, well known to the reader. The only reference I can give is to pp. 179-181 of vol. xvii. of the edition of 1865.

reality would have to consist in their accordance with my present feeling. This is a view which, so far as I know, no Hedonist among us has advocated,¹ and in any case it would hardly square with the gospel of practice. And hence, unless I am to take mere quantity of doing as my end, I can myself see in the end no sense in the cry of practice for practice' sake.

And, if I may be allowed to put on one side things which I am unable to comprehend, I would venture to state in a few words how I understand the relation of practice to life. The end I take to be the fullest and most harmonious development of our being, and, though I will not deny that this coincides with the largest amount of mere doing,² the latter aspect I must regard as but incidental. Now, if our being is to be realised, its main functions must be regarded as ends, and every side of our nature in being realised will thus assuredly be practical. For, to speak in the main, whatever we are and whatever we acquire, becomes and remains ours only on the condition that we are active and doing. Thus everything in life, to speak once more in the main, is a practical end, and every possible side of our life is practical. But among these ends and aspects there is on the other hand an important difference,³ for we are forced to deny in a sense that some of them are practical. Some of them, that is, do not involve the alteration of existence except incidentally, while with the rest this alteration is, in various senses and degrees, essential and vital. Eating and drinking, and life in the family and in society and the state, may be called practical essentially. Our actual existence in time and in space has in various senses to be changed by all of these functions. And in addition their contents can be said to fall within the world of what we do and make. Their product can be said in the main to qualify that existence which we produce and alter. And further the arts and sciences which subserve these "practical" ends, are themselves, so far as they subserve these, practical also. But the attitude of mere theory and of mere apprehension is on the other hand not practical. It has to alter things, but, so far as it remains independent, its chief end and main purpose does not consist in any such alteration. Truths must exist in a mind, and, to exist in it, they must come there, and, to speak roughly and in the main,

¹ Cf. *Appearance*, p. 374.

² I wish here neither to deny nor to assert this. The question is a difficult one.

³ I have further enlarged on this point in the Note appended to this paper.

they must also be brought there. And so of course, in order to exist, they must alter that mind. But the truth itself does not consist in its existence in me. Neither I nor any other man can make truth and make falsehood what they are. Truth may not be truth at all apart from its existence in myself and in other finite subjects, and at least very largely that existence depends on our wills. But, though I can find in truth the satisfaction of a want, and though I can recognise my own being in the possession of truth, yet on the other side I cannot regard its nature as subject to my will. If for its realisation a change in myself is indispensable, I cannot on the other hand say that its main being lies in that alteration of existence. While truth is mere truth, I do not even carry it out into the world. And to make its essence a bare quality or a mere deed of our minds is to destroy that essence.

The same thing holds again of what is beautiful in nature or in art. The nature of that is in principle not subordinate to an external end. We can make it to exist or appear, but we cannot on the other hand make it to be that which it is. Its character is something which is beyond my power, it is something which I must recognise and cannot alter. So far as it is a product it is a product which cannot be taken as the mere adjective of the function or process. Beauty in other words is from one side independent of our wills. It is an end the specific nature of which is not subject to our choice, and cannot consist in a relation to anything else which is so subject. And if truth and beauty have this character, and if on the other side truth and beauty are human ends, then clearly we have ends which are not practical. They are practical, that is to say, incidentally, but not in their essence. Thus on the one side these ends may be called independent, though on the other side they must involve human need and desire. And hence, if our life is to satisfy its desires, these ideal ends should be desired and be pursued for themselves. And, viewed in this way, it is clear that though practical they are still not subordinate to practice.

If we take things from another side, then all, as we saw, can fall under the practical end. For everything in life is subject to life as a whole, and the end of morality is to develop, to order and to harmonise, our human existence. There is no element therefore to which the moral end is unable to dictate, and even truth and beauty, however independent, fall under its sway. Beauty and truth therefore are at once dependent and free. The moral end dictates to us their pursuit and it sets limits to that pursuit. The space

which these objects are to occupy in my life, how far and how long it is right for me to follow them, nay even to some extent the kind of truth and beauty which I should ignore or should follow, all this, it is obvious, is or may be the affair of morality. But the nature of that which is to be beautiful or true falls outside of the moral control. It is the vision, and it is not the object, which is subject to our wills. The ideal does enter into my life and it makes a part of my existence, but it is only in one aspect that I can master it and subject it to my power. And the practical human end is, in very truth, to follow ends which in themselves assuredly are not all practical or all merely human.¹

Any such creed is perhaps as obsolete as it is old and familiar, and, if we believe the advocate of "pragmatism," it is but foolishness and falsehood. And yet in philosophy, if error is to be removed, it possibly after all should be removed by discussion. It is hardly mere darkness to be dispelled by the rising of some luminary however resplendent. And yet, since neither of us seems to understand what the other can be meaning, a rational discussion between the 'personal idealist' and any adherent of the old doctrine seems unattainable. There is a view that the independent use of the intellect is impossible, that the intellect has neither freedom nor any being of its own, and that, except so far as it consists in practice or again indirectly squints at practice, the intellect is nothing. This view to me at least seems contrary to the plain facts of human nature, and to me at least this view seems to end in nonsense. There is again a view that the independent use of the intellect is possible but is undesirable, and this view again, though less obviously absurd, seems to me indefensible. Certainly on my side I should insist that any one-sided development is not desirable. I should insist that the realisation of any aspect of human nature should, to speak in general, be limited by due regard for the whole. But to distort this truth into a vicious error, and to suppress wholly in its specific quality one main function of my being, this is to me a deplorable and inhuman

¹ We may put it thus, that in the end the practical end must be the Good, but that the Good, when you examine it, is plainly more than mere practice. Or from the other side we may say that in the end there is no criterion which is not practical, and that the true and the real will in the end fall under the Good. But, when we have shown this, we find ourselves forced on the other hand to make distinctions within the Good, and to recognise, as before, that the Good consists in more than practice. And practice itself, when we examine it, will be found even in itself (I cannot deal with this here) to involve and to depend upon judgment and truth.

mutilation. If you could show that the science and art which fails to squint at practice is an evil excrescence, and that like sexual aberration it perverts a desirable function, the case would be altered. But the loud assertion of the Personal Idealist¹ will not move those who have learned otherwise from the facts. And it will move them the less since they are convinced that the assertor, if he understood his own doctrine, must hold any end however perverted to be rational if I insist on it personally, and any idea however mad to be the truth if only some one is resolved that he will have it so.

The following of science for the sake of science and of art for the sake of art is, if I may repeat what I have accepted, to be kept within limits. Like every other side of human nature it is thus subordinate to the welfare of the whole, but on the other hand within its own limits it should be perfectly free. This relative freedom is even dictated by the interest of the spiritual commonwealth; and hence this freedom is in the end the most practical course, if we take 'practice' in anything but a limited sense. And it will be a mistake in practice after all, when you take our world as a whole, to seek to banish from it the pursuit of unworldly objects and ends. But you do in effect condemn these pursuits, you vitiate their nature and you destroy them, when you sentence them to keep throughout at least one eye upon the world. On the one hand obviously our available supply of energy is limited. On the other hand, if due regard is had to this limit, the independent cultivation of any one main side of our nature promises advantage, for it promises (at least to those who hold to the unity of that nature) to react and to contribute to the general good.² We believe in short in relative freedom, and we do not believe in divorce or in one-sided suppression. And we do not believe that the way to advance our human nature is to subordinate all of it to one aspect—I do not care what that aspect is. At the beginning, I agree, there is no distinction between theory and practice, and again I am clear that there is none in the end.

¹ *Personal Idealism*, p. 85. I shall briefly notice lower down the difficulty which arises with regard to a knowledge that truth ought not to be independent. Clearly this truth also is dependent, but it is hard to say on what.

² I have of course not forgotten that there are 'developments' of human nature which are undesirable and vicious. Why these are undesirable is a question which I cannot discuss here. The answer in general is that such things not only are contrary to the interest of our whole nature, but also are hostile to the realisation of that very side of it to which they belong. They therefore are not in the best sense developments but are perversions of our nature.

But on the other hand our human life is to me assuredly neither all beast-like nor all divine. And, if I am so far condemned to follow a philosopher who lived before the coming of the new light, I am for my part well content to share in his darkness.

But I shall doubtless be told that the intelligence springs from and depends upon need and desire. There is no understanding, it will be urged, and no truth, except where there is an interest ; and since interest and want must be admitted to be practical, we have here a clear proof that all in the end is subordinate to practice. To myself however this proof adduced by the logic of Pragmatism seems hardly to require any serious discussion. To me it seems obvious that, if some function belongs to our nature, there will be a need and desire which correspond to that function. Hence, if the free use of the intellect is really one aspect of our being, we shall in consequence have a need and a desire for that use. And how this can prove that no interest is in the end intellectual, I fail wholly to perceive. There is an attempt apparently to pass direct from "my want must be practical" to the required conclusion with regard to the object of my want. But since the doctrine attacked denies this conclusion, and since it holds that interest and want, practical on one side, may nevertheless be directed on an object which in itself is not practical, there is literally, so far as I can see, no argument at all. All that I can find is the sheer assumption that a certain view is mistaken, coupled apparently with an entire failure to apprehend in what that view essentially consists. And you might as well come to me and offer to argue that I cannot want to look at a star, because my vision and my want are always terrestrial. And you might as well demonstrate to me that plainly I can love nothing beyond me, because my love after all must be a piece of myself. But the Personal Idealist, I imagine, is likely to smile at my belated logic.

(III.) I will now attempt briefly to point out the various senses in which we may try to subordinate truth to practice. We have already learnt the ambiguity of any assertion that truth is practical, but it may repay us to realise this ambiguity more in detail, even if that detail is far from exhausting the subject.

(1) We may affirm that ' reason is the slave of the passions '. We may hold that, except to find means to a foreign end, truth is (a) idle and useless or (b) even impossible. (a) The first of these statements does not deny the possibility of a

truth which is merely theoretical. It denies it only so far as to insist that such a truth is worthless, and that it therefore does not deserve to be called truth. (b) The second statement on the other hand appears to make an unqualified denial. But it seems inconsistent with itself so far as it assumes an independent knowledge of means; for any such knowledge would appear to contain truth which so far is theoretical. Further the doctrine that the world and my nature are of such a kind that all truth must be practical, appears itself, so far, to be a truth which is theoretical and therefore is no truth.

{ (2) We may from this proceed to a position with which we all are more or less familiar. Truth, we may hear, is after all nothing but working hypothesis. We have truth when we can say of an idea that it will 'do,' and an idea will 'do' only when, and so far as, it will work. There is, in short, no meaning in truth other than the idea which works best. This general statement however admits of more than one interpretation. (a) It might mean that truth is the idea which works best theoretically. There is in other words here no truth in the sense of something which is given as absolute. There are no data which we may assume and on which we may build as certain each by itself. All is material, in short, with which we experiment ideally, and the ideal experiment which in the end best satisfies itself and us is what we mean by truth. It is however obvious that, with so much, truth has not become merely practical. Indeed such a position would be consistent with an extreme intellectualism. And on the other hand the doctrine that truth is what works, usually means to make truth the mere servant of something else. We may therefore pass on to consider another meaning. (b) The order and series of my sensations may be taken for granted, and truth may be regarded as a construction which is formed out of these. The end for which the construction is made may remain unspecified, and at present at least this point may be ignored, for in any case the doctrine has failed to make truth merely practical. Truth is our construction, but truth is forced to start with an order of sensations. This order is in the main independent of my choice and my will, and is a given fact which dictates to me and to my choice of means. It is hence hard to see how such a fact can be excluded and left outside of truth, or how again such a fact is merely practical. "Reality which in the outer order confronts me is such, that to reach a certain end I am obliged to hold for true this or that"—a truth like this, I agree, is highly imperfect, but I cannot see that it has ceased to be so far

theoretical. Or, if we enlarge our doctrine by ceasing to lay a one-sided stress on what is outer, and if we call truth the ideal construction based on the entire order of what happens, we have still, so far as I see, made no advance in principle. Whatever end we may desire, the means to this end are still dictated by something which we have to call matter of fact; and this knowledge as to matter of fact still remains and must remain at least in part theoretical. And our knowledge further with regard to this entire state of things seems once more truth which has not itself the character assigned by us to all truth. (c) We may go on therefore to seek a remedy in the removal of our one-sided prejudice. We may reject the limitation of knowledge to the mere world of events which happen, and may deny the claim of this world to be taken as an ultimate foundation. Reality, or the Good,¹ will now be the satisfaction of all the wants of our nature, and theoretical truth will be the perceptions and ideas which directly satisfy one of those wants, and so indirectly make part of the general satisfaction. This is a doctrine which to my mind commends itself as true, though it naturally would call for a great deal of explanation. But, with this, evidently truth is not subordinate to practice. It has a practical aspect, no doubt, but its whole essence is not practical. Its end is an element in the general end, and is in this sense subordinate; but its end is not subordinate to any other partial aspect of the whole. And practice on its side will be no more than such a partial aspect. Hence, if truth is to be practical, this whole view must be given up or else must be modified. And it must, I presume, be modified by the denial of any want save that which in the end is practical in its essence. Truth will therefore once more become dependent and subordinate, and will consist in the ideas which serve as external means to the practical end. But, with this, we seem thrown back once more into the midst of our old difficulties. For the nature of things does not seem to depend upon and to consist in subserviency to the practical want and choice of myself or of any set of men. And on the other side truth seems forced to take account of the whole nature of things. In other words I may choose to isolate what I call my practical end, but the means to that end must be prescribed largely by something other than my choice. And since truth is forced to express something which thus dictates to practice, the essence of truth can hardly consist

¹ The Good is here taken once more in its highest sense, a sense in which it has ceased to be merely practical and has ceased to be merely good.

in subservience to the practical end. We may perhaps put the same thing by asking how, if truth has no independence, there is in the end any possibility of real argument or of real error. And our knowledge of the whole situation and of the nature of truth seems once more incompatible with the position which we have thus given to knowledge.¹

(3) A more radical view is the doctrine that reality in the end is will, and that intelligence has somehow a secondary position. A view of this kind was upheld in the first quarter of the last century by more than one well-known philosopher, and it has naturally been subjected to a good deal of criticism. This is a point which our new gospel seems to think calls for little attention, and I could not myself be expected here to enter into it at length, even were I able to do so. I may however be permitted to state briefly the main reasons which have always made it impossible for me to accept in any form the primacy of will.

(a) Will in my judgment must imply something in the self or beyond the self which is other than will, and, apart from this 'other,' I cannot find any sense or meaning in the 'will' either of man or of God. There is to me no thinking without something which thinks and again something which is thought of—something in either case which is other than mere thought. And in the same way there is no willing except that which both proceeds from something and changes something—something again in either case which is other than will. And I may add that to me will involves not only perception but also idea, and that I find this hard to reconcile with a secondary position of intelligence.

(b) The necessity for an 'other' may lead to an admitted plurality of wills, and in any case without such a plurality the whole doctrine tends in effect to negate itself. But on the other hand the plurality, if admitted, raises difficulties which to my mind are insuperable. If will demands a perceived 'other' which it alters, how is this to consist merely in another will? To me it seems that each will must presuppose in the other will something which is more than bare willing. My volition to me is a process of passage from idea into existence. Hence, as soon as and as far as that passage is realised, my volition in the proper sense has ceased to exist. The outer

¹ The question how far anywhere we are to use working ideas the nature of which is to be dictated in some sense by a practical end, is a question I do not discuss. The point, I agree, is both interesting and important, and it deserves a discussion which would be impossible within the limits of this paper. I am concerned here simply with the assertion that all truth is in the last resort merely practical.

existence which is the expression of my will is in a sense certainly my will, but in the strict sense it is not my will. Thus I do not understand how the inner side of another will is to serve as that perceived 'other' which my will demands, while again, if the other will is taken as a perceived existence for me, I must understand it to be something which is more than and is other than mere volition.¹ And we have already seen that, if you confine yourself to my will, that demands both an 'I' and an 'other' as conditions of the process. Further with an admitted plurality of wills there is a difficulty with regard to their relation. The relation (that seems evident) cannot be the mere adjective of either of its terms. But, if it falls beyond each, then neither term by itself is all reality, and there is at once a question on our hands with regard to their 'togetherness' or unity. This again apparently must be will; but, if it is will, I do not see how it is in the end to have an 'other'. If on the contrary it is not will, then, since we hardly can take the unity as barely unreal, reality seems at once to include more than will.

Will in fact implies all reality, and in this it is like thought, for in thinking once more you can find all reality. You can, that is, identify a complex whole with one of its aspects, and then naturally in that aspect you can go on to find everything contained or implied. But for myself I see no advantage in such a procedure. And I see no advantage in rushing blindly from the rejection of one extreme to the acceptance of the other, especially since I have now been

¹ The fundamental difficulty I take to be this, that will must imply and must presuppose what is other than itself. Thus on the one hand bare will is no will, while on the other hand, as soon as will has ceased to be bare it has become something more than will. This main difficulty is, to me, at once radical and insuperable, and it shows itself in the relation between will as inward and as carried out. If you do not here admit an existence which in some sense is more than mere will, you, so far as I see, make will an unmeaning word. Thus with a plurality of wills, if each will is to have any known world outside itself, you are on the above ground forced to admit some existence beyond it which is more than any mere will. For I cannot see how, if each will has no outside of its own, each is going to serve as the outside for another. This idea may seem plausible, but I at least cannot carry it out. And if, leaving this, you assert that will itself is a whole which possesses in itself both an inward and an outward side, then I do not understand what you are to reply when some one else chooses to assert that this same whole is intelligence or feeling.

To find the solution of the world's problem in a number of wills, which serve amongst themselves each to the others as outward existence, is, I agree, at first sight a very promising adventure. For myself I have never been able to surmount the obstacles which I have mentioned. But it would be a pleasure to me to learn that they can be surmounted.

acquainted with both extremes for more years than I care to recall.

If further we give to intelligence a secondary place, we have to reconcile this fact with our knowledge that it is so. We may say that Will possesses an awareness of itself, and on this awareness we may base our philosophy of Will. But, not to speak of the difficulty which arises from the evident or at least the apparent fact of other experience and knowledge, it is hard to see how this awareness can justify its position. For we are in a difficulty on one side if we regard it as secondary. On the other side if this knowledge and this truth is to be primary, the secondary place assigned to all intelligence seems hardly intelligible.

(4) I must pass from this attempt to identify reality in the end with will. For the Will, which is reality, is not for such a view my mere individual will. And it is my individual will with which, so far as I understand the matter, we have to do when we come to Prof. James and his followers. At least, if it is not *my* will which makes reality and truth to be what they are, I hardly see what can be left of the gospel which they preach. I have already noticed what to myself appears a mere endeavour to compromise. If you take the world to be a funded accumulation made by striving beings (MIND, N.S., 45, p. 94), you unite in one creed, it seems to me, every opening to objection. In the first place, since this fact is not your mere individual will, you either are confronted with a reality which is other than your will, or else you must accept a real identity between this existing will and yours. And what then has become of individualism and of pluralism and of 'personal idealism' I am unable to guess.¹ And further your knowledge of the fact of this accumulation, on what does that knowledge rest? Is it dictated to you by a fact which is other than your will? Then, so far as I can judge, the whole doctrine has in principle vanished. Does it depend on and consist in your individual want and choice, and is it *this* which in the end both is and makes all reality and truth? It is strange, if

¹ The self-elected leader of our Personal Idealists seems at times to fall back on the old and well-known view, that truth is merely what happens to prevail, merely those sensations and ideas which happen to enforce themselves among a particular set of men, and that truth has no meaning which is other than this. He even appears to be under the impression that this doctrine is new as well as salutary. But, for myself, I could never see that whatever is the result of a crude interpretation of Darwinism must therefore be novel. And when the same writer preaches that Man (with a capital) is to be the measure, I should not infer that he has asked himself what in the end this capital is to mean.

so, that you should seem unable to say what you mean, and should fly for refuge to the unexplained phrase of 'conditions'. It is useless again to offer a reference to Aristotle and to Fichte, for there is more than one reason why such a reference gives no satisfaction. The preachers of a new gospel should, in short, be ready with payment in cash. And, when they seek to put me off with a cheque drawn on their account with Moses and the prophets, I take it as a practical admission of insolvency.

If the follower of the new way desires to be consistent, he must take courage, it seems to me, to face his obvious conclusion. Reality and truth are what I want and are that which at any time I choose to make them. I am omnipotent, that is, in a sense in which the God of Christian theology is not omnipotent. For I can make and I can unmake fact and truth at my caprice, and every vagary of mine becomes the nature of things. This insane doctrine, so far as I see, is what consistency demands, but I cannot attribute it even to the protagonist of Personal Idealism. For, apart from other inconsistencies, even he appears to believe that, to gain immortality, he must lead others through magazine articles and circulars to be of one mind with himself as to life after death. And since, to speak for myself, I am not clear that I desire such immortality, I congratulate myself the more on having declined, it is true on other grounds, to co-operate in what seemed to me a foolish business.

The new gospel doubtless to myself has not made itself intelligible, but I have not found any one else who is able to understand it.¹ I do not see how it can meet old and familiar objections, and I am even forced to venture so far as to doubt its novelty. The one thing I cannot doubt is that we ought to have more explanation and less self-advertisement. It does not really help us when we hear from Mr. Schiller a perpetual cry that there is no philosopher but Prof. James and that Prof. James has a prophet. And it does not help

¹ Mr. A. Sidgwick, the reviewer of *Humanism* in the last number of MIND, appears to welcome and embrace the offered gospel as both important and new. At the same time he appears to admit that he also is unable to give any coherent account of it, and he seems to allow in effect that he does not know what in the end it comes to and really means. If, like Mr. Sidgwick, I claimed to be the champion of philosophical scepticism (MIND, N. S., No. 11), I naturally might join with him in celebrating the defeat of reason and the triumphal advent of the unintelligible. What however to my mind Mr. Sidgwick fails to explain is how this defeat of reason is to be the assured victory of Pragmatism as a rational theory.

to hear from Prof. James (on his part not to be outdone) that, if Mr. Schiller would not exhaust himself by excess in facetiousness, he would produce a philosophy as probably classical as it would be certainly inspired (*MIND*, N.S., 45, p. 94). I forget before how many blasts of the trumpet the walls of Jericho fell, but the number, I should judge, has already been much exceeded. The walls of Jericho, so far as I see, have no intention of moving, and the dwellers in Jericho tend irreverently to regard the sound as the well-known noise which comes from the setters forth of new pills or plasters. In this particular they are wrong, but I think that at least in general they are right to refuse to connect philosophy with the sound of the trumpet. And there is a thing which, in his zeal and in the goodness of his heart, Prof. James may have forgotten. It is perhaps true that a man is never written down except by himself. But it is certain that a writer can be discredited by the extravagance and the vulgarity of his disciple, if at least he does not see his way to disconnect himself from it.¹

I will recall some beliefs which our new gospel seems called on to meet. Practice is a necessary aspect of human nature and of the whole of things, but practice is not the whole of things nor is it the entirety of human nature. It is a pernicious error to set up one aspect of our being (I do not care what that aspect is) as an end by itself to which everything else is subordinate. Our nature is complex, and on the other hand our nature has and ought to have an unity, but its unity is not to be found by setting up one element as absolute, and by turning all the rest into mere external means. Further it is true that any one-sided expenditure of our limited energy is so far hurtful. And it is true that in the interest of the whole such expenditure must be limited. But it is wrong to conclude from this that within its own limits no element is to have free play, and that the whole in short is best served by the work of slaves. And, before a man lays down the law as to practice, it might be better if he told us what in the end he takes practice to mean. And before we rush or drift from a rejection of 'intellectualism' to a setting up of 'voluntarism,' we might perhaps inquire

¹ If the reader will look, for instance, at the article on 'Useless Knowledge' in *MIND*, N.S., No. 42, he will hardly, I think, be of opinion that what I have said above is uncalled for, or that it goes too far. Vulgarity doubtless is a matter of sense and feeling, but, where Plato and Aristotle are concerned, there will, I think, be few persons whose sense and feeling will be that of the writer of the above article.

whether after all we are inevitably condemned to choose between conflicting abstractions.¹

The contention that truth and falsehood depend on my will is to the last degree ambiguous, and it may end in what is unmeaning or is plainly false. To make the whole essence of truth consist in a choice made by this or that person subverts the very nature of truth. On the other hand to treat the will of others, or to treat the result of any past volitions as being my will and choice, seems really a thoughtless attempt at compromise. Finally the essence of will requires an 'other' which is not will, and without this 'other' bare will like bare intellect ceases to be itself. Itself is reduced in either case to vacancy and to nothingness. And the question of this 'other' cannot be disposed of by unexplained phrases, and still less can it be met by any appeal to authority. And once more, if knowledge is known to be secondary, the fact of this knowledge itself calls for explanation.

It is well to protest against one-sided intellectualism and to insist on the reality and on the worth of practice. It is well to lay stress on the defects of Monism and on the positive claims of Individualism and Pluralism. Such protests against one-sidedness are perhaps never out of place. Such criticisms, even where they are not deserved, can per-

¹ *Personal Idealism*, it seems to me, supplies us with two striking illustrations of the tendency to avoid Seylla and to find a haven in Charybdis. The Rev. Dr. Bussell (pp. 337-368), seeking to protect our threatened morality, declares open war upon Orientalism and Mysticism. But even a layman may venture to remind Dr. Bussell that theologians, perhaps as learned and as pious as himself, have held that mere morality is not the highest thing. And certainly a layman may wonder how even a Doctor of Divinity can apparently persuade himself that to strive and to cry and to 'hustle' morally is the chief doctrine of the Gospels and is the main secret of Jesus.

The Rev. Dr. Rashdall, whose work is however very different indeed both in spirit and in kind, offers another illustration of the self-same tendency (pp. 390-391). The omnipotent and omniscient infinite God of Christian theology has of course given rise to well-known difficulties. And an exit from these difficulties may naturally be sought by the removal of one or more troublesome attributes. If God is made finite, and, I presume, in part ignorant and in part impotent, and in short is reduced in principle to the level of one creature among others, certain objections, it is clear, will at once lose their force. Thus, if you want to treat God as one person over against others, your readiest course is to deny that he is infinite. And if you wish to relieve any person of moral responsibility, it is a well-known expedient to seek to deprive him either of knowledge or of power. But there are unfortunately obvious objections and difficulties on the other side. And these obvious difficulties, I presume, were present to and moved the minds of the more orthodox theologians. In any case surely they exist, and surely there can be no excuse for ignoring them.

haps do no harm; and they can never perhaps fail to be more or less deserved. But these protests and these criticisms, it seems to me, are one thing, and the setting up and the preaching of some counter-onesidedness is surely another thing. And before anything, no matter what it is, is proclaimed as a new gospel, it will be better, I think, to ask if account has been taken of objections, objections which at least exist, even if they are not old and obvious.

NOTE.—It is better perhaps, even at the cost of some repetition, to add a few words on the difference between practical and non-practical activity. The doctrine which I have advocated is briefly this, that the above difference exists and that on the other hand it is not absolute.

There is in the first place no activity which in the end is merely practical, and the merely practical would in the end be nothing real. It would, so far as I see, be the maintenance and alteration of existence in complete abstraction from the quality of the existence and the change. Its end would be to produce the greatest quantity of bare doing. How far such an ideal is in principle self-consistent, I will not inquire, for certainly it is an ideal which no one would accept, no one at least who understood clearly what it means. And the assumption that such a practical activity exists anywhere must be rejected. You will find no creature out of whose life you can strike quality as irrelevant. However low you descend you will reach no stage where the ‘what,’ that is sought and done, is subordinate to bare doing, and except as a means to bare doing is worthless.

And that at least not everything in life is thus practical or a mere means to practice seems manifest when we glance at the facts of life. We need not appeal here to that which in the narrower sense is intellectual or æsthetic. The pleasure of rest after accomplished labour, the song that gives vent to the joy in being, the heightened self-feeling from the perceived presence of one’s kind—it seems strange to insist that these things are barely practical. For myself I prefer to think that each creature has its own quality and its especial delight, and that in the quality of that which fills its self it finds and it seeks its own fulfilment.

This is a view which, I admit, I did not learn from philosophy, and, even if it were refuted by philosophy, I could not forget what I imbibed in my youth. I learnt that Jehovah found his work good, and took pleasure in it because it was so, and not merely because his own activity had been something extreme, or because (as a Personal Idealist might say) he had been ‘young strong and virile’. And I learnt from

the poets that every life in its own quality partakes of the divine. There is nothing so humble or so vile as to have no nature of its own in which it finds happiness, but every creature realises, however strangely, what is at once its special being and something beyond it. And every creature rejoices not merely because so much is in doing or has been done, but because its own need is satisfied or because the object of its own particular desire has become reality.

Any such doctrine is divided by a chasm from the creed of the Personal Idealist, the Personal Idealist, that is, who comprehends his own principle. To his mind, when the male creature is drawn towards its mate, there is no feeling of an over-mastering end beyond self. There is no object to which passion ascribes, for however fleeting a moment, an infinite worth. Nor is there a common existence where love, however imperfect and rude, gives in an object the abiding sense of an inward contentment. In the view of the Personal Idealist no object counts for any more than a worthless means to one's own mere activity. The object is recognised as something which is good barely because it serves the turn, as something which in short has value just so far as it is found to be practicable (*Pers. Id.*, p. 98). The ideal is, in short, the abstraction of activity and of function from the quality of its object. This abstraction represents perhaps to most of us the essence of that which is false in theory and sordid in conduct. And the reason why the Personal Idealist is unaware of such a radical collision, is that he has made no attempt to realise the true meaning of his own doctrine.¹

On the one hand no activity is barely practical. There is in the end no activity which exists for its own sake as a process, without any regard for its own nature and quality, and in abstraction from all that can be regarded as a product. On the other hand we may say that in the end all activity is practical. For there is nothing which is apart from process and change in existence. And in one of its aspects it is possible to view the whole Universe as a will which everywhere asserts itself practically. Between that which is practical and that which is not practical we thus seem in the end unable to maintain any difference.

And there is in truth no such difference which is absolute. On the other side a relative distinction may be useful and necessary, and I will point out the principle on which this may be drawn. If you like to say that the difference in

¹The passage referred to, which deals with Identity, is obviously full of intellectual confusion, whatever we may think of it otherwise as a sample of academical literature.

any given case is a matter of degree, to some extent I am able to accept that contention.

As against a non-practical activity my activity is practical when and so far as its product directly qualifies the existence which is altered. When I am active it is plain that I make a change in my existence. Now can the product of my activity be taken as the adjective of my changed existence? So far as this can be done my activity is practical, and otherwise not so. When I dig the ground I make a change in my world, and it is my world which so far is altered. When I morally order myself, the moral arrangement becomes the adjective of my own existence. When I eat and drink, the result is that food and drink have been consumed, and that on the other side I am changed by having eaten and drunk. When I unite with other men in supporting and developing a social community, the result of what we do is, at least in the first instance, an adjective of our organised existence. Thus and so far the above activities are practical distinctively. On the other side when I perceive a horse that is present, or think of one that is absent, certainly by my so perceiving or thinking my existence is changed, but the alteration cannot be said to consist in the horse. For my perception or thought has not, on any sane theory, brought the horse into being. My activity therefore is so far not practical. And when after digging the ground I contemplate it, and when I say 'My work is good,' my activity here has ceased to be practical. For I can hardly so far be taken to have altered the ground or myself, and to have given to either of them a new quality not owned before. And, in short, all apprehension, whether theoretical or in the widest sense æsthetic, will fail to be practical except incidentally. It is practical only so far as what comes in it is the adjective of that existence into which it has come and which it has changed. Thus an activity is not practical because existence has been changed by it. It is practical only so far as the changed existence can be taken as qualified by the product of the activity. And again in a secondary sense anything is practical so far as it is taken as subserving a practical change. On the other hand, so far as the change made is, in a word, a revelation, to that extent the change is not practical. Thus the apprehension of an object is never merely practical. Again when I make a spade purely for the sake of digging, the end is practical, and a perception of the means, though not practical itself, is subordinate to practice. But, when I adorn the handle of the spade and so regard it with pleasure, my perception and my pleasure have ceased to be practical.

For the spade has now been revealed to me so far as a joy in itself. And it is an object which, apart from desire for its possession, we may call 'in itself desirable'. Wherever, in short, in the life of the family or of society, wherever in love morality and religion or beauty and truth, I have a product which is more than a mere quality of what is altered, I have something which so far goes beyond practice. I so far have something which is a revelation and is not a mere doing or something done. But we have entered here on a theme which goes far beyond the limits of this article.

In any case the abstraction of mere doing is not a rational end. The good, in other words, so far as it is good in itself, is so far not *merely* practical. And as good in itself, we may believe, it is revealed in some measure even to the humblest. And as good in itself, which in different senses and in various degrees is more than the mere adjective of passing events and of finite existence, it is apprehended by and becomes clear to the human intellect. On the other hand I must repeat that no such distinction is absolute. Thus to the religious mind everything which is good is but the bringing to light of God's perfection and glory ; and yet to the same religious mind nowhere is God more really present than in that will for good which in myself and others makes changes in the world. This double nature and aspect of things will remain foolishness to the Personal Idealist, and it cannot be held consistently in human life ; but the constant sense of it together with the endeavour to realise it in thought, may perhaps be said to make the life of philosophy. And thus philosophy is hard, while to think one-sidedly and to make theories which ignore the deepest instincts of our nature, is not so difficult. Philosophy always will be hard, and what it promises even in the end is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision. But its certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension of the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexity and all its unity and worth. And I have not myself cared to ask if philosophy suffers violence, or lavishes after all its best gifts on 'the young the strong and the virile'.

II.—MEINONG'S THEORY OF COMPLEXES AND ASSUMPTIONS (II.).

BY B. RUSSELL.

MEINONG's book, *Ueber Annahmen*, is very important, for it introduces to notice a hitherto almost wholly neglected class of facts, and adduces such a wealth of evidence in their favour that their existence, henceforward, can hardly remain open to question.

The work is divided into nine chapters : On first principles, the characteristic functions of the sentence, the most obvious cases of assumptions, inferences with assumptions, the objectivity of the psychical, the apprehension of objects of higher order, the Objective (*das Objectiv*), the psychology of desire and value, elements of the psychology of assumptions. The last two of these chapters, however important in themselves, are devoted chiefly to themes lying outside epistemology, and will therefore be omitted in the following discussions ; the other chapters all contain much that no theory of knowledge can safely neglect.

Chapter i. defines the class of facts to be dealt with. Two marks distinguish judgment from mere presentation : one is belief or conviction, the other is a certain attitude in regard to the opposition of affirmation and negation. Now although the first of these marks always implies the second, the second does not always imply the first : the main thesis to be established is, that affirmation and negation can occur without conviction, and do so occur in what are to be called "assumptions" (*Annahmen*) (pp. 2-3). An assumption or hypothesis might seem at first sight to be a mere presentation, but this view Meinong, erroneously in my opinion, believes to be capable of disproof. Direct perception alone, he remarks, now seems to him sufficient to establish the difference between a supposition and a presentation ; but a formal proof can be obtained from the case of negative assumptions, as, for instance, "Suppose the Boers had not been conquered".

Negation is never a matter of presentation: this may be taken as self-evident (p. 6). But how, in that case, are we to deal with such notions as "not-red"? These are commonly regarded as presentations or concepts. But if so, is the negative element in the act, the content, or the object? Plainly not in the act or content, for we cannot have two kinds of presentation of one object. Thus we shall have to assume a negative object "not-red," and this will have to be an object of higher order, for it cannot be thought of without at the same time thinking of red (pp. 6-8). If there are negative objects, they are plainly not objects of experience. To conceive not-A, we require not only A, but also another object M, of which it is judged that M is not A.¹ We might suppose that the negative, though a product of judgment, is itself an object of presentation, which can be apprehended without judgment, like "different from A". And this might tempt us to identify diversity and negation; but here inspection shows that we should be mistaken: "there is no *perpetuum mobile*" does not mean "whatever exists differs from the *perpetuum mobile*"; and "*x* is not an *a*" cannot, by any analysis, be found to contain diversity. Consequently negation is a genuine element in a negative judgment (pp. 9-11). Returning now to our supposed object not-A, this, being an object of higher order, and not an object of experience, would have to be a well-founded object. But in that case, it would have to be connected necessarily with its fundament; yet many negations, e.g., "stones do not rise," have no necessity. Consequently not-A is not a well-founded object, and is therefore not an object at all (pp. 12-13). It is true that "something of which the judgment holds that it is not red" is a negative object, which we may call not-red; but it involves the negative judgment and its relation to that of which it holds, and such psychological and epistemological elements could hardly be involved in "not-red" without being quite plainly visible, whereas, when we examine so-called negative presentations, we find (except perhaps in rare cases) no trace of any such roundabout process. Thus it is to be concluded that the opposition of yes and no makes no difference to the *act* of presentation, is only to be applied in an artificial manner to the object and therefore to the content of presentation, and never arises within mere presentation (pp. 13-14).

¹Observe that the M here must be, in mathematical language, variable: i.e., no particular object will fulfil the purpose, but the notion "any object" is required.

The above argument underlies much of what follows, and must therefore be examined with some minuteness. The contention derived from necessity is open to the same objection as was urged above in the same connexion ; and if this objection is valid, the whole argument, as a piece of reasoning, collapses. But further points remain. In the first place, such an expression as "not-red" is ambiguous, for it may apply to whatever is not red, or to whatever is not redness. In the latter sense, the thing which is red is included under "not-red". And in this sense, diversity does seem prior to, or at least co-ordinate with, negation. If A is an object, and not-A means "whatever is not identical with A," then not-A means "whatever is diverse from A". Now diversity may, of course, be defined as the negation of identity ; but this course, though suitable to formal logic, is perhaps hardly reconcilable with inspection, according to which diversity would by most people be judged fundamental. If, on the other hand, A is a predicate, not-A will usually mean whatever does not have the predicate A. It is quite necessary to keep these cases apart in considering not-A, for they give quite different kinds of objects. But the second, if not the first, involves the notion "something of which the proposition so-and-so is false". Meinong appears to reject such a meaning for not-A, on the ground that it involves psychological and epistemological elements. For my part, I cannot see that any such are involved : of any object x , if A is a predicate, either " x has the predicate A" or " x does not have the predicate A" will be true quite objectively. But this raises the question whether propositions are psychological, to which I shall return later. Assuming, for the present, that they are not, it will follow that not-A, when A is a predicate, is also a predicate, and is just as much an object as A is, but an object which is a complex.

Admitting, as it seems we must, that negation can only be derived through propositions, there is an important distinction to be made, without which confusions will become almost unavoidable. To deny a proposition is not the same as to affirm its denial. The case of an assumption will itself make this clear. Given any proposition p , there is an associated proposition not- p . Either of these may, as Meinong points out, be merely supposed or assumed. But when we deny p , we are not concerned with a mere assumption, and there is nothing to be done with p that is logically equivalent to assuming not- p . And direct inspection, I think, will show that the state of mind in which we reject a proposition is not the same as that in which we accept its negation. Again,

the law of excluded middle may be stated in the form : If p is denied, not- p must be asserted ; this form, it is true, is too psychological to be ultimate, but the point is, that it is significant and not a mere tautology. Logically, the notion of denying a proposition p is irrelevant : it is only the truth of not- p that concerns logic. But psychologically, it would seem, there are two states of mind which both have p for their object, one affirming and the other denying ; and two other states of mind, having not- p for their object, one affirming and the other denying. The assumption of p or not- p again has the same object as the affirmation or denial, but here the object is merely considered, not affirmed or denied.

The importance of the above distinction, in the present case, lies partly in the help which it affords in deciding a question as to which Meinong, though he nowhere discusses it, now appears to me to have decided rightly, whereas Frege, who approaches the subject through logic, has apparently come to the opposite conclusion.¹ The question is this : Does an assumption have a different object from the corresponding judgment, or does it merely have a different attitude to the same object (the proposition) ? The case of belief and disbelief shows that it is possible to have different attitudes to the same object, and thus allows us to accept the view, which is *prima facie* the correct one, that there is no difference in the object. I have discussed elsewhere² the problems raised by this decision in the case of inference and hypothetical propositions.

One other preliminary point remains. Is there, in addition to the assumption and the assertion of a proposition, another attitude, in which the proposition is merely the object of a presentation ? Meinong decides this question in the negative, for he holds that there is no presentation of a proposition or a complex (*v. inf.*), and that "the ill man" and "the man is ill," of which the first is an assumption, the second a judgment, have the same object, though they do not express the same state of mind (pp. 24-25). In this point Frege, if I am not mistaken, again adopts the opposite opinion, for he regards "the ill man" as referring to a different object from "the man is ill" (*loc. cit.*). I agree with Meinong in identifying these two objects, but I differ from him in that I do not see in what sense an assumption is not a presentation of a proposition. But this point will occupy us again at a later stage.

¹ See, e.g., his *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, vol. i. (Jena, 1893), pp. x, 7-10.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 503-504.

Meinong's second chapter, after a brief discussion of signs, investigates the characteristics of the sentence. Not all sentences express judgments—*e.g.*, questions and imperatives (p. 26). Dependent clauses also do not express judgments, for they are not asserted. “I expect it will rain to-day” does not assert that it will rain; “it is false that so-and-so” is not compatible with “so-and-so”. Clauses may be attached to a word in a way which leads to no judgment at all, as in “the opinion that so-and-so”. Also, “if *p*, then *q*,” and “*p* or *q*,” do not assert either *p* or *q*. What is expressed by language is a thought, but what is indicated is an object: even when a man does not assert, we do not usually infer the speaker's state of mind—for example, when we hear a work of fiction read. In this case, as in the above cases of dependent clauses, it is necessary to replace judgments by assumptions.¹

The third chapter enumerates some of the more obvious instances of assumptions. The hypotheses of mathematical propositions, literary works of art, children's pretences, lies, and (instructive collocation) the theories of philosophers, can none of them be understood without assumptions. When a geometrical argument begins with “let a right-angled triangle be given, having one of its sides double of the other,” we have to do with a proposition which is not asserted: hence we have an assumption, not a judgment. Scientific hypotheses again, at least in their inception, are unasserted, and afford instances of assumptions. When children pretend, it is quite plain that they are not taken in by their own fancies: these fancies constitute assumptions; and the same applies to reading a novel. A liar wishes to produce, in another, belief in a proposition which he himself does not believe: if he is to be successful, he will have to entertain the assumption of the proposition in question. And this is why liars tend to believe their own lies—a mere presentation would not be so liable to turn into a judgment (p. 50). In understanding the theories of a philosopher whom we are reading, the same process is usually required: we *may* make the opinion in question the object of a presentation, and thence of a judgment based upon this presentation, or we *may* (and this is more usual) entertain the assumption which has the same object as the opinion to be examined (pp. 49-50). Meinong now returns to the subject of questions, which he had already discussed in the preceding chapter. A question expresses, if the answer to it is yes or no, the desire to have

¹ Cf. also p. 272.

an assumption turned into the corresponding judgment or its opposite (p. 54). And in all desire, since the opposition of yes or no occurs in the object of desire, we are necessarily concerned with an assumption: for mere presentation is inadequate, and the truth of what is desired is obviously no part of desire (p. 55).

Chapter iv., on assumptive inferences (*Annahmeschlüsse*), is very important for the analysis of reasoning. It begins by remarking (p. 61) that, though the forms of inference have been elaborately studied by formal logicians, the question, What facts were concerned in these inferences? has been left for the present time. If Meinong were himself a formal logician, he might have added that the forms of inference were studied in the past with the same blindness and inadequacy which the failure to analyse inference would lead one to expect. In our day, both defects have been largely remedied. Meinong does not know that Frege—a most unduly neglected author—had already, simply through analysis of inference, been led to distinguish assumptions from judgments.¹ It is in this connexion, more obviously perhaps than in any other, that assumptions can be seen to be absolutely indispensable.

There is very grave difficulty, in this subject, more, indeed, than in any other subject with which I am acquainted, in keeping perfectly clear the distinction of logic and theory of knowledge; this distinction, nevertheless, is hardly anywhere so indispensable, owing to the very startling lack of parallelism between the two standpoints in this matter. I have discussed elsewhere² the logical questions involved; in the present discussion I shall mention them only where confusions seem most likely to occur.

The fundamental logical fact, in this subject, is the relation of implication between propositions, expressed by "p implies q," or "q follows from p". This relation, as is universally admitted, does not require either p or q to be true. But when p is true, we get the principle used in inference, namely, "p, therefore q". Here q is asserted with a reference to p; and it is a fact that, by this process, many propositions can be seen to be true, as to which immediate inspection gives no decision. Meinong holds that a similar operation is possible with assumptions, i.e., an operation in which (in virtue of the

¹ The distinction is already to be found in his "Function und Begriff," p. 21 (*Jenaische Gesellschaft für Medicin und Naturwissenschaft*, Jena, 1891).

² *Op. cit.*, §§ 38, 52, 477 ff.

fact that p implies q) we assume q with the same reference to the assumption of p as is involved in a true *therefore*-inference; and in this he sees the essence of the so-called hypothetical judgment, which, he declares, is really not a judgment at all (p. 89). There are thus three things to be distinguished, according to Meinong: (1) the relation of implication, (2) the *therefore*-inference, which operates with judgments, (3) the *if-then*-inference (as we may call it), which operates with assumptions.

The distinction of (1) and (2) is very important, and quite indubitable; but (3) appears open to doubt. Every *if-then* sentence, it seems plain, asserts something, and is either true or false; it is undeniable that the two propositions with which it is concerned are assumed, not asserted, but it seems also undeniable that a relation is asserted between them. Meinong affirms (p. 87) that such relations can only be affirmed, and that when we attempt to deny them we really deny something else. In testing this assertion, it is necessary to point out that almost all Meinong's instances contain variables, and therefore deal with what I call *formal* implication. "If the sun shines, it need not therefore be hot," and "if quadrilaterals are equilateral, they need not be squares" (p. 88), which he suggests and rejects as denials, both have this nature. In the first, a variable time is involved; in the second, a variable quadrilateral. He asserts (*ib.*) that *necessity* is denied in these propositions, whereas necessity is not a constituent in *if-then* statements. I have already remarked that necessity, in the old modal sense, appears to me inadmissible; there is, however, where propositions containing variables are concerned, a meaning for necessity, and that is, that the said propositions hold for all values of the variable. Now "if the sun shines, it is hot" does assert something for all values of the variable; and this is what is denied in the suggested instance. Thus in the sense in which necessity occurs in the denial, it occurs in the affirmation also. Meinong discusses, as obviously of quite another kind, propositions where the connexion is temporal, as "when a train leaves the station, a bell rings for the next station". But these are precisely of the same kind as the other statements; the proposition is really the following: "If x is a time at which a train leaves the station, x is a time at which a bell rings for the next station". And it is to be observed that where variables occur, as in all these instances, neither hypothesis nor conclusion is a proposition at all, but only becomes one by giving a definite value to the variable. What is asserted is, that an implication holds *in all cases*; and it

is, I think, from failure to perceive this, that the denial seems to Meinong so very different from the affirmation.

The notion of assumptive inferences seems, it must be confessed, to derive some support from observation of what actually occurs when we follow a chain of reasoning without assenting to the premisses. There is, at every stage, first the recognition of the implication, then a new beginning with the conclusion, then a new recognition of an implication with the previous conclusion as premiss. But what happens is, I think, as follows. First we assume a proposition p ; then we judge that p implies q ; then we assume q , and then we judge that q implies r . But what distinguishes this case from a *therefore*-inference is, that we might just as well assume q without perceiving that p implies it; whereas, in the other case, we actually *judge* q , which we do because of the implication. It is of course true that the *cause* of our assuming q may be, in part, our perception that p implies it; but this cannot be the *ground*, because assumptions do not require grounds and are incapable of having any.

With regard to what Meinong calls assumptive inferences, in which, by means of implications, we pass from one assumption to a second, which has what he calls relative evidence, there is a difficulty, which he himself recognises (pp. 261-265), in the fact that inconsistent assumptions can be combined, and that the rules of inference cannot bind our freedom of assuming. He seems to regard the making of self-contradictory assumptions as very rare; but, on his own theory of negation, it is implied in the statement of the law of contradiction itself. For this affirms that, if p be a proposition, p and not- p cannot both be true, *i.e.* it is false that p and not- p are both true. But this, being the negation of " p and not- p are both true," can only be the outcome, on his view, of the assumption that p and not- p are both true (pp. 105-108). In view of the fact that assumptions are thus free, I cannot understand how the notion of assumptive inference, as distinct from judgments of implication, can be maintained.

The part of assumptions in inference, however, is very great, even if this particular contention of Meinong's be false. For, whenever we judge that p implies q , we necessarily use the assumptions of p and q , since we are not judging either p or q ; and this applies even if, in another judgment, we do actually assert p , and thence q . If there were no assumptions, inference would be inexplicable; and this is peculiarly evident where, as in the case of a *reductio ad absurdum*, premisses and conclusion are actually disbelieved.

The fifth, sixth and seventh chapters are closely interconnected, and must be considered jointly. The fifth, on the objectivity of the psychical, examines the relation of object and content in presentations, assumptions and judgments. No psychical occurrence, and in particular no presentation, is without an object; but in order to explain how a presentation comes to have an object, assumptions are indispensable (p. 93). It is well here to start from judgment. If I judge rightly that I feel pain, then the pain does as a matter of fact exist; and if I make a correct judgment which is not existential, but affirms that something subsists, then again the object must really subsist: in the first case the judgment has what may be called by the traditional name of transcendence, in the second case quasi-transcendence. In such cases the object of the judgment is that which is rightly affirmed to exist or subsist (pp. 94-95). But in the case of false affirmative or true negative judgments, this account of the object becomes inapplicable: for *ex hypothesi* these judgments cannot have the objects they would have if true and affirmative. The objectivity, in such a case, seems to belong only to the presentation involved; but the object of the presentation may not exist, and there seems to be only a capacity for an object. But capacities, though facts, are not perceptible, whereas the objectivity of presentations does seem perceptible (pp. 96-100). In this difficulty, assumptions give the solution. The difficulty concerns only presentations and negative judgments; positive judgments, true or false, serve obviously for the apprehension of an object. But *pure* presentation is not directed to an object at all: it is only potentially objective.¹ When we seem to perceive direction to an object, this arises through the presence of an affirmative assumption: the object is presented "as if it were real". If not, the presentation has only *potential* objectivity. The introduction of assumptions in place of judgments enables us, in the above manner, to give objectivity even to such presentations as the round square, for assumptions are not bound by the law of contradiction. Thus the objectivity of a presentation is its capacity for being the basis of an affirmative assumption (pp. 101-103). And this applies also to negative judgments and assumptions; these are always based upon the corresponding positive assumption, and are only made when this has suggested itself (pp. 105-108).

¹ *Gegenständlich* is used by Meinong to mean *having* an object, not *being* one.

In the above theory, there seem to me to be certain errors, which it will be well to examine at once. In the first place, not all propositions assert or deny being or existence. Meinong appears to hold that when a relation R is affirmed to hold between a and b , as in (say) " a is the father of b ," what is really affirmed is the being or subsistence of the relation.¹ But there are grave objections to this view. In the first place, it must be the relation particularised as relating a and b , not the abstract relation of paternity, whose being is supposed to be affirmed. But there are logical reasons for supposing that there are no such entities at all as particularised relations; most of these I have set forth elsewhere (*op. cit.*, § 55), but another is derived from false propositions. If what is actually meant by a relational proposition is the being of the particularised relation, then, when the proposition in question is not true, it must be meaningless: for it affirms the being of what, *ex hypothesi*, does not have being, and therefore there is nothing of which it affirms the being, and therefore it affirms nothing and is meaningless. In other words: every constituent of a proposition, whether this proposition be true or false, must have being; consequently, if the particularised relation is a constituent of the proposition in which it is supposed to occur, then, since such a proposition is significant when it is false, the particularised relation has being even when the terms are not related by the relation in question. Hence the being of the particularised relation is not what is asserted. It may be thought that this point has been unduly laboured; but it has a very important consequence. Since not all propositions assert or deny the existence or subsistence of an object, we cannot always take such object as the object of a judgment; and hence it is an easy step to the conclusion that we can never do so. What I wish to affirm is that the judgment or assumption "A exists" has as its object, not A, but the existence of A, *i.e.* that which, in chapter vii., Meinong calls the *Objective* of the judgment or assumption. It would follow that there are not, as he appears to hold, two kinds of objects of a judgment, the one the thing judged about, and the other the fact affirmed concerning it. In the above case, "A is the father of B," we have already seen that the paternity is

¹ In a later passage (pp. 143-146) Meinong says that he formerly held this view, but has now seen reason to abandon it. He holds, however, that no evil results can follow, as a rule, from assuming it when convenient. The above seems, nevertheless, to constitute a case where it does lead to errors, and where (as often happens) the influence of an opinion has persisted after the opinion has been renounced.

not the object, and it is obvious that neither A nor B is so : the conclusion remains that, if there is an object, it can only be the whole proposition. And this result, if valid, seems to throw doubt upon the view that presentations only acquire objects through assumptions, which, in any case, has a decided appearance of paradox. It is true, of course, that redness, *e.g.*, is very difficult to think of without the assumption of its existence, which necessarily occurs in any visualising of a red colour. Yet if, as Meinong admits (p. 102), there are pure presentations, it is difficult not to suppose that the presentation of redness has redness for its object. And in the case of objects incapable of existence, a similar conclusion seems even more evident.

Chapter vi., which is very important, deals with the function of assumptions in the apprehension of objects of higher order ; it deals also (though the connexion is rather hard to see) with the nature of the difference between intuitive (*anschaulich*) and unintuitive presentation. The former problem is one in which, though I find few points to criticise in the discussion, a direct logical method seems to me to lead far more directly to the goal. Complexes, as soon as we examine them, are seen to be always products of propositions : one might be tempted to describe them, rather loosely, as propositions in which the truth or falsity has been left out. In any case, no analysis can be made of a complex except by reference to one or more propositions. This being so, it follows that the apprehension of a complex involves the apprehension of a proposition ; and since the assertion of the proposition is not required, its assumption will be all that will be relevant. This is the direct logical road. The other way, which is pursued by Meinong, is to examine our apprehension of complexes, and to show that it contains or involves the apprehension of propositions. The supposed advantage of this method is, I imagine, that our apprehension exists, and is therefore supposed more amenable to inspection : but it is impossible to apprehend an object unless the object itself is amenable to inspection. The supposition is equivalent to assuming that we can find out about otherwise unknowable objects by examining our knowledge of them. Meinong, though he does not hold that only what exists is immediately knowable, seems still to feel that it is safer and more empirical to begin with what exists ; and this recommends the psychological as opposed to the logical method. But except a certain cumbrousness in some problems, this method does not have any inevitable bad consequences.

The opposition of intuitive and unintuitive presentation,

Meinong says, occurs only in the presentation of complexes : that of simple objects is of neither kind (pp. 114, 122). But the same object can be presented either intuitively or unintuitively ; hence the distinction must not be sought in the object. And since it cannot lie in the act of presentation, it must lie in the content. It would seem that the same partial contents occur in both, but are combined into different complexes by a difference in the real relations existing between them (pp. 112-113). The intuitive combination seems natural, and offering itself without any act of ours ; the other, more artificial, and produced, as a rule, by our intellectual activity. The first sort of combination he calls *Zusammensetzung*, the second *Zusammenstellung*. (I shall speak of the resulting complexes as *compounds* and *composites* respectively.) The first sort may be typified by "the red cross," the second by "the cross which is red" (pp. 116-117). But unintuitive presentation can also form "the cross which is not red," which intuitive presentation cannot form. The presence of the negation indicates the need for an assumption ; and the affirmative "cross which is red" similarly requires an affirmative assumption. Thus all unintuitive presentations involve assumptions (pp. 118-119) ; and the same must be held concerning intuitive presentations, though where these are perceptions they involve judgments (pp. 120, 121, 137, 138). It is impossible to have a presentation of *a* and *b* standing in the relation *R*, for we must have *R* rightly related to *a* and *b*, and so on, whence an endless regress of a kind which, so long as judgments or assumptions are not introduced, is logically objectionable (pp. 122-123). This is reinforced by a long and difficult argument from the nature of knowledge, which, though I am not sure of understanding it, I shall do my best to reproduce. If truth requires the correspondence of ideas with facts, it must be the correspondence of the immanent objects of ideas with facts, not of the contents of ideas : for the content of the presentation of a square table is not square. When such correspondence subsists, there is a relation which we may call that of *adequacy*. A presentation is adequate when it is legitimated by a self-evident affirmation ; but except where affirmative knowledge is concerned, there is a merely immanent object, and we say that the object is adequate to the presentation, not *vice versa*, for the presentation is here prior. Now the relation of content and object is ideal, not real, and ideal relations are never affected by real relations between their terms. Hence, taking as objects the contents of the presentations of *a* and *b* and *R*, no real relation between them can

substitute for them, in presentation, the presentation of the one object "*a* and *b* in the relation *R*" ; nothing we can do to them will give them the relation of adequacy to this object unless they have it already ; consequently there is no *presentation* of this object at all (pp. 124-129).

This argument involves many points calling for criticism : in the first place, the idea of adequacy seems bound up with the notion that the object of a presentation is something which forms part of the presentation, and may be rightly called immanent. And as regards judgments, there seems no difference in the relation to their objects when they are correct and when they are incorrect ; the difference is rather in the objects, which are true propositions in the one case, and false propositions in the other. Again the opposition of ideal and real relations seems to be bound up with the notion of necessity, and to be not capable of precision. But leaving all these points aside, there remains a simple fact, which forms probably the basis of the argument. The proposition "*a* has the relation *R* to *b*" is an object not to be obtained by juxtaposing *a* and *R* and *b* ; it is a new object, having that special kind of unity that characterises propositions. And hence the presentations of *a* and *R* and *b* will not, of themselves, yield this object. But I do not see why the thought of this object should not be called a presentation ; indeed, the question arises whether assumptions are anything more than presentations of propositions. It is the fact that propositions, and the complexes formed by means of them, have a kind of unity which, apart from truth and falsehood, distinguishes them among objects ; but I do not see that the attitude towards a proposition, when it is assumed, differs in any way from the attitude towards objects which is called presentation. In short, the arguments adduced do not, to my mind, prove that the difference of an assumption and a presentation is not wholly derived from the difference between their objects.

By introducing judgments or assumptions, Meinong continues, it becomes possible, which so long as we confine ourselves to presentations it is not, subjectively to combine a *superius* with *inferiora* (p. 134). I should express what I believe to be the same fact as the one Meinong is analysing, by saying that the combination of *superius* and *inferiora* is what constitutes a proposition, and that therefore any state of mind, of which the object is or contains such a combination, has a proposition as the whole or part of its object. And a state of mind which has a proposition as the whole of

its object is either a judgment¹ or an assumption, the latter being merely the presentation of a proposition, and differing from judgment both as regards the act and content and as regards the relation of content to object.

In the same chapter, Meinong raises a difficult point, which seems to involve the inner essence of relations. In the presentation of "the cross which is red," the cross and the red are obvious, but there seems to be no presentation of their relation (p. 142). This fact leads Meinong to reject the view that a judgment of relation asserts the being of the relation (pp. 144-145)—a view which we have already seen reason to think erroneous. It leads also to the conclusion that the concomitance of complexes and relations cannot be maintained universally, since a complex may be thought of without any presentation of the relation (p. 147). The fact itself, so far as I am able to judge from inspection, appears to me to be true. We can and do, apparently, think of objects in a certain relation, without thinking of the relation at all. And apart from inspection, the endless regress seems to prove that this is so; for if not, we should have to think also of the relation of the relation to the terms, and so on, which would make the apprehension of objects in relation impossible. This is, we may conjecture, the reason why common sense and many philosophers regard relations as less real, less substantial in some sense, than their terms. There is probably some logical fact corresponding to this, but I am at a loss to discover what it is. In some sense which it would be very desirable to define, a relational proposition seems to be *about* its terms, in a way in which it is not *about* the relation. And we distinguish between "A is the father of B" and "fatherhood holds between A and B": the latter, but not the former, is about fatherhood as well as A and B, and asserts, while the former does not, a relation of fatherhood to A and B. Hence, although, at first sight, the difference might seem to be a merely subjective difference of emphasis, it results that there is a real logical difference; and this difference may be relevant to the above question.

Chapter vii., on the Objective,² points out that judgment, in addition to what has hitherto been called its object, has reference also to something else which is like an object, namely to the something which is known, the something indicated by the whole sentence. If I say "there was no

¹ Including, for the moment, disbelief under judgment.

² *Das Objectiv*. I shall use a capital O to distinguish this technical substantival sense from the usual adjectival one.

disturbance," something positive is affirmed, which is plainly not the disturbance, since this is denied. We can say: "It is a fact that there was no disturbance"; thus "that there was no disturbance" is an object in a new sense: this Meinong calls the *Objective* of the judgment "there was no disturbance" (pp. 150-153). When the judgment is false, the Objective is merely immanent, just as the object is in similar cases: the judgment always *has* its object and its Objective, but these do not necessarily have being—when the Objective is false, we can only say that the judgment is *directed towards* an Objective (pp. 154-155). This Objective of the judgment is what (following Mr. G. E. Moore) I have called a proposition: it is to the Objective that such words as true and false, evident, probable, necessary, etc., apply (p. 174). That there are Objectives is made abundantly plain by instances. When we say, "it is certain that the evidence is not concluded," it is not the judgment, but the Objective, that is certain. If A does not exist, we can say "that A does not exist, is"—or, as would be more natural in English, "there is the non-existence of A". When we say, "I believe that so-and-so," it is the Objective so-and-so, not the judgment, that we believe. (In all such cases, as is plain, we are really concerned with an appeal to inspection, which, to my mind, makes the Objective perfectly visible. If I say "A is the father of B," I am not concerned with my own judgment, but with something quite outside it: in this sense, a judgment, like a presentation, has a reference to something other than itself, namely the fact asserted; and this is Meinong's Objective.)

A curious difficulty arises for Meinong from the conclusion that there is no presentation of a proposition. The Objective, in his theory, cannot be the object of any presentation; and yet it can be the object of a judgment, as in "*p* is certain," where *p* is an Objective. It would follow that we can think of something, namely an Objective, without having any presentation of it (p. 159). Some possible escapes are suggested from this paradox, but their acceptance is not urged upon the reader. Now I confess that, not being myself a psychologist, I have much difficulty in understanding what Meinong means by presentation; and the possibility here suggested adds to my difficulty. It is, therefore, with much diffidence that I venture upon criticism in this matter. But I fail to feel any force in the argument against the presentability of complexes. If *aRb* denotes "*a* has the relation *R* to *b*," Meinong proves, I admit, that no operation will produce the presentation of *aRb* out of those

of *a* and R and *b*. But the further argument that there is no presentation of *aRb* seems to be made in forgetfulness of the Objective. For the presentation of a complex need not be a complex of presentations, when we remember that the complex is the Objective, and that therefore, if there is such a presentation, the complexity is primarily in the object of the presentation, *i.e.* in the Objective. It is, I admit, difficult to suppose that the content of the presentation of *aRb* does not contain those of *a* and R and *b*, for every property of the object seems to demand a strictly correlative property of the content, and the content, therefore, must have every complexity belonging to the object. Nevertheless it is not impossible to maintain that the content of the presentation of *aRb*, though it plainly involves those of *a* and *b*, does not involve that of R. No doubt difficulties might be found in this view, but I cannot think they would be greater than the difficulty of an unrepresented object of thought. And, as Meinong's own arguments show,¹ this view is one which, whether logically permissible or not, certainly commands itself to direct inspection. If we adopt this view, an assumption will be nothing other than the presentation of an Objective. Nevertheless, in his last chapter, Meinong asserts that the way in which, in chapters i. and iii., assumptions first occurred, proves beyond all doubt that they are more than presentations (p. 276), and that, in fact, they are nearer to judgments than to presentations; they may, he says, be described as judgments without conviction, but it would be nonsense to describe them as presentations determined with respect to yes and no (p. 277). I should reply by distinguishing three kinds of opposition of yes and no, of which two are objective, and belong to the Objectives of assumptions, while one is subjective, and belongs to judgments but not to assumptions. Given a proposition *p*, there is first its truth or falsity: this belongs to the Objectives of assumptions. Next there is the opposition of *p* and not-*p*: this also belongs to the Objectives of assumptions, for either *p* or not-*p* may be assumed; and this is the opposition of yes and no which Meinong always employs in his arguments on this point. Thirdly, there is the subjective opposition of yes and no, which is that of belief or disbelief: either *p* or not-*p* may be believed or disbelieved, whether true or false; this is the opposition which specially characterises judgment, and is absent in assumption. Thus the opposition of yes and no, in the two senses in which it applies to assumptions, belongs

¹ Cf., e.g., p. 142.

to the object, and derivatively to the content, but not in any sense to the act; whereas in judgment, there is a yes or no in the act itself. Thus Meinong's argument is only valid if it is impossible to have a presentation of an object which contains a *not* as constituent—for the opposition of true and false is irrelevant in this matter, and only the opposition of *p* and *not-p* is in question. But we have already seen reason to doubt the conclusiveness of his reasoning on this point. The greater likeness of assumptions to judgments, we shall conclude, is derived from the identity of their objects and the close similarity of their contents; but in regard to the act, assumptions are to be classed with presentations, being merely the presentations of objects of a certain kind.

Meinong distinguishes "objects of thought" from "objects of presentation," the former being such as cannot be presented (p. 163), which are the same as those that involve Objectives. He points out that the division between objects and Objectives is not as sharp as might be supposed. "Black" is an object of presentation, but "the blackness of the board" is an object of thought, and so is "the black," (*i.e.* "that which is black"). In fact, relations, attributes, and all complexes require Objectives, which occur everywhere except in the simple, or, speaking not quite precisely, in cases of complete intuitiveness with mere presentation (pp. 178-180). Again, it is always Objectives, *i.e.* that something should exist or not exist, that we desire, and to which we attach value (pp. 182-183).¹ Some general properties belong to all Objectives. They are all objects of higher order; they never

¹ I do not intend to enter upon the non-epistemological parts of Meinong's work, but in this connexion one observation seems important. While agreeing entirely that desire is always directed to Objectives, I cannot think that these are always existential. Every mathematician, unless his patience is more than human, must often have wished, in regard to many general theorems, that there were fewer exceptional cases; yet here what is desired is not an existential proposition. And it would seem that value also may attach to non-existential propositions where these, as sometimes occurs, are felt to have beauty. Clifford felt, for example, that elliptic Geometry has more value than Euclidean; and it is difficult to suppose that the greater value attaches *only* to the knowledge, and in no respect to what is known. Another point, which, however, raises grave questions both of ethics and of logic, is, that value can only be held to attach to *true* propositions. The value attached to such as are false is only the value which they would have if they were true. This results very simply from the fact that otherwise a bad world would be as good as a good one, for the false existential propositions that were good would subsist just as much in the one as the true ones would in the other. This seems to show that judgment, not assumption, is relevant to questions of value; for the assumption "A exists" only has a valuable Objective in case A really does exist and its existence is good.

have existence, but they have subsistence when true though not when false ; and they are timeless (pp. 187-189). When Objectives occur as objects, it is usually the assumptions, not the judgments, of them that occur (p. 203). It is owing to their having been overlooked that no one has known hitherto what class of things were to be called true or false, or how to distinguish logic and epistemology from psychology ; for without Objectives, only knowing (*Erkennen*), which is psychical, could be the object of epistemology, whereas this is really concerned *primarily*, not with knowing, but with knowledge (*Erkenntniss*). Meinong confesses that it is only since he has recognised Objectives that he has known *why* epistemology is not psychology ; but he holds that both logic and epistemology must concern themselves with knowing as well as with knowledge, and hence must be built upon a psychological basis, thus leaving psychology still the most central and fundamental part of philosophy (pp. 192-197).

These last remarks on the relations of logic, epistemology and psychology appear to me to contain remnants of the former theories through which Meinong has emerged, so far as he has emerged, from "psychologism" ; and doubtless they are much influenced by his belief in an "immanent" object. For it is plain that logic must concern itself as much with false propositions as with true ones ; but false propositions, according to Meinong, are the non-subsisting, merely pseudo-existing Objectives of erroneous judgments, and except through erroneous judgments they have no connexion either with existence or with subsistence. Hence, in order to survey the whole field of logic, it will be necessary to take account of judgment ; and so psychology appears as fundamental. But if we deny the distinction between the immanent object and the (so to speak) external object, the positions become reversed. We shall now hold that a presentation or judgment is only capable of being directed to an object because such an object subsists, and that thus the subsistence of the object is prior to the presentation or judgment. We shall hold that, since psychological judgments, like all others, affirm propositions (*i.e.* Objectives), whatever can be said concerning propositions generally applies equally to those of psychology. We cannot say that logic is specially concerned with Objectives and psychology with the judgments that have those Objectives, for all knowledge is concerned with Objectives, psychological knowledge like the rest. But logic will certainly concern itself with the general nature of Objectives, with truth and falsehood, and whatever else may be discoverable of a like degree of generality. Psychology will

concern itself (*inter alia*) with judgment; and the theory of knowledge will concern itself with the difference between correct and erroneous judgments, *i.e.* between such as affirm true and false propositions respectively. Since psychology consists of propositions, and wishes, at least, to consist of true ones, logic must be assumed in psychology; and not only the above very general kind of logic, but such matters also as the canons of inference; for these can only be inferred by assuming them, and are therefore necessarily presupposed in any argument from psychological data. For these reasons, it seems to result that logic, though not epistemology, is prior to psychology. And Meinong's own principle, that the *inferiora* are prior to the *superius*, makes the Objective necessarily prior to the relation involved in judgment.

III.—THE INFINITE AND THE PERFECT.¹

BY PROF. J. S. MACKENZIE.

A CONTRAST has often been drawn between the customary attitude of the ancient Greek mind towards the Infinite and that of the Moderns. For the Greeks it is said, the Infinite tended to have a bad meaning; it implied something unformed, indefinite, negative: whereas for the Moderns in general it means what is most complete, most perfect, most real and positive. That this antithesis is in the main correct cannot certainly be gainsaid; and it may well lead us to inquire whether there is not some fundamental misconception involved in the idea of the Infinite as used either by the ancient Greeks or by modern thinkers, if not even in the usage of both. Such an inquiry has no doubt already been made, especially by Hegel, with results that are not a little fruitful; but I do not know that the significance of the Hegelian view on this point has ever been sufficiently emphasised in English²: and at any rate it has seemed to me that it might be worth while to make a fresh attempt to set it forth and bring out its value. I believe that all the points that I seek at present to urge are substantially Hegelian; but I have no desire to implicate either Hegel or any of his followers in the conclusions that I draw or the special applications that I make.

First, then, I think it may be well to illustrate very briefly the divergent views of the Infinite to which reference is here made, as being specially characteristic of the thought of the ancient Greeks, on the one hand, and of modern speculation on the other. In doing so my object is, of course, not that of elaborate historical research, but only that of indicating what appear to be the essential points.

¹ A paper read before the Philosophical Society, University College, Cardiff, October, 1903.

² Except in Dr. Hutchison Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, which seems to be regarded as a sealed book by most English readers.

The earliest form in which such a conception appears would seem to be the *ἀπειρον* of Anaximander—translated by Prof. Burnet as “the Boundless”; and this is interesting, not only as the earliest conception of the kind, but also as being one in which the contrast between the Greek and the more modern notion may be regarded as still latent. The exact meaning of the “Boundless” of Anaximander is no doubt a matter on which there has been, and may well be, a considerable amount of controversy; but this much seems clear, that it had for him both a positive and a negative force. It was positive in so far as it was thought of as the primitive material, the *ἀρχή* out of which all things come, and into which they all return. It was negative in so far as it was the unformed material, in contrast with those particular determinations that become ‘separated out’ from it, and so was in itself little more than a bare potentiality of being. The subsequent development of Greek thought, however, went almost entirely in the direction of emphasising the more negative side of this conception.

The Pythagoreans probably represent the next important step. Here again the precise interpretation is a matter of some doubt; but it may be safely said that the general Pythagorean view was dualistic, and that their two elements were thought of as an unlimited material and a limit imposed upon it. Both seem to have been conceived as positive; but it is clear that for them all actual existence was found in the combination of the two, and consequently that the Infinite in itself was not thought of by them as effectively real. It was only an aspect of reality.

Now it is hardly too much to say that all serious metaphysical speculation among the Greeks was determined by the fundamental conception that thus emerges in Anaximander, and is developed by the Pythagoreans. The “Sphere” of Parmenides, though not directly related in a positive way with this conception, and perhaps even developed in opposition to it,¹ seems yet to be in reality a further working out of the same essential thought. The “Sphere” of Parmenides is regarded as that which is thoroughly real and perfect; and it seems clearly to be thought of by him as a determinate and limited whole. “It is not permitted,” he says, “to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything.”

The same view is in the main characteristic of the Eleatic School as a whole, Melissus having been apparently treated

¹ This is Burnet's view; but it appears to be very problematical.

as something of a heretic.¹ With regard to Plato, again, it is obvious how largely his conception of the Ideal Types is based on the Eleatic doctrine of reality; and also how, when he seeks to apply his theory to the things of Nature, he at once makes use of the Pythagorean idea of an imposition of determinations. And the same idea is evidently at the root of Aristotle's doctrine of Form and Matter. Matter is the indefinite material to which Form gives determination. Even the Atoms and Void of Democritus may fairly be regarded as an offshoot from the same central conception.²

On the whole, it seems not unfair to say that all Greek metaphysics is dominated by the conception of Form; and that this Form is thought of as, in some way or other, giving determinateness to an indefinite, pre-existing material. Heraclitus is of course an exception to this; and it would be easy enough to point to other side-currents. But the main stream of thought is very decidedly in this direction.

The same fundamental idea meets us when we turn to the more ethical aspects of Greek speculation. The Pythagorean "Numbers" for instance, were evidently treated as determinations of moral relations as well as of those that are material. In Plato's writings, and especially in the "Philebus," the same idea of a determining Form is applied in the treatment of Ethics; and finally this conception is summed up, in its most systematic form, in the Aristotelian doctrine of the Mean. All this is too obvious to require any detailed expansion or enforcement.

Similarly, Greek Ästhetics is in the main dominated by the idea of the beauty of that which has a determinate form or embodies a definite type. "Greek Philosophy," as Dr. Bosanquet says, "is inclined to select mathematical form, ratio, or proportion as the pure and typical embodiment of beauty."

In short, over the whole of the most characteristically Greek speculation is inscribed the famous Platonic formula, *μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω*; and geometry means for the Greeks the investigation of determinate forms.³

Curiously enough, the same inscription might be written over the whole of that line of speculation in which, more than in any other, the keynote of modern philosophical

¹ Burnet seeks to rehabilitate Melissus; but Aristotle is more likely to have known what his real value was.

² Burnet's treatment of the relation of the Atomists to the Eleatics seems to me very instructive.

³ Burnet seems to be right in thinking that even the "Numbers" of the Pythagoreans were essentially geometrical.

thought was struck—that of the Cartesian school. But with the Cartesians the conception of Geometry has changed. Instead of dealing, as the Geometry of the Greeks in general did, with the properties of separate figures, it is rather the effort to connect different figures and different modes of mathematical relation with one another, and to bring them all into connexion with certain ultimate points of reference. This appears in the development of co-ordinate geometry and in the attempts to express geometrical determinations in algebraical form. From this point of view, the conception of the whole comes to be regarded as prior to that of the parts. The part is treated as being determined by its position in the whole. The whole is the most positive form of reality: the part is only a particular mode in which it is determined. This way of thinking permeates the whole Cartesian school, and is obviously connected in the most intimate manner with their fundamental view of the nature of geometrical science.¹

The influence of this way of thinking appears at the very outset of the speculations of Descartes. The thought of the finite and imperfect, he maintains, presupposes the thought of the infinite and perfect; and, as he advances in the working out of his system, this comes in the end to mean for him that the idea of God, as that of the infinite and absolutely perfect being, is to be regarded as logically prior to the consciousness of any mode of finite existence. The final outcome of this conception appears of course most definitely in the system of Spinoza, where the geometrical method is most consistently developed, and where the idea of the Infinite is without hesitation placed at the beginning. For him the Infinite is emphatically the positive; "determination is negation"; finite existence is only an aspect of the infinite whole.

Now there are few direct followers of Spinoza in the history of modern philosophy, just as perhaps there were few quite direct followers of Parmenides among the Greeks. But certainly all Greek philosophy after Parmenides was coloured by his central thought; and to understand modern constructive metaphysics it is necessary, as Hegel said, to bathe in the sea of Spinoza. There is a curious resemblance between the two writers. Both say, in effect, there is nothing real but the whole; and both say, in effect, that this whole

¹This also is not a point that requires any elaboration. Descartes quite definitely bases his method on the mathematical analogy; and this is made still more explicit by Spinoza.

is to be conceived in at least a quasi-geometrical fashion.¹ But the great difference lies here. Parmenides says, the whole is a finite whole : Spinoza says, the whole is the absolutely infinite and perfect being. And this essential difference may be detected at almost every point in those currents of speculation which they respectively colour. Every ancient speaks with the accents of finitude : every modern who has breathed in a speculative atmosphere at all² has caught the tones of infinity.

The ethical significance of this doctrine of the Infinite can easily be traced in the writings of the various members of the Cartesian school. It has a double aspect, a positive and a negative. On the positive side, it shows itself in a lofty sense of the immeasurable value of a consciousness which is capable of grasping the Infinite. We see this in Descartes' idea of self-reverence, and still more clearly in Spinoza's "Intellectual Love of God". It is in this that Spinoza finally reaches the great object of his search—an attainable good which possesses a permanent and absolute value.³ The more negative side appears in the consciousness of the worthlessness of any good which has not this infinite completeness. We see this in Spinoza's own quest after perfection. The freedom which he seeks is contrasted with a state of bondage, in which most men are involved. But we see this more negative aspect of the Cartesian Ethics perhaps more definitely in the system of Geulinckx, with whom humility is the chief of the virtues. This view may be contrasted with the characteristically Greek attitude represented by Aristotle's

¹ In the case of Spinoza it is of course only quasi-geometrical. Even his infinite extension can hardly be regarded as the space with which geometry deals—any more than his 'eternity' is to be conceived after the manner of the chronologist. How far the "Sphere" of Parmenides was actually intended to be spatial I do not undertake to determine. Prof. Burnet seems to take him a little too literally.

² Of course this has no application at all to Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, and the British school of thought in general. The statement about the Greeks would also require some qualification with respect to Plato and the Stoics, and has, of course, no application at all to the Neoplatonists. But I leave the sentence as it stands, as being broadly true.

³ Compare the beginning of the treatise on the *Improvement of the Understanding* with the end of the *Ethics*. "I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme and unending happiness." "From what has been said we clearly understand, wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom, consists: namely in the constant and eternal love towards God, or in God's love towards men."

conception of the high-minded man, whose self-esteem is based on the realisation of certain forms of civic excellence, and who is entirely free from any consciousness of an infinite ideal.¹ The "wise man" of the Stoics is no doubt a nearer approximation to the Cartesian view; but even he attains his perfection rather by the suppression of his wants than by their complete satisfaction through an object of infinite worth. The "contemplative man" of Aristotle may be said to have reached a position very similar to that implied in Spinoza's "Love of God"; but he differs in this, that his contemplation is always supposed to be exercised on a definite and limited universe. Moreover, he is dependent for his high excellence (which is never thought of as infinitely high) on the organisation of the State and the presence of its practical virtues.

The two sides of the modern idea of the Infinite are seen again very clearly in the ethical writings of Kant, especially in his view of the moral life as involving an endless progress. On the one hand, it aims at a certain absolute completeness—perfect harmony with the moral law. On the other hand, being only the life of a finite creature after all, it cannot attain to any such completeness, and can only be thought of as continuously approximating to it, like an asymptote in Cartesian Geometry. This last illustration helps us to realise how thoroughly the whole conception is dependent upon a certain geometrical point of view. It was only Spinoza who definitely set himself to deal with human life as if he were dealing with circles and triangles; but most modern writers on Ethics have, more or less unconsciously, done the same.

For literary expressions of the view of life implied in these philosophical conceptions we have not far to seek. Take as an instance the well-known lines by Emily Brontë:—

O God within my breast,
Almighty, ever-present Deity,
Life that in me has rest,
As I—undying Life—have power in thee.

Or take Carlyle's Shoebblack—"Man's Unhappiness, as I construe, comes of his Greatness; it is because there is an Infinite in him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury under the Finite.—The Shoebblack also has a soul quite

¹ Compare also what Aristotle says about Shame—"A good man has no business with shame"—and contrast this with Wordsworth's "high instincts before which our mortal nature doth tremble like a guilty thing surprised".

other than his stomach ; and would require, if you consider it, for his permanent satisfaction and saturation, simply this allotment, no more, and no less ; *God's infinite Universe altogether to himself*, therein to enjoy infinitely, and fill every wish as fast as it rose." Or take even the more modest utterance of Tennyson :—

Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit may meet—
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

All these imply a consciousness of the presence of the Infinite in man in a sense that would probably to any Greek have seemed mere *ὑπερβολή*.¹ And, indeed, all through our modern literature and art—e.g. in the poetry of Whitman, the music of Wagner, the painting of Turner—there is a constant presence of the idea of the Infinite as something positive and valuable, in a way that, so far as one can see, would have been almost unintelligible to the Greek mind. I mean that in the highest forms of modern expressive art we seem to be constantly made aware of a certain suggestion of something not contained in the finite object before us—a suggestion that seems in the end to be intended to yield us that feeling which is no doubt most definitely set forth by Wordsworth, as that of

A presence that disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts ; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man :
A motion and a spirit that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
And rolls through all things.

This note of infinity is seldom long absent in the best modern art ; and it seems, on the whole, quite foreign to the spirit of the ancient Greeks.

Now what are we to make of this strange contrast ? Are we to accept the Greek or the modern view as correct ? Or are both to be rejected as erroneous ? Of course I have nothing at present to do with the historical origin of the antithesis. It would be easy to connect it with Oriental Pantheism and with the doctrine of human immortality diffused by the Christian faith. Both these tended to weaken the consciousness of limitation ; and other causes—such as the discovery of new worlds by astronomical science—may

¹ I have already indicated that I am aware of exceptions to this. But they do not appear to me to affect the main point.

have co-operated with them. Here it is only with the validity of the conceptions that I have to deal, not with the way in which they grew up.

Now one point, at any rate, may at once be noted in which the two contrasted conceptions touch. They are both, as we have seen, in their essence, spatial. And it may be added that, from this purely geometrical point of view, neither way of thinking appears to have any real justification. Geometrical figures are not properly to be regarded either as determinations given to an indefinite material or as limitations set upon an infinite whole. It seems preferable to treat them as ideal constructions made within an indefinitely extended but definitely qualified and homogeneous form. At any rate, if we desire to reach a clear understanding of the true significance of these contrasted ideas of the Infinite, it will probably be best to try to see what they mean in other than purely spatial applications. We may be helped to such an understanding by considering one of the most definite attempts that have been made to justify the peculiar use of the idea of the Infinite in modern speculation—I mean the attempt made by Descartes himself.

Unfortunately the statements of Descartes on this point are hardly characterised by his usual lucidity. He seems rather to slur the matter over as if he were dimly sensible of the insecurity of his position; so that, in the end, his conception is rather assumed than proved. Yet it is easy to see that it is the very keystone of his system. His proof of the reality of the material world turns on the existence and perfection of God; and every attempt that he makes to prove the existence of God depends on the presupposition that we have in our minds a definite and positive idea of the divine being, *i.e.*, of a being absolutely infinite and perfect. Now the only ground for maintaining this is the one that is thus stated by Descartes in his third "Meditation": "I must not imagine that I do not apprehend the infinite by a true idea, but only by the negation of the finite, in the same way that I comprehend repose and darkness by the negation of motion and light: since, on the contrary, I clearly perceive that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in the finite, and therefore that in some way I possess the perception of the infinite before that of the finite, that is the perception of God before that of myself; for how could I know that I doubt, desire, or that something is wanting to me, and that I am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more perfect than myself, by comparison of which I knew the deficiencies of my nature?"

This argument is a little confused by its unfortunate introduction of the exploded Mediæval conception of "degrees of reality";¹ but its essential point is clear enough. The contention is simply that we are aware of ourselves as being finite and imperfect, and that the consciousness of this presupposes the consciousness of that which is infinite and perfect. Now if we ask how far this is valid, it very soon appears that a distinction must be drawn in this respect between the idea of the infinite and the idea of the perfect.

If we start with the conception of the infinite, and consider what it means with respect to purely mathematical relations, it seems clear that it is not a positive idea at all. It merely implies the absence of any definite possibility of fixing a limit. If we take the case of any geometrical figure—say, a circle or triangle—we readily see that it has definite limitations. It is one figure, and not another: it has a determinate shape, size, and position. This involves the idea of a space surrounding it; and it may fairly be argued that we cannot (in the abstract) assign any definite limits to the space that is thus conceived. But this is evidently a negative statement: it does not imply that we have any positive idea of an infinite space. Indeed, it seems certain that we cannot have any such idea. In like manner, if we think of numerical relations—say, between the numbers one, two, three—it is clear that any magnitude that is taken as a unit is thought of as limited in comparison with other units that may be regarded as added to it. It is clear also that there is no assignable limit to the additions that might thus conceivably be made. The series one, two, three, when simply regarded in the abstract, is capable of indefinite extension. But this also is essentially a negative statement. We have certainly no positive idea of an infinite number. And similar considerations apply to all other cases of infinity in the sense of an indefinitely extensible series. This is, of course, what Hegel means by the "bad infinite";² but it is no doubt the

¹ I refer to this idea as exploded, in spite of the re-introduction of the phrase in some recent philosophical systems. Mr. Bradley's "degrees of reality" seem to have very little in common with what was formerly understood by the term, and, indeed, do not appear to be rightly described by it. What seems to be meant is rather more or less adequacy of point of view.

² Hegel's phrase '*das schlecht Unendliche*' is commonly translated in this way. Dr. Hutchison Stirling, however, is probably right (*Secret of Hegel*, p. 553) in holding that the more correct rendering is 'downright infinite'—or infinite pure and simple. But, as Dr. Stirling adds, "we have here the usual Hegelian irony; what here is *downright* to figurative conception or ordinary reflexion is *spurious* to Hegel".

most primary and obvious meaning of the term. In this sense, then, it seems clear that the contention of Descartes cannot be justified.

The case is, however, very different when we take the idea of the Perfect, instead of that of the Infinite as thus conceived. There can be no doubt that to say that anything is imperfect implies some consciousness of a standard of perfection. When I say that a colour is not pure red, I imply that I have a more or less definite knowledge of the meaning of pure red. When I say that a rose is not perfectly formed, I imply that I know what the perfect form of a rose should be. Even here of course the argument must be used with caution. I may have a vague sense of defect which implies only a vague consciousness of a standard: merely to be aware that something is wanting does not involve any knowledge of the kind of object that would satisfy the want. But it may certainly be maintained that, in proportion to the definiteness of our consciousness of defect, our consciousness of a standard of perfection must in like manner be definite. This, however, has in itself nothing whatever to do with the consciousness of the infinite. Merely to know that red is one particular colour, separated off from others; or merely to know that the rose is one kind of flower, and not any other, —such mere knowledge of limitation does not imply any definite knowledge of other colours or flowers, still less any idea of a colour or flower that is unlimited and includes all others.

Now the conclusion to which we are thus led is that the Cartesian idea of perfection is in reality a teleological, and not a mathematical conception. It is only when we have some end in view that there is any scope for the recognition of defect. The end, of course, may be a purely intellectual one. It may be the attainment of complete knowledge about some object, or the removal of doubt with regard to some truth. When we have such an aim in view, we are aware of our ignorance or doubt as a falling off from perfection. Merely to be ignorant, or merely to be aware of ignorance, is not to have any real grasp of what is meant by knowledge; but to be aware of ignorance as a defect is to be conscious of knowledge as an ideal. The perfection, then, which is referred to by Descartes must be thought of as an end, aim, or ideal; and this is a point which the Cartesian school in general appears to have very imperfectly realised. With Spinoza, in particular, the effort is constantly to make the idea of the infinite purely geometrical in form,¹ and to elim-

¹ This is true, I think, in spite of the fact that Spinoza did, in a manner, draw the distinction between the true and the false infinity. He reaches

inate all its teleological implications. Of course he does not really succeed in this attempt: the idea of an end shines through at every point in spite of him. But it was Leibniz who first saw, with any distinctness, that the Cartesian point of view could be made intelligible only through the introduction of a teleological conception; and even with him the idea of an end is hardly seen to be of the essence of the position, but is rather imported into it from without—the fundamental ideas being still mathematical.

The significance of this distinction between a geometrical and a teleological idea of perfection may perhaps be made somewhat clearer by noticing its bearing upon the proofs that have been given of the being of God. If the view that has now been put forward is correct, it seems clear that the famous ontological argument is vicious. The essential point of this argument—at least as used by Descartes—is that a being that includes all reality cannot be conceived as non-existent; and the defect of the argument lies in the fact that it is not really possible to conceive of any such being at all.¹ To suppose that it is possible is to suppose that a mathematical idea of infinity can be completely formed. That a being, on the other hand, simply conceived as the ideal standard of perfection, might be non-existent, is clear—*i.e.*, it is clear that the existence of such a being requires some other proof than the mere fact that it is conceived. What is wanted further is to show that the very fact that such an ideal is formed proves that it possesses objective validity. How this might be shown, I hope to consider later. I am not now urging that no valid ontological argument can be devised, but only that the form commonly given would require to be very considerably modified.

The confusion between the conception of the Infinite and that of the Perfect, to which I have been calling attention, is certainly not unnatural or surprising. It arises, as we have seen, from the attempt to view reality in a purely mathematical way—an attempt that has had great fascination for the scientific mind since the time of the Pythagoreans. From a mathematical point of view, differences of quality can only be expressed by the conception of infinity; and consequently any idea of a standard of perfection must take this form. I might illustrate this by

the infinite in the wrong way, though he afterwards tries to correct the error. If he had really grasped the more positive conception of the infinite, his geometrical method would have disappeared.

¹ Leibniz indicated this defect, but did not press his point.

referring to one of Carlyle's sayings about religion—"All religion was here to remind us, better or worse, of what we already know better or worse, of the quite *infinite* difference there is between a Good man and a Bad; to bid us to love infinitely the one, abhor and avoid infinitely the other,—strive infinitely to *be* the one, and not to be the other". What exactly does "infinite" mean in such a statement as this? If it means anything, it is surely something that is rather qualitative than quantitative. There is an infinite difference between the good man and the bad in the sense that there is a qualitative difference between their attitudes towards life—a point that is fully recognised even in Aristotle's apparently quantitative doctrine of the Mean. In the same sense there is an infinite difference between a good picture and a bad—*i.e.*, there is a difference which cannot be adequately expressed by any finite enumeration of specific points of difference. Similarly, to "love infinitely," to "strive infinitely," mean, I suppose, an uncalculating devotion—a devotion which does not aim simply at the realisation of certain measurable results, but rather at the achievement of a certain qualitative excellence. In this sense an infinite devotion may be found also in the soldier, in the artist, even in the man who aims at being a scholar or a gentleman. But if we call such devotion infinite, we should remember at least that it is very different from the infinite devotion of the millionaire, who seeks simply to amass money without assignable limit. In the latter case the infinity is purely quantitative, and has no assignable end; and the same may be said to be true of the aim of the pure pleasure-seeker. It was precisely for this reason that the mere money-making life and the life of mere pleasure-seeking were regarded by the wisest of the Greeks as violent and unnatural.

I believe we may trace a similar confusion in the common saying that genius means "an infinite capacity for taking pains". The "infinite capacity" here is on a par with the "infinite love" and "infinite striving" of the above quotation. It does not mean, as is sometimes thought, an endless plodding, but rather an absorbing devotion to some specific object—music, poetry, science, or whatever it may be—and the fixed determination to achieve a definite result, whatever it may cost. This is a qualitative excellence; and to represent it as an infinite quantity means little more than that the man who is without it would require to be completely transformed in order to have it. In the same sense we may say that there is an infinite difference between a sound and a colour, between a rose and a violet, between

a dog and a horse, between a circle and a square. The meaning in such cases is simply that there is no real bridge from the one thing to the other; and consequently that the steps that would be necessary to lead us over could only be represented, from a quantitative point of view, as an infinite series.¹

It is an easy transition from such confusions to those that are connected with the idea of God. The common way of setting forth the perfection of the Divine Being is, or used to be, that of enumerating a variety of attributes supposed to be infinite. Thus it was said that God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, eternal; and these attributes were apt to be conceived—though no doubt the more speculative intellects have tried to guard against this—simply as an infinite extension of the corresponding qualities that we know in our finite world. A man, it was thought, occupies a definite portion of space: God fills it all. A man has a “span-long life”: God lives on without any limitation. A man is ignorant of many things, and is in doubt about many things: God knows them all, and is quite sure of them. A man can lift so many pounds’ weight: God could lift any number. Of course this is putting it very crudely; but does the ordinary conception amount to anything very different from this? Now no one who reflects on the matter at all can really suppose that the idea of a perfect being is to be reached in any such way as this. Genuine religious feeling sweeps it all aside at once, and says instead, ‘God is love,’ ‘God is our Father in Heaven,’ or something else that is expressive of a qualitative excellence. And it is not difficult to see that the purely quantitative conception is in reality meaningless. What meaning, for instance, can be given to omnipotence? Can there be an infinite force? It could only be expressed, I suppose, as an infinite possibility of motion; and what real meaning could be given to that? Nor, so far as I can see, could there be an infinite knowledge; for all knowledge is of something definite. Perhaps it may be thought, however, that there is some meaning in an infinite time and space; and that, in respect of these at least, we may think of God as infinite. This is a point that appears to require some further consideration.

It is no doubt in connexion with space and time that the

¹ Cf. Stirling’s *Secret of Hegel*, p. 552—“The limitless externality which lies in the notion of Quantum or Quantity is qualitative; and therefore it is a cheap wonder that falls prostrate before the infinite quantities that can be conjured up in the quantitative progress; for with such quality such quantity is the turn of a hand”.

idea of the mathematical infinite most naturally arises; and a short study of its significance with regard to these may help, more than anything else, to make our position clear. It certainly seems at first as if space and time, and the world of objects and events which they condition, could only be thought of as going on into infinity; and it does not appear to be possible to avoid this conclusion by the Kantian distinction between phenomena and things in themselves. However phenomenal they may be, they are at least phenomena that demand this kind of completeness. Kant's statement of the antinomies is, however, quite enough to convince us that there are as great difficulties in thinking of the world in space and time as infinite as there are in thinking of it as finite. And, though Kant's negative solution of these antinomies (by the distinction between phenomena and things in themselves) is unsatisfactory, we may find more help in his positive solution of the difficulty. As stated by Kant himself, indeed, this is little more than an amplification of the negative solution; but it is capable of being restated with a slight modification which entirely changes its meaning. This I must now endeavour briefly to bring out.

The positive solution, when reinterpreted, really amounts to this. Space and time, apart from the world of objects and events which they condition, are meaningless abstractions, and cannot properly be said to be either finite or infinite.

[†] The world that is conditioned by them, however, is limited both in space and time; and consequently space and time themselves, so far as they have any actual existence, are limited, though (in the abstract) they may be regarded as indefinitely extensible. I think this must be understood as implying that both space and time are closed circles. That is to say, if any one were to go out into space in an easterly direction until he reached the extreme limit of the material world on that side, he would find himself also at the extreme limit on the western side. In other words, there is no extreme limit, but rather a closed sphere, as Parmenides affirmed. Similarly, if any one were to go forward in time till he reached the closing event in the drama of existence, he would find himself also at the opening of the first act; and the universe would repeat itself, as in Virgil's Eclogue, or as in so many other ancient speculations.¹

¹The idea of cycles of existence seems, in some form or other, to have been common to the doctrines of most of the early philosophers. As I have here introduced this theory in an exposition which purports to be largely Hegelian, it may be well to explain that I know of no ground

If we accept this solution, it is evident that we introduce a new meaning of infinity. A closed circle, however limited it may be in its content, is yet in a very real sense infinite. It has determinateness, but it has no end. Now, if the infinity of God in space and time be taken in the sense here indicated, no objection need be raised against it. Even the human consciousness is, in a manner, unlimited with respect to space and time. The mind of man is never fixed to the here and now, but is always ready to wander through eternity; and we can easily think of a completed consciousness, to which all time and space should appear as present. Such a consciousness would be infinite in a very real sense, but a sense utterly different from that in which a mathematical series is infinite. Its content would still be definite and limited, but it would also be perfect and complete.

Now this I take to be the essential point in the positive conception of infinity which Hegel seeks to substitute for what he describes as the "bad infinite". The true infinite is without end, not because it goes on indefinitely, but because, like a circle, it returns into itself. Such an infinite is evidently, in a sense, also finite;¹ and this is perhaps what Goethe meant to express in his famous epigram:—

Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten?
Geh nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten.

The true infinite, in short, is a completely determined finite;

for attributing this conception to Hegel himself. It seems to me, however, to be quite in the spirit of his philosophy. Obviously, it cannot be satisfactory, from the Hegelian point of view, to say merely that space and time are conceptions that have to be transcended. What is transcended, in the Hegelian system, is not annulled; and an antinomy is not solved by simply saying that we have got above it. It seems correct to say that space and time, as used in our ordinary experience, cannot be accepted as ultimately valid conceptions. Nevertheless, they are conceptions by which the world of our experience is determined, and we must try to make them intelligible as such. This seems to be involved in Hegel's position; and consequently the attempt which is here made to apply the revised conception of infinity does not appear to be inappropriate.

¹Cf. Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, p. 290—"The answer to the question, How the Infinite becomes Finite, is consequently this, that *there is no* such thing as an Infinite that is *first of all* Infinite and which is afterwards under a necessity to become finite, to go out into the Finite; but that it is *per se*—by and for its own self—already just as much finite as infinite. In that the question assumes that the Infinite is on one side *per se*, and that the Finite—which has gone out into separation from it, or which may have come from whencesoever it may—is, separated from it, truly *real*: here rather it were to be said, that this *separation* is *incomprehensible*. Neither such Finite nor such Infinite has truth."

and it may, therefore, be less misleading to call it the perfect, rather than the infinite, and to maintain that *all* infinites are "bad".

It is evident that, in this way, we come to side with the old Greek view of infinity, rather than with the more modern conception. We come to think, at any rate, that all good things are determinate, and that the sphere of Parmenides is in some respects nearer the truth than the absolutely infinite being of Spinoza. Nevertheless, we are far enough removed from the Greek idea of an infinite unformed material, on which a definite form is imposed. What we rather come into unison with is the Platonic conception of the Idea of the Good, as that which is most truly infinite and complete. And this is hardly a result that need surprise or pain us. Plato and Aristotle clearly represent the highest points in philosophic speculation; and the more nearly we approximate to them the more likely are we to be in touch with what is soundest in speculative thought.

But an objection naturally occurs to the modern mind. Surely, it will be urged, the positive idea of perfection must itself involve something of the nature of a mathematical infinite, since it implies at least an unattainable ideal, to which there can only be an asymptotic approach. To this I answer that it only appears so when we think of the perfect in a purely abstract fashion. The Cartesian school of thought has accustomed the modern mind to think of that which is perfect as an impossible jumble of all manner of conceivable and inconceivable realities. If we mean by the perfect this incredible compound—if we think that what is perfect must be a perfect sound and a perfect colour, a perfect rose and a perfect horse, a perfect man and a perfect woman, a perfect circle and a perfect square—then no doubt the conception involves a mathematical infinity. But once we start on this line of thought, we may as well carry it farther, and demand that what is perfect should be a perfect fool, and a perfect devil. Such an idea of perfection can lead us to nothing but perfect nonsense. The perfect that we are really in search of is something very different from this. It is something definite, concrete, and intelligible—not something that shall include the whole of existence, but rather something through which the whole of existence shall be seen to have meaning.

Perhaps an illustration taken directly from human life may help to make the point clearer. Each of us is, I suppose, painfully aware at times that he is something in particular, and not something else. This is felt even by those who are freest from any special limitations. Indeed,

he who was probably of all men the freest from them has yet expressed the feeling perhaps more adequately than any one else :—

When in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes,
I all alone beweep my outcast state,
And trouble deaf heaven with my bootless cries,
And look upon myself, and curse my fate,
Wishing me like to one more rich in hope,
Featured like him, like him with friends possessed,
Desiring this man's art, and that man's scope,
With what I most enjoy contented least.

Here Shakespeare speaks as if he were no better than Carlyle's Shoeblack, fooled by a "bad" infinity. Woe is me! I am this; I am not also that! But Shakespeare points (what Carlyle does not) to the true way of escape from this sense of limitation—viz., by self-identification with the other :—¹

Yet in these thoughts myself almost despising,
Haply I think of thee,—and then my state
(Like to the lark at break of day arising
From sullen earth) sings hymns at heaven's gate ;
For thy sweet love remembered, such wealth brings,
That then I scorn to change my state with Kings.

And we see still more adequately in his plays how he escaped from his individual limitations by the appropriation to himself of the universe of human life. Can we think of perfection in any other way? If we try even to picture to ourselves the perfection of a Divine Being, in what other way can we do it than by thinking of Him as knowing and loving a universe, in which He finds Himself expressed? The perfect being is surely not to be thought, as the Cartesians imagined, in the form of the universe as a whole, but rather in the form of the spirit which grasps the universe as one, and which is more than the universe through the return from it as another.²

¹ Cf. Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, p. 553—"The One is always One, the immediate ; so the non-immediate is its non-being, the negation of itself: thus it is *caught (befangen)* in the spurious Infinite, the *Sollen* of all kinds, and is '*das unglückliche Bewusstseyn*,' the unhappy consciousness that cannot find *itself*, but is for ever lost in its *other*. All this disappears before the simple consideration that the *other* is just the *condition*, the *presupposition* of *itself*; that the *other* is *for it*; that *it* is through the *other*; that *it* is One just because it is One, One, One; that *it* is the *other*, and the *other* is *it*."

² Cf. Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, p. 453—"Ideality may be named the quality of infinitude; for is not infinitude just that in which the whole wealth of the finite is ideally held? . . . Sublating the finite, and sublating, in this same act, its own self as an only abstract infinite, it is a return, as it were with both, into its own self."

This may help us to realise the ethical significance of the idea of a finite infinite. The modern mind, when at all of a speculative cast, is too prone to lose itself in a vague and empty mysticism. We admire nothing heartily unless it is vast, mysterious, unfathomable, illimitable, unspeakable. We heap Pelion upon Ossa, and think to scale heaven by a confusion of tongues. It is in contrast with this that the Greek view of life appeals to us with such a tranquil beauty — infinite through its limitations, eternal from its absorption in the moment. For them it is not the unfathomable that is admired, but that which is completely known and understood : it is not the illimitable that is great, but that whose definite restrictions give perfection of form. We too, if we are ever to attain to any completeness of excellence, must learn, I think, something of this free constraint. It is not the vague aspirations of the mind that give it worth and dignity :—

Not that, admiring stars,
It yearns, "Nor Jove, nor Mars ;
Mine be some figured flame which blends, transcends them all".

That way madness lies : that only leads us to the "bad infinite". The true infinite is found rather in the performance of some definite action that is wisely planned, and whose drudgery is made divine through its being done in the spirit of the whole ; in thorough insight into some intelligible object, which mirrors in itself both God and man ; or in the enjoyment of some limited thing that has nobility and power through its place in the system of the universe. The treasures of the spirit are not hidden away in caverns of the earth or in the remote heavens : we find them rather most completely by the appropriation of our "station and its duties"—by acting, feeling, and thinking adequately with regard to what is immediately around us, "rich in the simple beauty of a day."

"That strain I heard was of a higher mood."—The attempt to set forth the ethical significance of the conception has carried me away a little from the main point, and may perhaps seem somewhat irrelevant. But I make no apology for the digression. It has been a good deal the fashion of late to maintain that all reality worthy of the name is "beyond Good and Evil," and that the trivial point of view of Ethics has no right to obtrude itself in Metaphysics. But if the conception of the perfect here put forward is correct, such an attitude is entirely mistaken. The modern Absolute is, in truth,—at least in many of its phases—a lineal descendant of the being absolutely in-

finite of Spinoza, and has inherited some of the most fatal diseases of its stock. Indeed, there is even a blot in its scutcheon : it is, in some respects, little better than a bastard issue of Kant's thing in itself. This soulless Absolute,¹ which can never really be known or understood, springs, I believe, from the attempt to think of the whole of reality as a single and indivisible being. Against this I would seek to maintain that the only kind of Absolute that is worth considering is not an unknown thing in itself or a being absolutely infinite, or any compound of these or cross between them, but rather a perfectly determinate idea of the Good, which gives meaning to our world, and which shows itself perhaps more adequately in the moral, aesthetic, and religious consciousness than in any other way. But I have probably said enough for the present on this aspect of the subject, and I now turn to some other points.

I have tried to show how the idea of the finite infinite can be applied in dealing with space and time, regarded as completed wholes. It may be thought that its application to the indefinite divisibility of portions of space and time should also be brought out. In short, having dealt with the infinitely great, we may now be called upon to deal with the infinitely little. But it is hardly necessary to spend many words on this. From a metaphysical point of view, it can only be regarded as one of the Cartesian futilities—the one for which Leibniz is specially responsible. It seems clear that the infinitely little is a purely mathematical conception, just as the infinitely great is, and that it has no real ontological significance. Any thing or event is divisible into parts or moments up to a certain point; but that any one should be divisible without limit seems obviously absurd. Of course it may be said that the ultimate constituents of material things—whatever they may be—are ideally resolvable into still smaller parts. But this is only to say that they are in space ; and that space, as a pure form, contains an indefinite possibility of subdivision. This indefinite subdivision is only a naked possibility ; and, as we know, “a naked possibility is nothing”. The same consideration ap-

¹ I am perhaps a little hard on the Absolute here. I am aware that its many friends—and especially their leader, Mr. Bradley,—have made a very valiant effort to cure its diseases, but only, I am afraid, with a very partial success. On this point, however, I cannot here enlarge further. I may, however, quote the saying of Hegel (*lesser Logic*, Wallace's trans., p. 50)—“Common fancy puts the Absolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly before us, so present that so long as we think, we must, though without express consciousness of it, always carry it with us and always use it.”

plies to the indefinite subdivision of time. There is, it would seem, a smallest possible experience of change; but within that experience of change there may no doubt be said to be the naked possibility of any amount of further resolution. This only means that we know of no reason for stopping at that particular point except the bare fact that we are brought to a stand. Such a mere unrealised possibility of further division is a pure abstraction, and has no ontological significance. This is really all that need be said on that subject. There is no problem requiring solution.

There is, however, one other way of thinking of the infinite which seems to demand a few words of comment—that, namely, which has recently been brought forward with so much ingenuity and force by Prof. Royce. Of course it would not be possible here to go into any detailed examination of the extremely interesting applications that he makes of his conception. For the simple understanding of its meaning and speculative value it is enough to take some of the crudest illustrations, which bring out the essential point of it quite as well as any others. Let us take the instances of the continuous map and the pair of mirrors.

A complete map of a country, in which every detail is fully shown, would contain among other things, it is urged, a map of the map itself. That map of the map, being also a complete map of the country, would again contain a map of the map; and so on without end. There is a weakness in this illustration; since, at the time when the map is being planned, it would not itself be one of the things contained in the country.¹ There is also the further weakness, that it may be held to be of the very essence of a map, that unimportant details should be omitted. The illustration of the pair of mirrors is more satisfactory. When two mirrors face one another, the mirror A contains the image of the mirror B: in that image there is contained the image of the mirror A, with the image of the mirror B within it; and so on to infinity. The point of these illustrations is that they appear to supply us with cases in which an infinite series is demanded by the conditions of the problem and not merely brought out by subsequent reflexion. If we are to have such a map as is described, it can only be constructed by going through an infinite series; and if two mirrors are to go on reflecting one another there is no end to the images that must be formed.

¹ Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, p. 150, where the whole subject is discussed in an extremely instructive way.

I am afraid, however, that these cases are not in reality any better than that of the indefinite subdivision of a finite object. We are still only concerned with the "bad infinite". There is no such infinite map, nor are there any such infinite reflexions. As regards the map, indeed, it may very well be classed with the old Greek puzzle about the man who says he is lying, or the head that can never become bald. I have already pointed out some of the weaknesses of the illustration; but its fatal defect is that no such map can possibly be conceived. The illustration of the mirrors is much more plausible. Mirrors do actually go on reflecting one another to an indefinite extent. At least the extent of the reflexion is indefinite for one who has not made an exact study of the properties of light, and of the conditions in which the mirrors are placed. For one who knew these circumstances with complete accuracy, it would, I suppose, be quite possible to calculate the exact point at which the image would cease to be reproduced. At any rate, it may be taken as quite certain that there is such a point. The indefinite going on is only a "naked possibility," *i.e.*, it is an abstract possibility—a possibility for one who does not know, or who deliberately leaves out, some of the essential conditions of the problem. And this is just what gives rise to the "bad infinite" in all cases: we are lured on simply because we see no reason for stopping. But it is not a mark of excellence in anything that it should contain no ground for stopping. Whatever is incoherent may go on indefinitely. There is no particular reason why Shakespeare's "Sonnets" should ever come to an end. The play of "Othello," on the other hand, being a coherent work of art, has its inevitable close.

We have now perhaps sufficiently considered the incidental points that arise in connexion with this subject; and it remains only to complete our sketch by attempting to deal with the final problem which it suggests. The final problem is simply this—How far can we claim for the idea of perfection or infinity that has now been explained that it has any ultimate objective validity? This is of course simply another way of stating the old question with regard to the proofs of the being of God; for I suppose there can be no doubt that the ideal of perfection is what men ultimately mean by the thought of God. The question, then, is this—Can we show that the ideal of perfection has a definite meaning, and that it is a principle by which the world that we know is conditioned and explained?

That it has a definite meaning ought, I think, to be apparent from what has been already stated. The perfect

or infinite, it would seem, is to be interpreted as meaning that which is not limited by anything else; and this implies, not that it contains all possible reality within itself—which is absurd—but rather that in all that is other than itself it finds *its* other, and so is not really restricted by it. What is other than itself is recognised as its necessary counterpart. From this point of view, self-sufficiency, so far from being the mark of perfection, is the sign of finitude. The rose is imperfect, not because it is other than the lily; but because it does not appreciate the lily; but the poet, who sees the beauty of both, is free from this imperfection, not because he is the lily and the rose, but because he is able to appropriate their peculiar excellence. Now, this meaning of perfection or infinity not only seems to be quite definite and intelligible, but may clearly be said to be realised wherever there is knowledge and love. To know anything or to love anything is to be infinite with regard to that.¹

We get in this way at least a partial answer to the problem that has been suggested. When it is asked whether the infinite is real, a simple answer is that it is realised in every act of knowledge and love. God is Love; and we might argue, after the manner of Descartes—I think, hence I am; I love, hence God is. More definitely, we might urge that the existence of God is proved by the existence of moral and intellectual genius. The comprehensive insight of a Shakespeare shows the existence of the infinite on a large scale; and it might be maintained that we see it even more completely in the depth of heart of a Christ or Buddha. From this point of view, therefore, it might be affirmed that there can be no doubt that God exists: the only question is—How much is there of Him? How far can He be regarded as the essential condition and secret of the universe?

This question, however, at once suggests to us that the answer that has now been given is unsatisfactory. It is not

¹ Cf. Hegel's lesser *Logic* (Wallace's trans., p. 62)—“It is, speaking rightly, the very essence of thought to be infinite. The nominal explanation of calling a thing finite is that it has an end, that it exists up to a certain point only, where it comes into contact with, and is limited by, its other. The finite therefore subsists in reference to its other, which is its negation and presents itself as its limit. Now thought is always in its own sphere; its relations are with itself, and it is its own object. In having a thought for object, I am at home with myself. The thinking power, the ‘I,’ is therefore infinite, because, when it thinks, it is in relation to an object which is itself . . . And so infinity is not, as most frequently happens, to be conceived as an abstract away and away for ever and ever, but in the simple manner that has just been indicated.”

enough that we should find actual instances of the infinite or perfect, so long as it is at least equally easy to point to instances of the finite. We mean by the idea of God not merely the idea of a being who is infinite, but that of a being who is completely infinite, and who is the key to the universe. In short, the argument that has been suggested has the same defect as the argument of Descartes for the being of self. "I think" only tells us of the existence of the self in a momentary act of apprehension: "I love" only tells us of the existence of something divine in a similar momentary act. How are we to remove this deficiency? Now I think we may best arrive at a solution of this problem by asking how we arrive at the solution of the corresponding problem with regard to self.

How do I really know that I exist? Not assuredly by murmuring to myself at intervals—"I think, hence I am". Rather, I know that I am, by knowing *what I am*—sometimes no doubt through the painful consciousness of deficiency, but sometimes also through the more joyful one of certain forms of achievement. I know that I am, in short, not from the mere abstract fact of thinking, but from the concrete building up of a particular content of experience.

Now, in like manner, it may be said that, for the proof of the being of God, the elementary abstract material before us is the simple fact "I love" or "I know"; but it is not by brooding upon this that we establish the doctrine. The establishment of the truth must rest rather, in this case also, on a certain concrete totality of experience. Every time I really know anything, or find (what is pretty nearly the same thing) that I am able to love anything, I am made aware that the world of my experience is not something alien and unintelligible, but something that I can actually appropriate as the counterpart of myself; and this inspires me with an ever increasing confidence that the world is in its essence knowable and lovable. We thus, in a manner, prove the being of God through our consciousness of ourselves; but in a manner very different from that supposed by Descartes. We reach the idea of God, not through the consciousness of our deficiency and weakness, but rather through the sense of our own perfection. It is because our eyes are like the sun, that we see the light¹: it is because we are aware of our own freedom and infinity, that we believe the universe

¹ Wäre nicht das Auge sonnenhaft,
Wie könnte es das Licht erblicken?
Wohnte nicht in uns des Gottes eigne Kraft,
Wie könnte uns das Gottliche entzücken?

to be infinite and free.¹ And this idea, we may further maintain, is proved to be real—so far as it can be proved at all—by the mere fact that we believe it. This is a revised form of the ontological argument. The idea of God proves itself to be a reality by the fact that it survives in the struggle for existence—that it continues to present itself to us as the only possible key to our experience. That it can hold itself there, is the best evidence that it is valid: it must be valid, because it is vital.

It is here, as I think, that we find the element of truth in that idea which has created so much stir in recent years under the name of "The Will to Believe". With much that passes under that title I have the smallest possible sympathy. I do not find in myself that mysterious faculty of willing, which some are so ready to claim; nor do I discover any peculiar dignity in the simple act of choice. I consider, moreover, that all true belief must rest on an intellectual, rather than on a purely volitional basis. But I think it is true that our most ultimate beliefs, and especially the belief in the being of God, may be regarded as involving an act of faith. It is the faith, however, I should say, on which our intellectual, no less than our more distinctively ethical activities depend—the faith that the universe is a thing that can be appropriated, a thing that can be known and loved. This faith certainly seems to me to be the essence of all religion; but is it not also the essence of all science, of all poetry, and of all morality? It is the salt, I think, by which alone, both in our thought and action, we are saved.

¹ Freedom, from the point of view here explained, is almost synonymous with infinity.

IV.—SCEPTICISM OF THE INSTRUMENT.¹

BY H. G. WELLS.

YOUR invitation to me to come and talk philosophy to you at the home and centre of philosophy not only flattered me exceedingly but attracted me very strongly for quite other reasons. I responded to Mr. Sturt, who conveyed that invitation to me, with an alacrity that may even have alarmed him. I announced to him by return of post that I would read you a paper on the "Metaphysics of an Amateur". In reply, and as it were to give me some taste of your quality, Mr. Sturt sent me a rather large, very interesting, and occasionally difficult book called *Personal Idealism*. This crossed a postcard from me saying that the paper I proposed to read you would be better called the "Philosophy of an Amateur". You must imagine after that a decent pause, broken only by a sound of turning leaves and by an occasional sigh. Then came the manifest consequences of this unforeseen lapse into study on my part. I wrote to Mr. Sturt transposing my title into a different key, and "Scepticism of the Instrument" was the final title I chose. But I can assure you that for the rest, this is exactly the paper of my original intention.

I recall those earlier titles to-night because they serve to define my attitude towards what I conceive to be your atmosphere, and to apologise to a certain extent for my impudent acceptance of your invitation. They are, I think, none the less expressive because they are essentially absurd. They are absurd because to talk of the Philosophy of an Amateur is to imply a sort of Professional Philosophy, Philosophy that has specialised and become technical, and that is just exactly what Philosophy cannot do. Philosophy must surely remain as wide as thought, as general as literature, as comprehensive as anything, and it is absurd to talk of a professional speciali-

¹ Paper read to the Oxford Philosophical Society, 8th Nov., 1903. The Editor of MIND has printed it practically as it was read.

sation that takes everything for its province. Every man who thinks must needs think upon a philosophical framework, explicit or implicit ; we are all philosophers directly we broaden to a philosophical inquiry, and it was, I perceived, a quite preposterous modesty to come before you deliberately, self-labelled Amateur.

And yet, as I say, that word, for all its inaccuracy, conveys something I find no other word conveys so well. There exists an extensive philosophical literature, in which I am, in these present surroundings, conspicuously unread, and definite courses of philosophical study that I have not pursued. I am sorry for it. But life is short, crowded with other interests, and some have had a stronger appeal for me. To many minds—conceivably to some of yours—this philosophical literature is the sum of philosophical wisdom, and such courses as you follow here the only proper justification for philosophical pretension. To discuss philosophical questions, without such qualifications, must appear from that standpoint the vilest of presumptions. At first, before I realised you at all, I was disposed to assume *that* as your probable attitude in general, and to make concessions to it, to assume that you would all be disposed to hold—as the unthinking multitude certainly holds—that here on the one hand is the natural man, here in his everyday world, and there, on the other, is philosophy, the particular right philosophy, the only orthodox world view-point, a long way up and over there, far away from the things of this life, and that from here to there is a tedious and toilsome and singularly unprofitable scramble over rocky books and arguments. I assumed too as a consequence of this unjust anticipation of what you might be, that you would display something of the same hostility to any one who not only had not traversed, but did not intend to traverse, that arduous path, that a good Mussulman would feel towards any one who sported a green turban without the qualifying journey to Mecca.

But afterwards I decided that it was unfair to you to make such assumptions, that probably it would not offend you if after repudiating that journey I still dealt with you as one Philosopher of a sort among other Philosophers presumably of a rather different and better sort (yet equal under Heaven), and that even if it did not appeal to you quite as that, it really did not—in the last resort—matter so very much. For my own part, what I understand by Metaphysics and Philosophy is something nearer than breathing and closer than hands and feet, something in its last essential aspect incurably personal, implicit sometimes and as unsuspected as

Monsieur Jourdain's power of prose, and made explicit mainly by clear-headed self-examination, something common to all men just as far as, and no further than, their individualities have things in common.

Now if I am right in considering, as I do, that one's philosophical belief should be merely one's own more or less thoroughly explored mental basis more or less thoroughly mapped and *the statement of the systematised attitude of one's individuality to thought and things in general*, then sound philosophical discussion resolves itself into a comparison of philosophies with one another and with the general medium of communication. And it seems to me, after all these preliminary qualifications, that I may most propitiously attempt to interest you this evening by describing very briefly the rude home-spun metaphysical and philosophical system in which I do my thinking, and more particularly by setting out for your consideration one or two points in which I seem to myself to differ most pointedly from the current philosophy of the man in the street. My hope that this may appeal to you is strengthened by the fact that though my process and method seems to me to differ pretty definitely from yours, though I seem to follow a path of my own, yet it is probable that I do at last emerge somewhere near to and parallel with what you are calling here Pragmaticism and Humanism as I find these terms defined by Mr. Schiller. You must be prepared (let me warn you) for things that will strike you as crude, for a certain difference of accent and dialect that you may not like, and you must be prepared too to hear the clumsy statement of my ignorant rediscovery of things already beautifully thought out and said. And it is quite unavoidable that in setting out these intellectual foundations of mine, that I should lapse for a moment or so towards autobiography.

A convergence of circumstances led to my having my knowledge of concrete things quite extensively developed before I came to philosophical examination at all. I have heard some one say that a savage or an animal is mentally a purely objective being, and in that respect I was like a savage or an animal until I was well over twenty. I was extremely unaware of the subjective or introverted element in my being. I was a Positivist without knowing it. My early education was a feeble one, it was one in which my private observation, inquiry and experiment were far more important factors than any instruction, or rather perhaps the instruction I received was less even than what I learnt for myself, and it terminated at thirteen. I had come into pretty intimate contact with the harder realities of life, with

hunger in various forms, and many base and disagreeable necessities, before I was fifteen. About that age, following the indication of certain theological and speculative curiosities, I began to learn something of what I will call deliberately and justly, Elementary Science—stuff I got out of *Cassell's Popular Educator* and cheap text-books—and then, through accidents and ambitions that do not matter in the least to us now, I came to three years of illuminating and good scientific work. The central fact of those three years was Huxley's course in Comparative Anatomy at the school in Exhibition Road. About that as a nucleus I arranged a spacious digest of facts. At the end of that time I had acquired what I still think was an exceptionally clear and ordered view of the ostensibly real universe. Let me try to give you the chief things I had. I had man definitely placed in the great scheme of space and time. I knew him incurably for what he was, finite and not final, a being of compromises and adaptations. I had traced his lungs, for example, from a swimming bladder, step by step, with scalpel and probe, through a dozen types or more, I had seen the ancestral caecum shrink to that disease nest, the appendix of to-day, I had watched the gill slit patched slowly to the purposes of the ear and the reptile jaw suspension utilised to eke out the needs of a sense organ taken from its native and natural water. I had worked out the development of those extraordinarily unsatisfactory and untrustworthy instruments, man's teeth, from the skin scutes of the shark to their present function as a basis for gold stoppings, and followed the slow unfolding of the complex and painful process of gestation through which man comes into the world. I had followed all these things and many kindred things by dissection and in embryology—I had checked the whole theory of development again in a year's course of palaeontology, and I had taken the dimensions of the whole process, by the scale of the stars, in a course of astronomical physics. And all that amount of objective elucidation came before I had reached the beginnings of any philosophical or metaphysical inquiry, any inquiry as to why I believed, how I believed, what I believed, or what the fundamental stuff of things was.

Now following hard upon this interlude with knowledge, came a time when I had to give myself to teaching, and it became advisable to acquire one of those Teaching Diplomas that are so widely and so foolishly despised, and that enterprise set me to a superficial, but suggestive study of educational method, of educational theory, of logic, of psychology, and so at last, when the little affair with the diploma was

settled, to philosophy. Now to come to logic over the bracing uplands of comparative anatomy is to come to logic with a lot of very natural preconceptions blown clean out of one's mind. It is, I submit, a way of taking logic in the flank. When you have realised to the marrow, that all the physical organs of man and all his physical structure are what they are through a series of adaptations and approximations, and that they are kept up to a level of practical efficiency only by the elimination of death, and that this is true also of his brain and of his instincts and of many of his mental pre-dispositions, you are not going to take his thinking apparatus unquestioningly as being in any way mysteriously different and better. And I had read only a little logic before I became aware of implications that I could not agree with, and assumptions that seemed to me to be altogether at variance with the general scheme of objective fact established in my mind.

I came to an examination of logical processes and of language with the expectation that they would share the profoundly provisional character, the character of irregular limitation and adaptation that pervades the whole physical and animal being of man. And I found the thing I had expected. And as a consequence I found a sort of intellectual hardihood about the assumptions of logic, that at first confused me and then roused all the latent scepticism in my mind.

My first quarrel with the accepted logic I developed long ago in a little paper that was printed in the *Fortnightly Review* in July, 1891. It was called the "Rediscovery of the Unique," and re-reading it I perceive not only how bad and even annoying it was in manner—a thing I have long known—but also how remarkably bad it was in expression. It disregarded quite completely the fact that a whole literature upon the antagonism of the one and the many, of the specific ideal and the individual reality, was already in existence. It defined no relations to other thought or thinkers. I understand now what I did not understand then, and that is why it was totally ignored. But the idea underlying that paper I cling to to-day, and I will try and present it now, in I hope a more acceptable form, as the best opening of my general case. My opening scepticism is essentially a doubt of the objective reality of classification. I have it in my mind that classification is a necessary condition of the working of the mental implement but that it is a departure from the objective truth of things, that classification is very serviceable for the practical purposes of life but a very doubt-

ful preliminary to those fine penetrations the philosophical purpose, in its more arrogant moods, demands.

A mind nourished upon anatomical study is of course permeated with the suggestion of the vagueness and instability of biological species. A biological species is quite obviously a great number of unique individuals which is separable from other biological species only by the fact that an enormous number of other linking individuals are inaccessible in time—are in other words dead and gone—and each new individual in that species does, in the distinction of its own individuality, break away in however infinitesimal degree from the previous average properties of the species. There is no property of any species, even the properties that constitute the specific definition, that is not a matter of more or less. If, for example, a species be distinguished by a single large red spot on the back, you will find if you go over a great number of specimens that red spot shrinking here to nothing, expanding there to a more general redness, weakening to pink, deepening to russet and brown, shading into crimson, and so on, and so on. And this is true not only of biological species. It is true of the mineral specimens constituting a mineral species and I remember as a constant refrain in the lectures of Prof. Judd upon rock classification, the words "they pass into one another by insensible gradations". You will think perhaps of atoms of the elements as instances of identically similar things, but these are things not of experience but of theory, and there is not a phenomenon in chemistry that is not equally well explained on the supposition that it is merely the immense quantities of atoms necessarily taken in any experiment that mask by the operation of the law of averages the fact that each atom also has its unique quality, its special individual difference. This idea of uniqueness in all individuals is not only true of the classifications of material science; it is true of the species of common thought, it is true of common terms. Take the word *chair*. When one says chair, one thinks vaguely of an average chair. But collect individual instances, think of arm-chairs and reading chairs, and dining-room chairs and kitchen chairs, chairs that pass into benches, chairs that cross the boundary and become settees, dentists' chairs, thrones, opera stalls, seats of all sorts, those miraculous fungoid growths that cumber the floor of the Arts and Crafts Exhibition, and you will perceive what a lax bundle in fact is this simple straightforward term. In co-operation with an intelligent joiner I would undertake to defeat any definition of chair or chairishness that you gave me. Chairs just as much as individual

organisms, just as much as mineral and rock specimens, are unique things—if you know them well enough you will find an individual difference even in a set of machine-made chairs—and it is only because we do not possess minds of unlimited capacity, because our brain has only a limited number of pigeon-holes for our correspondences with an unlimited universe of objective uniques, that we have to delude ourselves into the belief that there is a chairishness in this species common to and distinctive of all chairs.

Let me repeat; this is of the very smallest importance in all the practical affairs of life, or indeed in relation to anything but philosophy. But in philosophy it matters profoundly. If I order two new-laid eggs for breakfast, up come two unhatched but still unique avian individuals, and the chances are they serve my rude physiological purpose. I can afford to ignore the hens' eggs of the past that were not quite so nearly this sort of thing, and the hens' eggs of the future that will accumulate modification age by age; I can venture to ignore the rare chance of an abnormality in chemical composition and of any startling aberration in my physiological reaction; I can, with a confidence that is practically perfect, say with unqualified simplicity "two eggs," but not if my concern is not my morning's breakfast but the utmost possible truth.

Now I submit to you as my first point for consideration, that syllogism is based on classification, that all hard logical reasoning tends to imply and is apt to imply a confidence in the objective reality of classification. Classification and number, which in truth ignore the fine differences of objective realities, have in the past of human thought been imposed upon things. Let me for clearness' sake take a liberty here—commit, as you may perhaps think, an unpardonable insolence. Hindoo thought (of which I confess I know very little) and Greek thought (of which I know scarcely more) impress me as being obsessed by the necessary conditions of human thought—by number and definition and class and abstract form. But these things, number, definition, class and abstract form, I hold, are merely unavoidable conditions to mental activity—regrettable conditions rather than essential facts. I have the impression that Plato regarded the *idea* as the something behind reality, whereas it seems to me that the idea is the more proximate and less perfect thing, the thing by which the mind, by ignoring individual differences, attempts to comprehend an otherwise unmanageable number of unique realities.

Let me finally give you a rough figure of what I am try-

ing to convey in this first heading of my discourse. You have seen the results of those various methods of black and white reproduction that involve the use of a rectangular net. You know the sort of process picture I mean—it used to be employed very frequently in reproducing photographs. At a little distance you really seem to have a faithful reproduction of the original picture, but when you peer closely you find not the unique form and masses of the original, but a multitude of little rectangles, uniform in shape and size. The more earnestly you go into the thing, the closer you look, the more the picture is lost in reticulations. I submit the world of reasoned inquiry has a very similar relation to the world I call objectively real. For the rough purposes of every day the net-work picture will do, but the finer your purpose the less it will serve, and for an ideally fine purpose, for absolute and general knowledge that will be as true for a man at a distance with a telescope as for a man with a microscope it will not serve at all. It is true you can make your net of logical interpretation finer and finer, you can fine your classification more and more—up to a certain limit. But essentially you are working in limits, and as you come closer, as you look at finer and subtler things, as you leave the practical purpose for which the method exists, the element of error increases. Every species is vague, every term goes cloudy at its edges, and so in my way of thinking, relentless logic is only another phrase for a stupidity, for a sort of intellectual pigheadedness. If you push a philosophical or metaphysical inquiry through a series of valid syllogisms—never committing any recognised or recognisable fallacy—you nevertheless leave a certain rubbing and marginal loss of objective truth and you get deflections that are difficult to trace, at each phase in the process. Every species waggles about in its definition, every tool is a little loose in its handle, every scale has its individual error. So long as you are reasoning for practical purposes about the finite things of experience, you can every now and then check your process, and correct your adjustments. But not when you make what are called philosophical and theological inquiries, when you turn your implement towards the final absolute truth of things. Doing that is like firing at an inaccessible, unmarkable and indestructible target at an unknown distance, with a defective rifle and variable cartridges. Even if by chance you hit, you cannot know that you hit and so it will matter nothing at all.

This assertion of the necessary untrustworthiness of all reasoning processes arising out of the fallacy of classification

in what is quite conceivably a universe of uniques is only one introductory aspect of my general scepticism of the Instrument of Thought. I have now to tell you of another aspect of my doubt, and that concerns negative terms. Classes in logic are not only represented by circles with a hard firm outline, whereas they have no such definite limits, but also there is a constant disposition to think of negative terms as if they represented positive classes. With words just as with numbers and abstract forms there are definite phases of human development. There is, you know, with regard to number, the phase when man can barely count at all, or counts in perfect good faith and sanity upon his fingers. Then there is the phase when he is struggling with the development of number, when he begins to elaborate all sorts of ideas about numbers, until at last he develops complex superstitions about perfect numbers and imperfect numbers, about threes and sevens and the like. The same is the case with abstracted forms, and even to-day we are scarcely more than heads out of the vast subtle muddle of thinking about spheres and ideal perfect forms and so on, that was the price of this little necessary step to clear thinking. You know better than I do how large a part numerical and geometrical magic, numerical and geometrical philosophy has played in the history of the mind. And the whole apparatus of language and communication is beset with like dangers. The language of the savage is, I suppose, purely positive; the thing has a name, the name has a thing. This indeed is the tradition of language, and to-day even, we, when we hear a name, are predisposed—and sometimes it is a very vicious indisposition—to imagine forthwith something answering to the name. We are disposed, as an incurable mental vice, to accumulate intension in terms. If I say to you Wodget or Crump, you find yourself passing over the fact that these are nothings, these are, so to speak, mere blankety blanks, and trying to think what sort of thing a Wodget or a Crump may be. And where this disposition has come in, in its most alluring guise, is in the case of negative terms. Our instrument of knowledge persists in handling even such openly negative terms as the Absolute, the Infinite, as though they were real existences, and when the negative element is ever so little disguised, as it is in such a word as Omnipotence, then the illusion of positive reality may be complete.

Please remember that I am trying to tell you my philosophy, and not arguing against yours. Let me try and express how in my wild aboriginal mind this matter of

negative terms has shaped itself. I think of something which I may perhaps best describe as being off the stage or out of court, or as the Void without Implications, or as Nothingness or as Outer Darkness. This is a sort of hypothetical beyond to the visible world of human thought, and thither I think all negative terms reach at last, and merge and become nothing. Whatever positive class you make, whatever boundary you draw, straight away from that boundary begins the corresponding negative class and passes into the illimitable horizon of nothingness. You talk of pink things, you ignore, if you are a good logician, the more elusive shades of pink, and draw your line. Beyond is the not pink, known and knowable, and still in the not pink region one comes to the Outer Darkness. That same Outer Darkness and nothingness is infinite space, and infinite time, and any being of infinite qualities, and all that region I rule out of court in my philosophy altogether. I will neither affirm nor deny if I can help it here. If I use the word 'infinite' I use it as one often uses 'countless,' "the countless hosts of the enemy"—or 'immeasurable'—"immeasurable cliffs"—that is to say as the limit of measurement rather than as the limit of imaginary measurability, as a convenient equivalent to as many times this cloth yard as you can, and as many again and so on and so on. And, as I say, a great number of apparently positive terms are, or have become, practically negative terms and are under the same ban with me. A considerable number of terms that have played a great part in the world of thought, seem to me to be invalidated by this same defect, to have no content or an undefined content or an unjustifiable content. For example, that word Omniscient, as implying infinite knowledge, impresses me as being a word with a delusive air of being solid and full, when it is really hollowed and with no content whatever. I am persuaded that knowing is the relation of a conscious being to something not itself, that the thing known is defined as a system of parts and aspects and relationships, that knowledge is comprehension, and so that only finite things can know or be known. When you talk of a being of infinite extension and infinite duration, omniscient and omnipotent and Perfect, you seem to me to be talking in negatives of nothing whatever. When you speak of the Absolute you speak to me of nothing. If however you talk of a great yet finite and thinkable being, a being not myself, extending beyond my imagination in time and space, knowing all that I can think of as known and capable of doing all that I can think

of as done, you come into the sphere of my mental operations, and into the scheme of my philosophy.

But that is a theological digression.

These then are my first two charges against our Instrument of Knowledge, firstly, that it can work only by disregarding individuality and treating uniques as identically similar objects in this respect or that so as to group them under one term, and that once it has done so it tends automatically to intensify the significance of that term, and secondly, that it can only deal freely with negative terms by treating them as though they were positive. But I have a further objection to the Instrument of Human Thought, and that is one rather more difficult to convey.

Essentially this idea is to present a sort of stratification in human ideas. I have it very much in mind that various terms in our reasoning lie at different levels in different planes and that we accomplish a large amount of error and confusion by reasoning terms together that do not lie or nearly lie in the same plane. Let me endeavour to make myself a little less obscure by a most flagrant instance from physical things. Suppose some one began to talk seriously of a man seeing an atom through a microscope, or better perhaps of cutting one in half with a knife. There are a number of non-analytical people who would be quite prepared to believe that an atom could be visible to the eye or cut in this manner. But any one at all conversant with physical conceptions would almost as soon think of killing the square root of 2 with a rook rifle as of cutting an atom in half with a knife. Our conception of an atom is reached through a process of hypothesis and analysis, and in the world of atoms there are no knives and no men to cut. If you have thought with a strong consistent mental movement, then when you have thought of your atom under the knife blade, your knife blade has itself become a cloud of swinging grouped atoms, and your microscope lens a little universe of oscillatory and vibratory molecules. If you think of the universe, thinking at the level of atoms, there is neither knife to cut, scale to weigh nor eye to see. The universe at that plane into which the mind of the molecular physicist descends has none of the shapes or forms of our common life whatever. This hand is to him a cloud of warring atoms and molecules, combining and recombining, colliding, rotating, flying hither and thither in the universal atmosphere of ether.

You see, I hope, what I mean, when I say that the universe of molecular physics is at a different level from the universe of common experience;—what we call stable and

solid is in that world a freely moving system of interlacing centres of force, what we call colour and sound is there no more than this length of vibration or that. We have reached to a conception of that universe of molecular physics by a great enterprise of organised analysis and our universe of daily experiences stands in relation to that elemental world as if it were a synthesis of those elemental things.

I would suggest to you that this is only a very extreme instance of the general state of affairs, that there may be finer and subtler differences of level between one term and another, and that terms may very well be thought of as lying obliquely and as being twisted through different levels. It will perhaps give a clearer idea of what I am seeking to convey if I suggest a concrete image for the whole world of a man's thought and knowledge. Imagine a large clear jelly, in which at all angles and in all states of simplicity or contortion his ideas are imbedded. They are all valid and possible ideas as they lie, none in reality incompatible with any. If you imagine the direction of up or down in this clear jelly being as it were the direction in which one moves by analysis or by synthesis, if you go down for example from matter to atoms and centres of force and up to men and states and countries—if you will imagine the ideas lying in that manner—you will get the beginning of my intention. But our Instrument, or process of thinking, like a drawing before the discovery of perspective, appears to have difficulties with the third dimension, appears capable only of dealing with or reasoning about ideas by projecting them upon the same plane. It will be obvious that a great multitude of things may very well exist together in a solid jelly, which would be overlapping and incompatible and mutually destructive, when projected together upon a plane. Through the bias in our Instrument to do this, through reasoning between terms not in the same plane, an enormous amount of confusion, perplexity and mental deadlocking occurs. The old theological deadlock between predestination and free-will serves admirably as an example of the sort of deadlock I mean. Take life at the level of common sensation and common experience and there is no more indisputable fact than man's freedom of will, unless it is his complete moral responsibility. But make only the least penetrating of analyses and you perceive a world of inevitable consequences, a rigid succession of cause and effect. Insist upon a flat agreement between the two, and there you are! The Instrument fails.

It is upon these three objections, and upon an extreme

suspicion of abstract terms, that I chiefly rest my case for a profound scepticism of the remoter possibilities of the Instrument of Thought. It is a thing no more perfect than the human eye or the human ear, though like those other instruments it may have undefined possibilities of evolution towards increased range, and increased power.

So much for my main contention. But before I conclude I may—since I am here—say a little more in the autobiographical vein, and with a view to your discussion to show how I reconcile this fundamental scepticism with the very positive beliefs about world-wide issues I possess, and the very definite distinction I make between right and wrong.

I reconcile these things by simply pointing out to you that if there is any validity in my image of that three dimensional jelly in which our ideas are suspended, such a reconciliation as you demand in logic, such a projection of the things as in accordance upon one plane, is totally unnecessary and impossible. This insistence upon the element of uniqueness in being, this subordination of the class to the individual difference, not only destroys the universal claim of philosophy, but the universal claim of ethical imperatives, the universal claim of any religious teaching. If you press me back upon my fundamental position I must confess I put faith and standards and rules of conduct upon exactly the same level as I put my belief of what is right in art, and what I consider right practice in art. I have arrived at a certain sort of self-knowledge and there are, I find, very distinct imperatives for me, but I am quite prepared to admit there is no proving them imperative on any one else. One's political proceedings, one's moral acts are, I hold, just as much self-expression as one's poetry or painting or music. But since life has for its primordial elements assimilation and aggression, I try not only to obey my imperatives, but to put them persuasively and convincingly into other minds, to bring about *my* good and to resist and overcome *my* evil as though they were the Good and the Evil. And it is obviously in no way contradictory to this philosophy, for me, if I find others responding sympathetically to any notes of mine or if I find myself responding sympathetically to notes sounding about me, to give that common resemblance between myself and others a name, to refer these others and myself in common to this thing as if it were externalised and spanned us all. Scepticism of the Instrument is for example not incompatible with religious association and with organisation upon the basis of a common faith. It is possible to regard God as a Being synthetic in relation to

men and societies, just as the idea of a universe of atoms and molecules and inorganic relationships is analytical in relation to human life.

The repudiation of demonstration in any but immediate and verifiable cases that this Scepticism of the Instrument amounts to, the abandonment of any universal validity for moral and religious propositions, brings ethical, social and religious teaching into the province of poetry, and does something to correct the estrangement between knowledge and beauty that is a feature of so much mental existence at this time. All these things are self-expression. Such an opinion sets a new and greater value on that penetrating and illuminating quality of mind we call insight, insight which when it faces towards the contradictions that arise out of the imperfections of the mental instrument is called humour. In these innate, unteachable qualities lies such hope of intellectual salvation as we may entertain in this uncertain and fluctuating world of unique appearances. It has been the constant flaw of reasoned belief in the past that it excluded a humorous charity towards all but the petty and negligible contradictions of life.

So frankly I spread my little equipment of fundamental assumptions before you, heartily glad of the opportunity you have given me of taking them out, of looking at them with the particularity the presence of hearers ensures, and of hearing the impression they make upon you. Of course such a sketch must have an inevitable crudity of effect. The time I had for it—I mean the time I was able to give in preparation—was altogether too limited for any exhaustive finish of presentation; but I think on the whole I have got the main lines of this sketch map of my mental basis true. Whether I have made myself comprehensible is a different question altogether. It is for you rather than me to say how this sketch map of mine lies with regard to your own more systematic cartography. There were times in my reading of your *Personal Idealism* when, with a certain pride, I seemed to be sounding in response to modern Oxford, and times when I very distinctly was not. I chased your elusive common intention through eight various papers by eight various authors with some pertinacity. It was I will confess an arduous hunt. The quarry of your meaning took cover from me, now in Latin and now in Greek, tongues unknown to me, and when it trotted out on the other side it was always harder to follow than ever. There were passages of Hegelian, I remember, more terrible to a simple man than Greek. Figures of speech also distracted me extremely, Greek ethical students, for ex-

ample, throwing themselves into the arms of Nature, beneath the rarefied and shadowy form of the abnegating Sage, and a tangle of Narcissus and Hylas and Naiads and the Judæo-Christian ideal and Nietzsche all appealing forcibly down the same paragraph. I am not accustomed to hunt in such richness of vegetation and I will admit perplexities and fatigues. Then I came upon "Science tells us," and immediately afterwards upon the word "scientist" and for a time I did not so much hunt as bolt. I made some flying leaps. Indeed I find your eight witnesses very difficult as a whole. With one I have prospered better, and as I read Mr. Schiller's Humanism there are times when I say almost without hesitation, this is about where I am. Almost without hesitation! And then again with the utmost hesitation. On the whole I think it is better to leave this question of our relative positions an open one for you to decide if you will.

V.—THE CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE IN ITS RELATION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY.

BY T. M. FORSYTH.

NOTHING is more characteristic of English philosophy than the insistence, on the part of each of its exponents in turn, that his system is grounded on experience. However they differ from one another either in their fundamental tenets or in points of detail, they agree that philosophy consists in reflexion on, or interpretation of, experience. Even the term 'observation,' if used in a large sense, is not in general obnoxious to the view of his attitude to experience taken by the successive thinkers. Thus Locke, Hume, and Reid alike use the word 'observation' as applicable to inquiry into the fundamental principles of knowledge no less than to the investigations of (say) the physicist or the astronomer. No doubt, even as regards the methods of science, the term has to be used in a wide sense before it will cover all phases of the procedure. But it is only extending its use still further and not overstepping the limits of its most general and simplest meaning of 'notice' or 'look,'¹ to take it as describing the method of investigation in all spheres alike. Apart, however, from the satisfactoriness of any single word descriptive of method, the starting-point of philosophy is most simply and at the same time most fitly stated to be experience. And the insistence on this is typical of the English (not, of course, excluding the Scottish) manner of thought. Notwithstanding its diversities and antagonisms the English philosophy as a whole is distinctively a philosophy of experience. Reid, for example, in opposing Locke and his successors distinguishes the 'principles of reason' from what he regards himself as in agreement with them in calling 'experience'. But in a wider way he considers his stand-

¹ Comparison with the Greek *θεωρία* is perhaps not too trite to be suggestive.

point and procedure to be quite the same as theirs. "They have put us," he says, "in the right road—that of experience and accurate reflexion."¹ Their procedure "is the only one by which any real discovery in philosophy can be made".² And even when Hamilton distinguishes between the methods of observation and analysis, it is explicitly as two ways of investigating experience—those of generalising its facts and of ascertaining its necessary implicates.³ Once more, not to multiply instances, we find Ferrier protesting against any limitation of the term 'experience' which implies that it signifies aught but the sole basis of knowledge.⁴

In view of this community of emphasis, it is easy to see that the differences between the phases or stages of English philosophic thought will be connected with the presuppositions of the various thinkers as to the general character or mould, so to say, of experience. Without going back so far as Bacon or Hobbes, we have the keynote of English philosophy struck in Locke's initial principle : "Whence has it [the mind] all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself."⁵ What his philosophy or that of any of his successors shall mainly be depends on their first *aperçu* of the nature of experience. An outline of the phases through which English philosophy has passed will be coincident with that of the stages in the unfolding of the conception of experience.⁶ Such an outline as can be given within moderate limits must be of the nature of a suggestion rather than a discussion.

We find Locke distinguishing two sources or kinds of experience—sensation and reflexion. But his statements concerning them do not serve to establish their distinction as either co-ordinate sources of the materials of knowledge or diverse functions of knowledge. For the various operations of the mind which are observed in reflexion are employed about the ideas obtained from sense; and further, the mind is as passive in the reception of ideas from reflexion as from

¹ *Works* (ed. Hamilton), i., 101.

² P. 97.

³ *Lectures on Metaphysics*, ii., 193.

⁴ Cp. *Institutes of Metaphysic*, p. 255.

⁵ *Essay conc. Human Understanding*, ii., 1, 2.

⁶ In what follows experience is regarded from the purely cognitive standpoint. A reference (express or implied) to the essentially practical character of all experience can, however, scarcely fail of recognition by the student of English philosophy from Bacon onwards. This consideration does not invalidate, but it supplements and reinterprets, the other.

sensation.¹ Locke's designation of reflexion as internal sense indicates the comparative unimportance of the distinction so far as his authentic view of experience is concerned. The implication of this view is brought out in Hume's contention that impressions are the only originals of knowledge. He continues to distinguish impressions of sensation and of reflexion, but treats the latter, like ideas, as derivative. "The impressions of reflexion are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and derived from them."² Hume's perception that it is erroneous to distinguish sensation and reflexion in such wise as to suggest that there are two diverse sources of experience is, like other of his differences from Locke, foreshadowed in several passages of Berkeley's early *Commonplace Book*. One passage in particular, which is entered as a memorandum in reference to his projected *Principles of Human Knowledge*, reads: "To begin . . . not with mention of sensation and reflexion, but instead of sensation to use perception or thought in general".³ Thus although in the opening sentences of the *Principles* Berkeley uses language precisely similar to Locke's, he had previously doubted its propriety; and throughout his exposition of the principles of knowledge the terminology is frequently in accord with Hume's rather than Locke's. Moreover, his inclination to diverge from Locke's mode of statement takes another form in Berkeley's early notes,—one that is afterwards extended in his later writings. We find him questioning from the first the fitness of calling the operations of the mind 'ideas'; and his subsequent use of the word 'notion' in contradistinction to 'idea' for the operations or activities of mind is only an elucidation of his youthful suggestions. In the second edition of the *Principles*, where the new term first appears, Berkeley nowhere distinctly identifies mental operations with the notions which are said to be the apprehension of them; but in his later philosophical work, *Siris*,⁴ this identification is expressly made. Ideas as passively received objects are directly opposed to notions, which are the acts or operations of the mind. In one aspect of it, Berkeley's conceptions of notions may be looked upon as foreshadowing the Kantian theory of knowledge;⁵ more especially in respect of the connexion of notions with 'relations'. This suggestion, however, Berkeley does not further develop, and it remains wholly without influence on later

¹ *Essay*, ii., 1, 2-4 and 25.

² *Treatise*, i., 1, 2.

³ *Works* (ed. Fraser, 1901), i., 27.

⁴ Sect. 308.

⁵ Cp. Prof. Pringle-Pattison's *Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 40-43.

thinkers. It is accordingly the reverse side of the distinction, namely the stress it lays on the passivity of ideas, that helps to bring out the view of experience which forms the fundamental presupposition of the whole Lockian development. This view is, that the original materials of knowledge are passively received data of sense *about* or *upon* which thought is engaged. Experience is regarded as consisting ultimately of unitary items of consciousness—which Locke and Berkeley call ‘sensations’ or ‘ideas’, and Hume ‘impressions’—that are known in isolation from one another. These distinct impressions or simple ideas are, Locke assures us,¹ the unequivocal certainties of experience. And Hume reiterates: “All perceptions are distinct”. “All our distinct perceptions are distinct existences.”² No doubt Locke, in the more specially epistemological portion of the *Essay*, in book iv., treats knowledge as consisting not in the isolated ideas themselves, but in apprehension of their relations of whatever kind.³ But the very terms of his statement imply that the ideas are already known. It is as the *objects* of mind that they form material for its elaboration. Knowledge is said to be of the relations of what are nevertheless conceived as detached existences, known separately and forming at once the basis and the object-matter of thought. Alongside their relations to one another Locke puts their relation to real existence. But he is unable to make clear wherein this sort of relation differs from the other.

Now when we inquire into the connexions of this conception of experience, we find its source to lie in the attempt to explain experience as the outcome of the juxtaposition of individual minds with an independently existing material world. It is a consequence, therefore, of that complete antithesis of mental and material existence which gave its precise form to the central problem of modern philosophy; the initial phase of this problem being to account for the origin of experience on the presupposition of the mutual independence of mind and matter. Experience thus contemplated is plausibly supposed to consist fundamentally of disjunct occurrences in the experient mind. Although much of Locke’s thought is inconsistent with this explanation of experience and should rather be interpreted as pioneer-work in the direction of surmounting it, it is unquestionably the

¹ *Essay*, ii., 2, 1.

² *Treatise* (ed. Green and Grose), i., 558, 559; (ed. Selby-Bigge), pp. 634, 636.

³ IV., i., 1-7.

source of his predominant conception of the nature of ideas. The supposition, too, that in such discrete ideas are to be found the primary or immediate *objects* of the mind in which they occur is another outcome of the same original assumption.¹ It is the preconceived independence and disparity of the two existents that seem to make the mind's knowledge of its own states, as such, the basis of whatever else it may know. This view of ideas remains the controlling principle of the whole development. Hume's 'impressions,' however he may guard them against any assumption as to their origin, are essentially 'distinct perceptions'. They are separate existences apprehended in their isolation, and having no intrinsic relations either to one another or to anything else. In so far as his insistence on the separateness of ideas implies that abstract reasoning can establish no connexions between them it is invaluable. But it proves untenable when taken as giving an actual account of the experiential basis of knowledge.²

It is not my intention to go through in detail the consequences of this fundamental presupposition. What I wish to do rather is to look at the views of experience that appear subsequently in English philosophy and to consider their relations to it of opposition and development. A new phase in English philosophic thought—that inaugurated by Reid—begins with the rejection of this principle. The general result of Hume's philosophy may perhaps be expressed most simply by saying that it is the identification of *idea* and *existence*. From this feature in his doctrine, at all events, Reid's antagonism takes its rise. Ideas are objects (the Humian philosophy maintains), but there is no proof that they are ideas of objects in the sense of implying existences beyond themselves. The existence of anything and the idea of it are one and the same. As Hume puts it: "The idea of existence is the very same with the idea of what we conceive to be existent. To reflect on anything simply, and to reflect on it as existent, are nothing different from each other. That idea, when conjoined with the idea of any object, makes no addition to it."³ In a word, the idea of the existence of an object is the same as the idea of the object. It follows, if they are ideas alone that are the objects of know-

¹ Cp. *Scottish Philosophy*, p. 15 ff.

² A complete 'answer' to Hume must be grounded on a psychology for which isolated data are essentially abstractions. Cp. Prof. James's *Principles of Psychology*, i., 245, 487.

³ *Treatise*, i., 2, 6.

ledge, that the only existence we know is the existence of ideas. The inadequacy of this as an account of our experience Reid never doubts. He sets himself accordingly to examine 'the principles upon which this system is built': and he finds that it 'leans with its whole weight upon a hypothesis' for which there is no warrant—the hypothesis that the mind's own ideas are the only immediate objects of knowledge. Reid does not, as we have seen, consider the method or the basis of his philosophy to differ from those of his predecessors. Its method is observational; its basis is experience. The source of error in the preceding systems lies, he holds, in the 'theories' or assumptions which are unwarrantably foisted upon experience and so preclude an adequate interpretation of the facts. The root-assumption is the 'theory of ideas'. Reid sees clearly that the outcome of the Lockian development is already predetermined in the presuppositions from which it begins. The reasoning he acknowledges to be quite 'just': the conclusions follow inevitably from the premisses. "We must," then, "either admit the conclusion or call in question the premisses."¹ But the conclusion is one which Reid finds it quite impossible to accept. That ideas are 'the sole existences in the universe' is too flagrantly in contradiction with common sense to be aught but a self-refutation of the philosophy in which the conception occurs. He directs his attack therefore against the principles on which it is based.

In opposition to the fundamental assumption of the Lockian development Reid urges that the object of knowledge is always other than the idea in which it is known. In perception, for example, "the object perceived is one thing, and the perception of that object another".² The object is not a percept or idea, but a quality or a fact. Similarly, in memory and imagination the object is not the memorial or the constructive image, but a fact remembered or imagined. Even when the object is an idea, it is not identical with the idea that is the vehicle of the knowledge of it, and yet it is immediately and not merely mediately known. "Every object of knowledge is an immediate object."³ In thus insisting that every object is as immediate as any other, Reid keeps more steadily to the divergence of his principles from any doctrine of representative knowledge or the issues which such a doctrine entails than does Hamilton. One of the latter's main criticisms of Reid is on the score that he fails to distinguish between immediate and mediate knowledge. But to say (as

¹ *Works*, i., 109.

² P. 292; cp. 106.

³ P. 427.

Hamilton does¹) that in memory, for instance, the immediate object of knowledge is the memory image, and that in perception what is directly known is only that portion of the material world which is in immediate contact with the sense-organs, all else being known inferentially from this; is to eliminate almost all that is of value in Reid's polemic. Hamilton's criticism only succeeds in showing that ideas, viewed as the vehicles of knowledge, may themselves be objects of knowledge—what neither Reid nor any other thinker denies.

Whether, then, the doctrines of the second phase of English philosophy shall be competent to supplant those of the first depends on the view of experience implied in the contention that objects or known existences may be other than ideas. Reid's theory of 'suggestion' is, as Hamilton clearly sees, inadequate as a substitute for the 'ideal system'. The conception that objects are suggested to the mind on occasion of the occurrence of its ideas does not sufficiently differ from the theory of representative knowledge to be secure against the logic for which the latter opens the way. Consciousness or immediate experience, and not any mediate function like suggestion or inference, must testify to the reality of existence as the object of knowledge. We find accordingly that Hamilton's appeal is to the 'deliverances' of consciousness and his argument directed towards establishing their validity. He distinguishes between the character of consciousness as fact and as truth, and says that while consciousness in its factual character is indubitable, as an attestation of existence beyond itself it requires at least indirect vindication.² But the very need of proof contradicts the supposition that external existence, as Hamilton views it, is matter of immediate experience. His argument involves—and this is a point he emphasises as against Reid and Stewart³—that our assurance of existence beyond the occurrence of our mental states is less direct and therefore less certain than that of the conscious states themselves. This Reid would not admit, and its denial is the stronghold of his position against the 'ideal theory'. The real significance of his and his successor's divergence from the principles of the preceding development appears in their contention that the primary

¹ *Dissertations* (Reid's *Works*, vol. ii.), pp. 810, 813-814; *Lectures on Metaphysics*, i., 218-219; ii., 153-154.

² *Lectures on Metaphysics*, i., 271 ff.; *Dissertations*, pp. 743-746; *Discussions*, pp. 86, 90.

³ Cp. *Philosophical Essays*, p. 57, where the statement is made that internal or mental existence is no more certain than material or external.

act of mind is judgment.¹ In opposition to the Lockian theory of knowledge Reid maintains that ideas are not primarily apprehended as unitary existences in consciousness, but are abstractions from the judgments which are the ultimate mental facts. The objects of knowledge are not ideas which are isolated occurrences prior to it ; but are existences the ideas of which, in distinction from the existences themselves, are only subsequently apprehended.² The primary or root-judgment is the judgment that such objects exist ;³ and this it is which guarantees the objective reference of conscious states. What this conception involves is that ideas or mental states, so far from being the sole objects of knowledge, are known only as the vehicles of a knowledge of objects other than themselves. But although Reid and Hamilton thus claim for experience an essentially objective character, they reinstate the assumption which it had been the outcome of the previous development to renounce—the conception that experience is the joint-product of two independent existences in juxtaposition with each other. Experience, in their view, is compounded of two factors or elements from different sources and with different natures. In a narrower meaning of the term, 'experience' is used in much the same way as in Locke's theory for the factor contributed by the object ; while the 'principles of reason' or the fundamental judgments of existence, relation, and so forth, form the contribution of the subject.⁴ Experience is thus still conceived in an abstract way. Its objectivity is due to the impregnation of its data with an element that comes from another source than the data themselves. An endeavour to surmount this duality and vindicate the essential unity of the experiential source of knowledge is a main feature in the next phase of thought—the associational philosophy.

As the Scottish philosophy (specially so called) arises by way of reaction against the earlier development, so the philosophy of Brown and the two Mills, though directly descended from such writers as Hobbes and Hartley, may be considered a counter-reaction towards a view akin to that of Locke and his successors. Moreover, the philosophic doctrines of the younger Mill, which one may take as the maturest expression of the associational philosophy, are expounded

¹ Cp. *Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 78-79, 102-106.

² *Works*, pp. 106-107, 209.

³ Cp. "The primary act of consciousness is an existential judgment," Hamilton, *Dissertations*, p. 934.

⁴ Reid, *Works*, p. 434 ff.; Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, ii., 347 ff.

in direct opposition to Hamilton's. In this antagonism of philosophic principles, as in the former one, we find the fundamental points of difference between the two systems to lie in a divergence of their ground-views of experience. In the first place, Mill impugns the conception that the declarations of consciousness require vindication: what alone is requisite is to ascertain what these declarations are.¹ Hamilton had distinguished between the facts of consciousness as evidencing their own existence and the same facts as evidencing the existence of something else beyond themselves; and had maintained that while it is impossible to doubt the fact of consciousness testifying, we may doubt the truth of what it testifies. Mill says the question is not as to whether the testimony of consciousness is trustworthy, but simply as to what its testimony is. In so saying he at once relieves his philosophy from a needless and self-refuting argument and pledges it to a more thorough analysis of experience. Mill proceeds, however, to rehabilitate the distinction between consciousness as dubitable and as indubitable, but in another way. In so far as his contention is that consciousness or experience requires no vindication but only interpretation, and that it is in respect of the latter alone that there is scope for controversy, he gives unquestionable expression to the most fundamental implication of the start from experience. But he identifies the indubitable aspect of consciousness not with the ever-present basis of all interpretation, but with what pertains to consciousness in its most primitive or least elaborated form.² His antithesis is between 'our consciousness in its present artificial state' and 'what is originally consciousness'. This implies an essentially limited view of the experiential basis. It is 'our primitive consciousness' as distinguished from 'our present consciousness' that is the depository of its certainties. The ultimate and primary facts of consciousness a growing experience conceals rather than reveals. Thus although Mill controverts the supposition that experience is to be supplemented by an element from elsewhere than its data themselves, his doctrine involves that it consists of primary data on which our interpretations are simply superimposed. Moreover, this primary or original outfit of consciousness consists of ideas or mental states that have no intrinsic reference beyond their own transitory existence. What reference they have is to other states (actual or possible)

¹ *Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy*, pp. 163-166, 172.

² Pp. 177-179.

of like character with themselves; and this reference is generated by the assumed associability of originally discrete experiences.¹ In Brown's philosophy the material world still appears as an independent reality suggested or inferred as the originating source of ideas,—an external reality known as to its existence and relations, though unknown as regards its essential nature.² This assumption Mill discards, and offers an explanation of the independent and objective character ascribed to material existence. But despite the value of his analysis, the underlying presupposition of the inherent subjectivity and disconnectedness of mental states makes it impossible for him to reach any adequate substitute for such an existent.

While, however, Mill's express philosophic doctrine is thus based on the presuppositions of the associational philosophy generally, the logical portion of his writings (both in the *Examination of Hamilton* and in his *System of Logic*) presents conceptions that point to a more concrete view of experience. The distinction between 'thoughts' and 'objects of thought' or between 'mental representations' and 'real objects,' the insistence on judgment as the primary act of consciousness and as asserting the connexion not of 'ideas' but of 'things,'³—these, taken in conjunction with his rejection of an originating source of ideas, are indications of a more adequate theory of knowledge; even if they also not infrequently appear simply to fall back on the supposition of an independent material world. What they imply is a conception of experience for which subjective states of consciousness are an abstraction from the concrete unity of knowledge,—one, therefore, for which experience has intrinsically an objective import.⁴ But Mill does not reinterpret the one aspect of his thought in the light of the other, and the resolution of objects into mental states remains an intractable element in his philosophy. The distinguishing feature of his thought as a whole is his recognition of the futility of seeking an explanation of experience in anything outside itself. This recognition is a link between him and Ferrier.

A new phase in the development of English thought is entered upon in Ferrier's doctrine. He expressly claims for it a national character; and regards it as continuing, even in

¹ Pp. 227-231.—It has been abundantly shown by Mr. Bradley and other writers that association is inexplicable on the basis of discrete particulars—that is, without an element of continuity or inward connexion.

² *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, lect. ix.-x.

³ *Exam. of Hamilton*, pp. 419-420; *Logic*, i., 5, 1.

⁴ Cp. C. M. Douglas's *John Stuart Mill*, ch. iii.

its antagonism, the work of Reid and Hamilton. But within the development of English philosophy as a whole it is distinctly a new departure. The main thought in his philosophy is, that instead of allowing our interpretation of experience to be influenced from the outset by any assumption as to what is requisite in existence to account for the *origin* of knowledge, we must start from an inquiry into its *nature* or implications. Experience or knowledge cannot be accounted for by reference to anything in existence beyond itself; for any such explanation presupposes what it professes to explain. On the contrary, inquiry concerning the character of being must be approached through investigation of the character of knowledge.¹ Knowledge or the known, Ferrier maintains, involves two distinguishable though inseparable factors—subjective and objective. But this does not mean that subject and object are two existents which between them engender knowledge: it means that they are two elements or features of what is known.² Subject and object, therefore, or mind and matter can never, he argues, be known as independent of each other. The distinction between them is a distinction within experience and cannot be made a basis for an account of its origin. Further, when subject and object are taken as a distinction of existence outside knowledge instead of a distinction within it, they can never be brought into connexion with each other, —as the history of philosophy amply shows. Either they stand apart in complete separation or each in turn is emphasised at the expense of the other. But the subjective and the objective are not thus separable. What is known is never an object apprehended as existing independently of being known, nor is it the apprehension without any object distinguishable from it. It is neither (as in Reid's view) an independently existing material world, nor (as in Locke's) an object coincident with the apprehending idea. It is always object in union with, and yet distinction from subject; or an apprehended somewhat that is distinguishable though inseparable from its apprehension.³

But while Ferrier avoids making assumptions as to what is requisite to originate knowledge or experience, and proceeds instead to inquire what it is in itself, he does not

¹ *Institutes of Metaphysic*, pp. 44-46, 470, 498.

² Pp. 86, 391.—Ferrier's assertion is that subject and object are always known along with each other—that knowledge is of oneself together with whatever else is known. This, however, is not essential to the principle implied.

³ Pp. 495-497: cp. *Philosophical Remains*, ii., 281-285.

succeed in avoiding assumptions with regard to its nature. Although, as already mentioned, he claims for experience its right to be regarded as the only source of knowledge, he yet distinguishes between two kinds of experience; and on their supposed antithetic character his whole procedure is based. "I do not," he says, "abandon experience as the ultimate foundation of *all* knowledge; only I maintain that there are *two* kinds of experience, both of which are equally experience, the experience of fact and the experience of pure reason."¹ 'Experience' in a narrower sense is opposed to 'reason' as the contingent and particular to the universal and necessary. Reason is conceived to be the source of necessary truths or principles which experience can at most only corroborate. "Experience may confirm the truth of [such a principle]; but reason alone can establish it effectually."² Elsewhere³ he says that such principles, like all else, are to be referred to experience—to an experience of their necessity. But his conception of the necessity of any principle and his mode of establishing it vary between considering it ascertainable by abstract reasoning and as an implicate of concrete experience.⁴ The same antithesis appears in Ferrier's depreciation of sense. His polemic against 'sense-experience' is valuable, so far as his contention is that sense is only one factor or aspect in knowledge and does not furnish data that are themselves separate items or 'completed objects' of knowledge. And he maintains that sense and intellect together constitute but one function of knowledge and are impotent apart from each other.⁵ But he nevertheless regards the character of intellect or reason as ascertainable independently of the sense-experience with which it is its function to unite. Knowledge is thus treated throughout as an instrument having a nature of its own independent of the data to which it happens to be applied. From knowledge so viewed there is no passage possible to a characterisation of being. Ferrier's transition is accomplished through the assumption that reality, or truth about reality, is not self-contradictory; that is, that knowledge proceeding as alone it can is knowledge of reality.⁶ This may truly be, as he says, a (or the) postulate of all knowledge. But it is thoroughly inconsistent with his own treat-

¹ In a letter quoted in Miss Haldane's *James Frederick Ferrier*, p. 80. This passage expresses Ferrier's attitude more succinctly than any in the *Institutes* or *Remains*.

² *Institutes*, p. 71 : ep. 33-84.

³ P. 255.

⁴ Pp. 76, 83-4, 517.

⁵ Pp. 256, 280-282.

⁶ P. 455.

ment of knowledge in separation from what is known. As against Ferrier's mode of statement, what requires to be maintained is that knowledge has no being independent of that which it interprets, and that only by abstraction can it be viewed as invested with a character of its own.

The necessity of beginning, without assumptions, from a consideration of the general nature of experience is recognised in John Grote's *Exploratio Philosophica*. The expression there given to the experiential basis of knowledge is such as on the whole underlies present-day discussion in philosophy. Grote's exposition of philosophic principles is throughout interwoven with comment on the procedure of his predecessors in English philosophy; and the view of experience he goes upon may be taken as typical of conceptions current in recent philosophic inquiry. One may regard this view as in a measure the fulfilment of the preceding stages in the development of the conception. Grote's initial contention is, like Ferrier's, that we cannot begin our philosophy from any assumption as to existence supposedly independent of the knowledge of it. We cannot, for instance, assume a material world existing independently of being known and a mind or consciousness which knows this independent existence. "Knowledge is not the bringing of one thing which is, into the relation which we call knowledge with another thing which is." For the ultimate fact—"the basis upon which all rests"—is not the existence of anything, but the knowledge or thought of it as existing: the existence of anything is ultimately indistinguishable from its knownness. Or as he puts it briefly in one passage, "All that we call existence is for us a *thought of ours*".¹ When once we have 'by a comparison of experiences' definitely conceived the existence of anything, we may give our attention to it as existing, leaving out of consideration meanwhile the dependence of this upon its being thought or known as existing; just as we may also look at knowledge in abstraction from the nature of what is known. But neither of these is the fundamental or entire view.² We may concern ourselves (as Grote phrases it) to 'know about' what we are already 'acquainted with'; but our acquaintance with it is what gives it existence for us.³

Experience therefore does not, on Grote's view, consist originally of facts about or upon which thought is engaged. It may be described, he says, as notice of fact or as fact

¹ *Exploratio Philosophica*, i., 59, 109; ep. introd., p. xiv.

² I., 17, 83-84.

³ I., 123-124.

presenting itself to our notice; but it is not fact *and* notice of it, for these two are the same in different words.¹ Experience has always the two aspects; which may be called 'immediateness' and 'reflexion'. Reflexion is the characterisation of what, apart from this, would be characterless or meaningless. Without immediacy there would be no reality or truth to know; without notice or acquisition of meaning (definiteness, however slight), there would be nothing known.² "So far then," Grote maintains, "as there are two elements of our knowledge, they are not thought and experience (that is, what is commonly meant by these words), but immediateness and reflexion. Only, it is to be observed, these constitute no antithesis—they stand in no contrast the one to the other. They are not, *e.g.*, anything that can be called the matter and form of knowledge, for reflexion gives no *form*, no new being or reality to immediateness: all the form and reality is already in the immediateness: they are more like the body and soul of knowledge, except that immediateness has all the *life* of knowledge, though as yet but embryonic and undeveloped: all it wants is quickening: till reflexion does this, it is knowledge in the germ, but not proper knowledge."³ The term 'experience' accordingly cannot be restricted to one element in knowledge supposed to be the contribution of the object or of sense, and requiring to be supplemented by an element of thought contributed by the mind or subject. Nor can knowledge be described as arising in the mind without any production or spontaneity, from data which are supposed to originate from anything existent or are viewed as if they so originated. For, on the one hand, the immediacy which is the basis of knowledge, is the source of whatever the most developed knowledge contains—'relations' as well as 'qualities';⁴ and on the other hand, without notice or characterisation there is no knowledge of one thing any more than of another.⁵

On immediate experience then, according to this view, all knowledge is based; and it arises wholly by way of notice⁶ (or appreciation) of what is involved in this. The distinctions of subject and object, minds and things, like all other determinations, arise from and are again referred to it.

¹ II., 226.

² II., 147, 182.

³ III., 156.

⁴ Cp. Prof. James, *Principles of Psychology*, i., 243 ff.; L. T. Hobhouse, *Theory of Knowledge*, pt. I, ch. ii.

⁵ *Explor. Philosophica*, ii., 159, 218-221.

⁶ In 'notice' the cognitive may be regarded as joining hands with the practical.

Subject and object¹ are what are over against each other as two distinct though united features of experience. As knowledge progresses these two develop into an explicit distinction of self and not-self, conscious states and their objects. But although they arise out of indistinction, they never altogether fuse or are other than complementary features of reality.² What we call existence is this reality, in which self and not-self antithetically participate, as in any measure defined or characterised.

The conception of experience here presented no doubt raises questions in place of those it transcends; but it gives a more concrete basis than any afforded in the preceding theories. As already said, it is a view such as mainly forms the basis of present-day discussion of philosophic problems. Even when the topic of discussion is precisely the general character of the experiential source of knowledge—say, its subjective and objective reference, or its features of immediacy and mediation—present controversy moves for the most part within the general confines of such a view as this. Its main import is its recognition that experience is not to be accounted for by reference to anything outside itself, that its combined subjectivity and objectivity are to be vindicated without annulling its unity, and that 'sense-qualities' and 'thought-relations' are not to be regarded as having different sources or fundamentally diverse natures. The general view of experience implied may be summarised, in conclusion, in such a way as to indicate both its own character and its relations to the other conceptions above outlined.

Experience is never only subjective or only objective. As the source of knowledge it is essentially one, and yet is never without a dual character. It does not consist of irrelative items that are either impossible of relation or await relation from without: its terms are discrete, but their relations are continuous. And it is always the passing of the relatively indeterminate into the relatively determinate, or the acquisition of meaning by what is real though undefined. There is no immediate knowledge, yet no knowledge other than interpretation of the reality present in immediate experience; and none that is merely mediate, for knowledge always involves a basis or warrant in the real. Experience cannot be explained. It can only be gradually characterised,—by the progressive coincidence of notice, or appreciation, with im-

¹ Subjective and objective seem ultimately coincident with immediate and reflected. Cp. S. H. Hodgson, *Metaphysic of Experience*, i., 72-75.

² Cp. *Explor. Philosophica*, i., 22-23, 47-48; ii., 180-183.

mediacy. And of reality so far as uncharacterised, we can only say that it is what in knowing we know, or that knowledge as such is knowledge of it. Lastly, as all experience is reflexion or notice of immediacy, philosophy begins in further notice or reflexion directed to the former as it subsists in its own immediate character.

VI.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Pathway to Reality: Stage the Second. Being the Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews in the Session 1903-1904. By the Right Honourable RICHARD BURDON HALDANE, M.P., LL.D., K.C. London: John Murray, 1904.

THIS volume of Lectures is a continuation of the lectures on the same foundation recently reviewed in these pages. Delivered in the same way as the former course—that is to say—delivered *extempore* and taken down by a reporter, they are marked by the same astonishing brilliancy, and are open to the same kind of criticism, as the former course. On the whole, however, Mr. Haldane does a good deal to clear up and defend his position, and to meet the difficulties which the present reviewer, among others, had ventured to suggest. Some of the more extreme modes of stating his position too seem to be here toned down or at least do not reappear.

Mr. Haldane begins with a defence of himself against the obscurity with which some of his critics (it appears) had charged him. His defence is the well-known defence of Hegel—that people have no more right to expect to find Philosophy easy reading than an unmathematical reader has to find it possible to understand a work of advanced Mathematics without severe study and application. In so far as such complaints against the Master or some of his disciples represent simply the discontent of an untrained reviewer who sits down to an advanced philosophical book expecting to be able to pronounce a magisterial judgment with the same ease which he experiences in dealing with a novel or even an historical work upon a period of which he knows nothing, the answer is adequate enough. Mr. Haldane's Lectures are undoubtedly as lucid as is compatible with the nature of the subject and his own philosophical position. As regards Hegel and Hegelianism in general Mr. Haldane might in fairness have recognised that the difficulty of understanding what the Master meant is recognised not only by profound Philosophers (Schopenhauer, for instance, was scarcely an incompetent student of Philosophy), but by Hegel's professed admirers, interpreters, and disciples. It is not only that there are particular points of disagreement, but there is no approach to

a consensus as to his central position. Mr. Bosanquet, for instance (of whom Mr. Haldane speaks with a deference which somewhat exceeds the demands of courtesy among the learned), would probably profess to express the Master's mind as faithfully as Mr. Haldane; at all events Mr. Haldane speaks as if he felt himself (of course with the reserves which every independent thinker must make in such professions) to be in substantial agreement with Mr. Bosanquet. Yet it is obvious to those who do not profess to move within the charmed circle of Hegelianism that at least on the side of Religion and Theology the difference between them is profound. Mr. Bosanquet does not believe in God in any sense which would seem to supply the smallest satisfaction to the ordinary religious consciousness. Mr. Haldane's idea of God, though it may not be wholly acceptable to the orthodox Theist, is at least that of a man who feels himself in sympathy with ordinary Theism and Christianity. God is with him at all events self-conscious. Mr. Haldane even indulges in a warm eulogium upon the Athanasian Creed (without, however, attempting a Hegelian vindication of the damnatory clauses). As to Dr. McTaggart, it is not too much to say that his interpretation of what Hegel actually meant is not merely different from that of Mr. Haldane, but the inverse of it. In Dr. McTaggart's version of Hegel the individual human consciousness (though but a part of the Absolute) is the only consciousness: for Mr. Haldane the individual consciousness is a mere "aspect" or even a "metaphor". Now of course these diversities of interpretation do not show that Hegel was not a great thinker; it is one of the notes of the great thinker to give rise to very divergent lines of thought. But when the disciples all persist in attributing their own opinion to the Master, it is surely unreasonable to suggest that any difficulty which any one may have in understanding what he meant must be the reader's own fault: and still more unreasonable to attempt to claim for the particular interpretation favoured by the writer the kind of authority which is due in any subject to the consensus of the competent. Mr. Haldane for instance constantly says, "Philosophy teaches," when at most it is Hegelianism that so teaches—sometimes only a particular section of the Hegelian School. Like the boasted unity of "Catholic teaching," the consensus often turns out on examination to consist rather in a determination to use the same phrases than in any identity of meaning assigned to them.

The present volume confirms the impression that Mr. Haldane has not really been uninfluenced by the criticism of such writers as Lotze and Mr. Bradley. Nothing can be more explicit than his repudiation of the attempt (with which he admits that some Hegelians have been not unreasonably charged) to get rid of sensation or feeling or the immediate element in knowledge, and to reduce all reality to mere discursive thought or abstract universals. As to Hegel's own attitude, he quotes explicit assertions of the Master, but I cannot help suggesting that he a little forgets

that in this or other matters (when we are dealing with a thinker of the first rank) the question is not so much whether he makes here and there a certain admission as whether he sufficiently bears it in mind in the general tone and tenor of his work. Nobody can suppose that a man of Hegel's powers should not in some part of his work have recognised the obvious fact that feeling had something to do with our knowledge. A diligent search will discover such admissions in Green, but that did not prevent him from repeatedly declaring that the world was nothing but "a system of relations". However, whatever may be thought of Mr. Haldane's vindication of his Master on this point, he leaves no doubt as to his own position. "Mind is just as much feeling as thought" (p. 41), and feeling, as it comes to us in the earliest stage of experience, "cannot be defined" (p. 31). But he still seems anxious to represent feeling as only a kind of thought—a mode of speaking which, I cannot but think, tends towards the ignoring of the differences between the two elements or (if the phrase be preferred) "aspects" of reality, and towards the evasion of the many difficult problems which turn upon the relation between them.

The first part of the present work is devoted to the completion of the argument begun in the previous volume. The second is devoted to the consideration of "finite Mind". And here the most original feature of Mr. Haldane's treatment is a very candid and thorough attempt to grapple with that problem which most Hegelians so systematically evade,—the relation of their system to those hopes or dreams of a future life which have at all times formed an inexpugnable element of any high religion that is worthy of the name.¹ Hegel's own treatment of the subject was (no doubt for sufficient reasons) so evasive that his attitude has been diversely interpreted by his profoundest students. And there has been the same difference among his followers. The more theologically orthodox disciples like Green have expressed more or less decided belief in a personal Immortality, and have hardly attempted to reconcile their private conviction as men with a philosophy which proclaims the subjectivity of time and tends towards the treatment of individuality as a mere seeming essentially connected with the perishable animal organism. The less orthodox have passed over the subject with silent scorn or some contemptuous assurance that the true eternal life is a thing that may be enjoyed here and now, and that, since all spirits are really One, it must be a matter of indifference who it is that enjoys it. Mr. Haldane treats the matter more seriously. He has more sympathy with some at least of the motives which prompt this persistent demand of the human spirit.

¹ Lest any one should object that this ignores Buddhism, it must be remembered that even if Nirvana be properly thought as the extinction of all consciousness, no Buddhist expects to attain Nirvana till after the expiration of many lives, in the course of which he receives the just recompence of his deeds.

At all events we are spared the banal sneer that those who want a personal immortality for themselves or others are merely stipulating for a *trink-gelt* for their virtue. And he makes a gallant effort to show that the sense of oneness with and inclusion in a "timeless" Absolute, or rather (since Mr. Haldane does not much favour that phrase) an Absolute in which time-distinctions are included without being lost, can be made an effective emotional substitute for the hope of a real and personal Immortality. The attempt is so little successful to my mind that I can hardly trust myself to summarise the attempt without a danger of caricaturing it. These are the sort of consolations that Mr. Haldane is prepared to offer to those who have not found the "appearance" or "aspect of Reality" which they call their personal life so satisfactory a thing (either from a hedonistic or a spiritual point of view) as Hegelianism assures them it really is, and who have failed to detect in a futureless terrestrial existence that "meaning" of which (for the Absolute) it is full. "It is only when we fall into the abstractions of the understanding which take what is presented as final in their own distinctions as final, and as representing complete truth and complete reality, that we rebel against this view" (p. 215)—the view that the death of the particular living creature is natural and necessary. It is only this same wretched understanding which supposes that a man must be either mortal or immortal: "there is a higher conception through which the sharp antithesis disappears" (p. 221). Hegel "points out that the subject is certain of its own infinite, non-sensual substantiality; that the form of its self-consciousness consists in an endless yielding up of its particularity, and finds its infinite value only in what he calls Love, which consists in infinite sorrow and arises out of it" (p. 233). "The grave and this temporal present, taken as events, turn out, from a higher standpoint, to be appearance merely, and not to be representative of reality" (p. 238). "Could we think out life, or even a particular event in it, completely, there were no room for the abstract antithesis of Death" (p. 244). These passages of course fail adequately to represent Mr. Haldane's treatment of the subject, but after all these assurances do not seem quite to satisfy even their author. In the following passage he approximates a little more nearly to the common view: "It may well be that between the extremes of mere duration on the one hand and being above time on the other, we can analytically construct the conception of a life which the understanding cannot present as existence in mere temporal sequence, but which, while it preserves in us the differentia of otherness and individuality, is yet not necessitated to present itself to itself, even in immediacy, as a passing phenomenon" (p. 249). Those who are less convinced that our inability to resolve the antinomies involved in the nature of time as we know it justifies us in talking about a timeless Absolute, will perhaps venture to translate for themselves Mr. Haldane's words into some such very crude and un-Hegelian

language as the following: "There is no reason why personal Immortality should not be true, though we cannot even say it in a way which is free from difficulty, and it may be reconcilable in some way which we cannot understand with the difficulties inherent either in the idea of an endless succession or of a time-series having a beginning and an end" (p. 249). The difference between the two modes of expression is that Mr. Haldane's disguises, while the more popular mode of statement admits, our inability to solve the difficulties inherent in the problem of Time.

The complaint of the outsider against many of the Hegelian doctrines and formulæ is not so much that they are untrue as that their upholders persist in representing them as containing much more truth and importance than they really possess—as clearing up problems of which they are really little more than the statement. This is eminently so with the doctrine of the subjectivity of Time which constitutes the great difficulty of a belief in a personal Immortality for the Hegelian mind. When that doctrine is stated with the caution and reserve employed by Mr. Haldane, who constantly protests against the idea that time-distinctions are simply lost and merged "in the Absolute," the position that time-distinctions are transcended in the Absolute, or are distinctions which exist merely in and for the being of the Absolute, means after all very little more than this—that in some way which it is admitted we do not and cannot understand the antinomies which exist for us do not exist for God. The Hegelian never succeeds in explaining how time is thought by God without falling into language which palpably eliminates just what constitutes the essence of time as we know it. Mr. Haldane for the most part avoids such imprudences, but even he makes no attempt to suggest *how* the admission that the Absolute is out of time really solves the problem. If we grant that in some sense the whole series is from the point of view of the Absolute present together, we are not yet rid of the difficulty. Either the series must be thought as having a beginning and an end, or as being beginningless and endless. Merely to say that there must be some *tertium quid* without saying what it is, is not to think but to give up thinking. Distinctions are not to be "transcended" by merely saying that they are transcended or antinomies to be resolved by merely putting them together and pronouncing them resolved.

One of Mr. Haldane's critics has, it appears, been unwise enough to disparage his work on the ground that it is only a restatement of Hegel. Hegel is a thinker whose books, whatever their true importance when properly understood, either are (to use words attributed to the late Prof. Green) "a great confusion" or appear to be so even to readers who (like Green) are nevertheless largely indebted to him. If the confusion be really there, the interpreter who removes it becomes an original thinker: if it is not there, the task of removing the appearance of it is none the less one which demands a metaphysical brain of the highest order.

Such a brain it is almost superfluous to say Dr. Haldane possesses. And he possesses what does not always go with it—consummate powers of lucid exposition—of expounding as lucidly as the philosophical position which he takes up admits of being expounded. If we put aside Dr. McTaggart, whose Hegelianism is avowedly a new departure, Mr. Haldane is probably the clearest and ablest interpreter of Hegel's central position; and all interpretation of Hegel is necessarily also to some extent a development. Some of Mr. Haldane's readers may (like the present reviewer) be personally inclined to the belief that other and less faithful developments have in them the seeds of greater progress than Mr. Haldane's, that the most serious problems of Philosophy at the present time are problems which the Hegelian mode of thinking simply leaves on one side, and that the Philosophy of Aspects will in the end be found to represent but an aspect of the Philosophy towards which man is groping. But few, at any rate among those who call themselves Idealists, will doubt that Hegel has taught the world much, and that lesson has to a great extent to be learned afresh by each individual student of Philosophy. Such students will for a long time to come be very grateful to Mr. Haldane for the help he has given them in learning it. At all events that is very emphatically the feeling with which the present reviewer lays down the book.

If we put aside a few passages about the merely "metaphorical" character of the individual finite mind, Mr. Haldane's is an eminently sober presentation of Hegelianism. And when Hegelianism is presented in a sober way, the difference between Hegelianism and many of its critics tends to become one of stress, of emphasis, of relative importance. Doctrines which seem to the Hegelian of inexpressible value seem to the outsider true enough as far as they go, but to be truths of comparatively little moment as compared with others which are ignored or denied. This is particularly the case when we turn to the practical and religious significance of Mr. Haldane's position. Mr. Haldane gives us the impression (which the young men who repeat the stock phrases as they might repeat the verses of Empedocles do not give us)—that to him Hegelianism means much, that to him in a word it is really a Religion, and serves the purpose which for more commonplace minds are served by the religious beliefs which he can regard merely as "symbols" of the truth. But why Mr. Haldane should feel all this emotion about such an Absolute as he describes, why it should cause him any satisfaction to think that he (like Nero or Caligula) is part of a super-moral Absolute, what help or inspiration, what consolation or stimulus, he can expect to find from the contemplation of Him, I for one find it difficult to conjecture. For, though it is true that Mr. Haldane quotes with approval Hegel's very Hegelian explanation of the Christian idea that "God is Love," that explanation resolves it into a consciousness of unity with a Being of whose character we after all know nothing except what is implied by this unity not only with Socrates but with Nero.

The Hegelian "love" seems to be a metaphysical abstraction. The Hegelian Religion as interpreted by Mr. Haldane seems to be Religion with the clerical element left out, though it fills him with an emotion which we should have supposed could be inspired only by a Being who realises an ethical ideal. As to why the Absolute should manifest Himself in Nero and his like, he has nothing to tell us beyond the usual assurances that, if we find anything amiss in the world, that is due merely to our limited point of view and the "fallacies of the abstract understanding". Those whose misgivings decline to be exorcised by the utterance of that mighty spell, cannot help asking themselves why they should distrust the moral judgment which tells them that much in this world really is amiss, and yet not distrust the moral judgment which tells them that they were born to set it right. It is true that Mr. Haldane's Optimism is implicit rather than explicit, but we are nowhere told of the grounds on which it rests, or how Morality can be even an "aspect" of a world in which nothing is really and ultimately wrong, except in the sense in which delusions and errors are undoubtedly aspects of the Real.

H. RASHDALL.

Recent Tendencies in Ethics. By W. R. SORLEY. Edinburgh and London : Blackwood, 1904. Pp. vii, 139.

THIS little volume, which consists of three lectures given to a summer meeting of clergy at Cambridge, is a specimen, and a very admirable specimen, of a most useful kind of literature, which similar occasions have called forth in abundance in Germany, but which is not so common in this country—the critical survey or report by an expert upon recent developments in his own department, made for the benefit of an audience in whom some general acquaintance with the subject may be presupposed. Such a survey and criticism, if at all well done, is a most valuable aid to study, and in the present case there can be no doubt that the task is performed in a masterly way. The work possesses in a high degree the qualities appropriate to its kind: breadth of treatment, clearness of style, concentration upon main issues, and a truly remarkable ease and simplicity in the manner of presenting them. Prof. Sorley speaks in his Preface of the "popular" form of the lectures, but there is in them none of that diffuseness of style and evasion of difficulties which one is apt to associate with the word. They are popular only in their necessary suppression of subordinate details and their success in dispensing with technicalities. In a word, they are models of their kind.

The first of the three lectures describes broadly the character of recent ethical thought in contrast with the thought of last century, the second and third deal with the two most prominent types in recent ethics, the Evolutionist and Idealistic, respectively.

What strikes the author in the ethical controversy of last century between Intuitionists and Utilitarians is the limited range and academic character of the questions in dispute. However opposed the views of the disputants were in regard to the origin of moral ideas and the criterion of morality, this opposition in theory did not preclude a very general agreement as to practical rules. The situation is very different now. "There are many indications in recent literature that the suggestion is now made more readily than it was twenty or thirty years ago that the scale of moral values may have to be revised; and it seems to me that the ethical controversies of the coming generation will not be restricted to academic opponents whose disputes concern nothing more than the origin of moral ideas and their ultimate criterion. Modern controversy will involve these questions, but it will go deeper and it will spread its results wider: it appears as if it would not hesitate to call in question the received code of morality, and to revise our standard of right and wrong" (pp. 12-13). The most conspicuous and extreme exponent of this demand for the revision of moral values is, of course, Nietzsche, and the author sketches his views briefly by way of illustration.

The latter part of the first lecture considers the influences that have been operative in determining the direction which recent ethical thought has taken. The special consideration of the influences operative at the present time is prefaced by a general distinction between "two quite different kinds of influence to which the formation of an ethical doctrine may be due. In the first place, there are the moral sentiments and opinions of the community and of the moralist himself; and, in the second place, there are the scientific and philosophical doctrines accepted by the writer or inspiring what is loosely called the spirit of the time" (p. 26). This distinction is important and would bear to be more emphasised. It really suggests in an abstract form the fundamental criticism which is later applied in the concrete to Evolutionist and Idealistic ethics, *viz.*, that ethical theory must take for its starting-point and basis the moral consciousness itself, and not seek to interpret and systematise moral facts by means of principles derived from *non-moral* sciences. That the defects of these two types of theory arise from the violation of this simple but essential canon is, in fact, the lesson of the whole book. "It seems to have been assumed," says Prof. Sorley in his final summing up, "that moral principles can be reached by the application of scientific generalisations or of the results of a metaphysical analysis which has started by overlooking the facts of the moral consciousness. . . . I have contended in these lectures that neither the mechanical unity of the naturalists nor the rational unity of the idealists has succeeded in comprehending within its unifying principle the essential nature of morality with its deep-going dualism of good and evil" (pp. 132-133).

To revert to those more relevant influences that belong to the first of the two kinds distinguished by Prof. Sorley, there is much

in his impressive but somewhat grave statement of them that one would like to quote, but the following passage must suffice. "Perhaps the greatest danger of the new social order is the growing materialisation of the mental outlook. It would be needless to point to the evidence, amongst all classes in the mercantile nations, of the feverish haste to be rich and to enjoy. For to point to this has been common with the moralists of all ages. This age like others—perhaps more than most—is strewn with the victims of the struggle. But it can also boast a product largely its own—the new race of victors who have emerged triumphant, with wealth beyond the dreams of avarice of the past generation. Their interests make them cosmopolitan; they are unrestrained by the traditional obligations of ancient lineage; and the world seems to lie before them as something to be bought and sold. Neither they nor others have quite realised as yet the power which colossal wealth gives in modern conditions. And it remains to be seen whether the multi-millionaire will claim to figure as Nietzsche's 'overman,' spurning ordinary moral conventions, and will play the rôle, in future moral discourses, which the ethical dialogues of Plato assign to the 'tyrant'" (pp. 30-31).

I am afraid I have left myself too little space to do justice to the second and third lectures. Both these lectures, indeed, are so closely packed, that I had better not attempt to summarise them. If I had to make a choice where all is good, I should say that the second lecture is the most excellent of the three. It gives in a short compass the most masterly and yet simply expressed criticism of Evolutionist ethics which I know, and it owes its quality, I think, to this, that the author confines himself in the main to making clear those broad and fundamental distinctions which Evolutionary ethics tends to confuse or ignore.

The third lecture is probably that which will encounter most professional criticism, and perhaps not altogether without a certain provocation, for Prof. Sorley himself seems moved by the intimacy of academic controversies to a more individual, detailed, and unsparing style of criticism. No doubt the general justice of his criticism of Green and Bradley, with whose metaphysical doctrines as bearing upon ethics he is mainly concerned, will be fully admitted by all but the more ardent disciples of these masters. But I think the said disciples will be able to fasten upon some small matters here and there, in which Prof. Sorley has dealt somewhat harshly. Thus he argues that the permanence which Green takes as a mark of true good or satisfaction affords no definite criterion of moral value. But perhaps the chief use of this note of permanence for Green himself was that it settled the claims of Hedonism. And after all it does seem a pretty definite and important point to take, that transient pleasures have in them no element of progress, contribute nothing to the permanent interests which unify (or, in fact, constitute) a life.

The criticism of Bradley is sharp, but, of course, only follows

therein, at a distance, the example of that critic himself. The two divergent tendencies in Mr. Bradley's metaphysical theory are well brought out, though, as Prof. Sorley says, "what would be contradiction in another writer is only two-sidedness in Mr. Bradley". I will content myself with one quotation. "All our predicates, Mr. Bradley teaches in his *Logic*, have reality—the universe of reality—for their ultimate subject. In this sense it may be possible to speak of reality as good. . . . But the question remains what we mean by 'good' in this connexion. . . . And the answer must be that Mr. Bradley means very little, since the goodness is manifested 'in various degrees of goodness and badness'. . . . [The term] seems to be used of reality in a somewhat vague sense, as it were *jure dignitatis*, and to have as little ethical significance as 'right honourable' when applied to a politician or 'reverend' to a clergyman: cases in which it may be consistent to say that right honourable gentlemen manifest various degrees of honour and dishonour, or that reverend gentlemen are worthy of various degrees of reverence or the opposite" (p. 107).

In the peroration to the whole discourse Prof. Sorley tantalises his readers with the slightest possible glimpse of his own ethico-metaphysical position. His intention, of course, is simply to indicate, as the positive outcome of his criticism, what in his view is the line which a truer solution of the ethico-metaphysical problem must endeavour to follow.

H. BARKER.

Nietzsches Philosophie. Von DR. ARTHUR DREWS. Heidelberg,
1904. Pp. viii, 558.

PROF. DREWS has given us an admirably full and clear account of Nietzsche's development, which I recommend to all those with whom the tincture of Nietzsche administered in literature, and even philosophy, has disagreed. Thanks to the efforts of ill-informed writers, public attention has been practically restricted to the last of Nietzsche's three distinct periods, and that the one most tainted with the suspicion of incipient insanity. If we are to form a just estimate of the man's philosophical place and importance, we must learn to see his works in their true perspective, and here we have the means. Prof. Drews has wisely gone very thoroughly into Nietzsche's middle or positivist period, which, although of little originality, is of immense importance. He has shown that we have there to do with no unmotived change of mood, but merely with the growing predominance of one element in a complex mood. Nietzsche had at first hoped that the individual was to be saved by means of art; but, even in his first period, there had been a strong undereurrent of empirical philosophy. Smarting from his disillusionment with Bayreuth, he began to depreciate art as a thing evanescent and ephemeral alongside the

bodily organism and the world of matter, and sought to save himself from excess of feeling by unrestrained devotion to science. Not that he cared, then or ever, for attaining results of objective validity. All he aimed at was to free himself from what he regarded as limits and prejudices; and he fell into the error, from which he never escaped, of imagining that this was the same thing as a positive contribution to the treasures of knowledge. Self-emancipation became a standard according to which he measured culture, with the strange result that we find him, in his last period, regarding that identity of ego and will on which his whole philosophy was based, as a *Volksurteil* to be got rid of, and his very self a prejudice he must cast aside.

Prof. Drews' criticism of Nietzsche is an effort to demonstrate the futility of all constructive philosophy based on the assumed identity of consciousness and being, and is thus in itself an attack on the whole development of modern philosophy due to Descartes. In particular, he regards Nietzsche as the *enfant terrible* of Kantian epistemology. There can, he considers, be no doubt that Kant, despite his vague acknowledgment of the *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, conceived the subject of knowledge as the individual consciousness, and gave no guarantee that reason might not be the product of subjective choice; so that Nietzsche only went farther in the same direction when he denied the objective significance of reason altogether. All truth, he declared, was a more or less useful fiction : *der Philosoph findet die Wahrheit nicht, sondern er erfindet sie*. The function of this new kind of philosopher was to dominate existence by putting a fresh fiction in place of one worn threadbare, and recreate reality in accordance with his own will : the Will to Truth is the Will to Might. Here comes in the influence of Schopenhauer, whose direct successor Nietzsche is. He accepts Schopenhauer's identification of Being and Will, but conceives the latter not as the absolute, but as the individual will, and, under the influence of Positivism, not as a metaphysical, but as an empirical reality. Prof. Drews considers that the belief that we in our own self-consciousness comprehend the Absolute justified Nietzsche in sinking the Absolute in the ego, just as it had Schopenhauer in sinking the ego in the Absolute. It is a matter of logical indifference whether I say, I am not, only the Absolute is, or, the Absolute is nothing beyond me. I am not clear that this is a matter of logical indifference, and I am certain that it is a matter of practical impossibility. Even Nietzsche, although his own ideal of the Übermensch so fascinated him that, under the influence of increasing megalomania, he identified his own personality with it, had, in his sanest moments, the wisdom to abandon its realisation to the future, from the clear consciousness that the ego is not absolute. Prof. Drews writes as a fervent disciple of Von Hartmann, but it is no business of mine to combat his philosophical beliefs, since these do not affect the fairness and reasonableness of his estimate of Nietzsche.

He finds the kernel of Nietzsche's philosophy in the effort on the ground of analogical, individual, empirical Will-principle, not only to explain, but actually to fashion the world, while bestowing on the ego freedom and independence. Naturally the effort was a failure. Freedom and culture are not possible on the basis of the individual self. Nietzsche's effort to achieve a purely autonomous morality resulted against his will in the overthrow of all morality whatsoever. Abandoning himself to the guidance of the irrational, blind will, Nietzsche's standpoint became pre-moral, sub-human. Nietzsche accepted this result with the unearthly hilarity of insanity, but he had another goal in view when he began his weary journey. He had aimed, by a release of its creative power, at present dammed up by historical and conventional restraints, to raise mankind to a higher stage of existence. Salvation, grasped by Schopenhauer in a mystical and religious sense, appeared to Nietzsche as the problem of culture. The world of appearance from which the individual had to return to himself, was the modern world of culture. But, practically making himself absolute, Nietzsche broke down every relation between himself and other persons, raised himself above the regimen of reason, deprived himself for ever of the possibility of indicating any goal towards which culture ought to strive, and saw himself compelled to regard the irrational, individual will as its own end. Seeking a deeper significance for things than Positivism had given him, Nietzsche found it in his doctrine of the *ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen*, a crazy effort to impress the image of eternity on our empirical existence, which had not even the merit of originality.

In his treatment of Nietzsche, Prof. Drews is in substantial agreement with Prof. Ziegler, a guarantee of soundness. Of course he has shed fresh light here and there, for instance, regarding the influence upon Nietzsche of the French writer Gobineau. It is a pity that he has not gone somewhat more into detail regarding Nietzsche's criticism of social and political theories, and abridged the disquisition upon the demerits of Christianity into which his consideration of the *Antichrist* may be said to degenerate. With much he says it is possible to agree, but I cannot conceive it to be true that Christianity rests so entirely on its historical basis. When Dr. Drews endeavours to minimise Nietzsche's dislike for his countrymen, and even to connect his insanity with the cropping up of a lower Polish stratum through his sound and healthy German culture, I applaud his patriotism but not his success.

There is a great deal of human interest about Nietzsche, and a great deal of interest for specialists. Dr. Drews makes the shrewd remark that the *Zarathustra* is perhaps the most interesting book psychologically considered that exists. Nietzsche's brilliance and originality, his appeal to the free creative spirit must continue to exercise their fascination; and it would be idle to pretend that he never touches a fatally weak spot in our culture. Again, in his

doctrine of the Übermensch, he seems to have said something that people cannot forget. Nor is this to be wondered at. The doctrine has a justification of a kind in scientific and religious thought. It does not seem *prima facie* absurd to turn the explanatory and heuristic principles of Darwinism into prophecies, and religion claims to initiate mankind to a higher stage of development, not always postponed to a *Jenseits*. Nietzsche's philosophy as a system goes to pieces easily enough; but it leaves us with something more than a heap of rubbish.

DAVID MORRISON.

The Groundwork of Psychology. By G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., etc. University Tutorial Press, 1903. Pp. iv, 239.

In the Preface to his *Analytic Psychology* Dr. Stout explained his view of the utility of a book on Psychology in general to special investigators; and compared it to the guidance which an inland explorer of a large island may receive from a chart of the coast. In the present work he has once more charted our island for us, this time on a somewhat smaller scale, and with a few changes in nomenclature, but on the whole without important alterations in the outline before laid down. The great merit of the "Ground-work" as of its predecessors lies in the quiet certainty of the workmanship and the clearness of statement which arise from a firm grasp of the subject; the author is not engaged in chasing ideas and feelings about in his own mind and dragging them out to view in a more or less mangled condition—a process to which the amateur psychologist is reduced; but he is exhibiting the outline and structure and life of the mental island in such a way that even the amateur may recognise it as his island also, and enter into intelligent possession of his kingdom.

Perhaps the most marked change in the book is in the definite adoption of a twofold division of the "modes of being conscious of an object" into Cognition and Interest, and of these two again into Simple Apprehension and Judgment on the one hand, and Conation and Feeling-Attitude on the other. Some such classification is no doubt needed for the convenience of working, and must justify itself by the extent to which it facilitates study; but except in a very technical sense there seems something paradoxical in opposing Interest to Cognition.

Another change is of a more general nature, and is to be found, I think, in the tendency to be more descriptive and less explanatory than in the *Analytic Psychology*. I miss the illuminating conceptions of Noetic Synthesis and Apperception; and though they may be partly found again as Ideal Construction, Implicit Revivals, and Associated Dispositions, they seem to have lost something of their virtue under these new forms. One result of

the change is perhaps mainly apparent; but it does seem to throw more weight upon merely linear association, and less upon the reinstatement of psychical states as wholes; more upon contiguity and less upon context. It is probably the somewhat revolting experiments by Prof. Ebbinghaus which have tended to emphasise mere linear associations; but even if we are to accept such forced and unnatural experiments (for the mind cannot be said to work naturally when engaged in processes so alien to the nature of mind), still context will explain more than contiguity; as in the striking result that repetitions more or less immediately following one another yield less enduring associations than those which are separated by considerable intervals of time (p. 66). A fact is always more impressive for being presented in different contexts; and so far as contiguity of the repetitions in time means identical context, it would militate against what little impressiveness the association might have acquired.

It is a real satisfaction to find Dr. Stout authoritatively assigning a duly subordinate place to Imitation as compared with Response in mental development. The undue weight attached to the former element by French and American writers is partly no doubt the emphasis which always attaches to the discovery of an extended application of a conception, but partly also it appeals to national characteristics which are hardly English. It is of great importance in the development of self-consciousness and intersubjective intercourse (see chap. xiv.) both which factor actually plays the most important rôle and which is emphasised by the sociologist; and it is certain that in a British community intelligent co-operation and organised response are far more operative than in either France or America.

There is one other point at issue between English and American psychologists on which Dr. Stout gives a decided opinion; and that is as to the nature of Emotion. He refuses to accept Prof. James's theory that an emotion is not the immediate reaction upon psychical excitement, but merely the result of the organic disturbance arising out of that excitement, and points out that upon such a theory we should have no psychical counterpart to the primary excitement.

For detailed treatment of the emotions the reader is handed over to Mr. Shand, who has written chapter xvi. on "The Sources of Tender Emotion" to illustrate a method by which we may derive secondary and more complicated emotions from primary. It is a little difficult to adapt oneself to the changed atmosphere of this chapter; and still more difficult to reduce it to equivalent terms with the rest of the book. We feel that our island has suddenly become a different sort of place, and we fail to find our way about it. It is very beautiful and appeals strongly to whatever of poetic sentiment there is in us; we suspect that if we do not feel like this, yet this is what we ought to feel like. But it lacks reality. Take first the treatment of sympathy, which illustrates

curiously the fallacy of the imitation theory. Sympathy according to Mr. Shand is the mere echo in number 2 of the feeling or mood of number 1; if 1 is gloomy 2 becomes gloomy also, if 1 is angry 2 repeats his anger; "it is mere echo, reflexion or copy". But when sympathy is reduced to this it ceases to be sympathy, it is apt indeed to be its very opposite. The person who always chooses the time when I want to be ill-used and depressed to be ill-used and depressed herself, or seizes the opportunity of my domestic woes to reinstate her own, is of all companions the most unsympathetic. True, the *possibility* of sympathy lies in her knowledge of how I feel; but if that knowledge is to become sympathy it must cease to be echo and become response. Repetition without response is only aggravation. Petruchio could hardly be called a sympathetic husband. Even the illustration of the orator and his audience will not hold on the merely imitative interpretation; his attitude is one of appeal, and if there is to be sympathy between him and his audience theirs must be one of response; he pleads "You do see that this is wrong and cowardly," and they respond "Yes, we do".

It is partly due to this treatment of sympathy as mere echo that Mr. Shand finds it necessary to offer a theory of the origin of the "tender emotions" which seems sometimes—only sometimes—a little strained in its application. All tenderness, he says, combines both joy and sorrow; it is indeed the characteristic emotion emerging from mingled joy and sorrow in an object, and in all the tender emotions we may trace some element of each. In working out his theory in detail Mr. Shand handles his subject very beautifully, even tenderly; but it does not seem possible to accept his analysis in quite all cases, notably Gratitude and Reverence. To take the latter only: "greatness and mystery alone evoke reverence, but only in union with goodness. And goodness is apt to inspire pity when we think of the common fate which attends it"; how can we apply this analysis to the reverence felt, for instance, for the Divine Being, the typical case of reverence?

H. BOSANQUET.

VII.—NEW BOOKS.

The Categories. By JAMES HUTCHISON STIRLING, LL.D., etc.
Edinburgh : Oliver and Boyd. Pp. 158.

'THIS whole little book,' says Dr. Stirling (p. 147), 'I really regard as no more than as something of an appendix to my preceding volume. If then I have given it the title of *The Categories*, it is only because I regard these in the main to function all through it.' The 'preceding volume' referred to is that entitled 'What is Thought?' which appeared in 1900. An appendix the present volume may be; but the reader will probably look upon it as a summary statement of the Secret of Hegel, and of the value of his principle for philosophy and religion. That Secret, as Dr. Stirling repeatedly points out, is the concrete Ego with its twofold function of uniting difference and differentiating unity, a double process made possible by its being essentially consciousness of self. The ways in which it expresses this process specifically are the Categories, which are just various ways of uniting difference in experience, and are determinate functions of the single Ego whose nature they express. The Ego is thus the supreme unity in difference when we are dealing with concrete reality, the subject-object relation which constitutes spiritual experience ; it is *the notion*.

Dr. Stirling, with that fertility of resource which is all his own, brings light to bear on this main idea from various quarters. After a short chapter on "The Categories Generally," chapter ii. is devoted to what he calls the "Double Statement" of Hegel's philosophy. This is concerned with Hegel's earlier writings and their relation, especially in the case of the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, to what we regard as the systematic development of his system; and is one of the most interesting portions of the volume. Chapter iii. takes up the "Categories and Physics," where we have some pithy criticism of the ideas of beginning and end with their relevant conceptions of time and causation, as these are employed in physics and biology. Here Dr. Stirling summarises arguments in his Gifford Lectures, and *Darwinism*. Chapter iv. discusses "Religion and the Categories," in connexion with *Aufklärung* in its various forms, and furnishes some very weighty sentences on Hegel's relation to Christianity. Even religion cannot dispense with the categories. They are the medium of communion of Spirit with Spirit. The Spirit is "The single breath of the co-integrated mass of the co-integrating categories, self-evolved self-involved—consciousness, self-consciousness, the concrete ego, as in the Ego, and from the Ego that is the Infinite, the Living Universal, the absolute I Am: God" (p. 133). The concluding chapter deals in a general way with the categories as in Kant and Hegel.

There is little call for remark, least of all of a controversial kind, on this delightful and characteristic volume of the greatest living exponent of Hegel. One regrets that at times (*v. pp. 41, 127*) Dr. Stirling should make an accusation of unintelligibility against Hegel that hardly seems

warranted by a scrutiny of the general context of the passages referred to. And in one part of his argument indeed it seems not quite possible to follow his lead. He seeks in the second chapter on the 'Double Statement' to make out that the *Phänomenologie* (1) is not an introduction to the system; (2) was not regarded by Hegel later on as an integral part of his system, its original title as 'First Part of System of Science' having been dropped, and the whole matter of philosophy recast in the *Logic* and *Encyclopædia*, more especially in the former; (3) was made a part of the *Philosophy of Mind* and the whole substance of the original volume thus compressed into a few pages and paragraphs of the *Encyclopædia*.

On (1) one can merely remark that if introduction means the best starting-point for understanding the system as a whole, it is not possible to dispute or assert Dr. Stirling's position. Everything depends on the person who is to be 'introduced' to the system. If it means, however, the philosophical justification of the system, meeting the ordinary mind half-way and leading him up to the peculiar position of absolute objective Idealism, then that is surely what is at least part of the aim of the *Phänomenologie*. Hegel's own statements in the Preface bear this out.

As to (2) it is quite sufficient answer to state that the *Phänomenologie des Geistes* was being revised by Hegel for a new edition during the few weeks before his death, *i.e.*, some twenty-five years after its first publication and after all the elaborate treatises of the system had been expounded either in lectures or otherwise. This is unintelligible if even the point of view of the *Phänomenologie* had been given up in any sense. That he expressly dropped the sub-title is true: but it is quite explicable if we merely suppose that his original idea of the range of his system changed—which has nothing to do with the value of any particular portion of the system. It merely affects the arrangement of the books. Hegel came to look on each treatise as complete in itself. Thus the *Logic* is a special development of a special point of view, just as is the case with the *Philosophy of Religion*.

Regarding (3) it does not prove change of front. The *Philosophy of Mind* covers all phases of mind-life from its lowest soul-life up to Art and Religion. The *Phänomenologie* deals with one stage of mind-life, and therefore its point of view finds a place in the general development of mind as a whole. But it does deal with that stage, and when worked out it becomes the elaborate treatise we know. If then the mere recurrence of *Phänomenologie* in *Philosophy of Mind* implies abandonment of the original treatise, we should have to argue in the same way that Hegel's view changed when he afterwards discussed the State in a separate volume, *Philosophy of Law*, or religion in *Philosophy of Religion*, or when he proposed to undertake a comprehensive discussion of Psychology, which we learn in the introduction to the *Philosophy of Law* he intended to do.

There is a slight slip on p. 71: 'Mangel an Vorarbeiten' should be 'Mangel an Vorarbeiten' (*v. Logik*, Vorrede, *W.W.*, iii., p. 6).

J. B. BAILLIE.

Education as Adjustment: Educational Theory Viewed in the Light of Contemporary Thought. By Prof. O'SHEA, University of Wisconsin. Longmans, Green & Co.

This readable and well-arranged book is an honest attempt within a moderate space to build up a structure of educational theory upon a

scientific basis. Its special merit is the admirable manner in which it "organises and interprets data derived from different fields of investigation". The fundamental idea was promulgated forty years ago by Wallace and Darwin, and has been since then incidentally adopted by many writers on evolution and psychology. Prof. Stout, for example, has spoken of the child's perceptual education as involving "only direct adjustments in the way of bodily movements to things and situations actually present to the senses," and has shown that "as the child grows older ideal anticipation of the future and recall of the past largely take the place of direct adaptation to circumstances". Baldwin has written that the largest part of a child's energies is expended in getting adapted to his social environment, and Butler in *The Meaning of Education* refers to two main educational periods—the period of physical adjustment, and the period of adjustment to spiritual environment. Still no book, as far as the present writer knows, has set itself so methodically to expand the idea, and apply it in a practical way to the work of the teacher and the school.

The chief part of a man's environment is the society of his fellows, and hence Education must "seek to develop social action". Prof. O'Shea therefore is right in holding that "the educationist must summon to his aid every science which is concerned with the investigation of human nature, and he must strive to interpret phenomena which are yet unexplained in the light of principles presented in biology, in psychology, in evolution, in neurology, in ethics and in sociology".

The greatest need in education he considers to be the development of the scientific temper among teachers. He would have the teacher a naturalist of a high type who can look upon the children before him as inheritors of the accumulated racial experience in the effort to get adjusted to environment, and as struggling incessantly on their own part to learn the world and adapt it to themselves, and who can in addition work his way through some of the detailed processes which are involved in the attainment of this end. He would have the teacher recognise that mind is "a reacting mechanism," "a functioning organ," "a medium for the securing of adjustment," and be acquainted with the manner of its response to environing influences, and with the effects of particular studies and different modes of presenting them, and the purpose and method of discipline in the school.

After an interesting résumé of the data for a science of Education, and a criticism of the common views of the aim of Education, the author discusses Adjustment as a process of recreating environments, and shows how it is affected by social organisation. "Differences in capacity will manifest themselves mainly in respect of the degree to which individuals can adapt themselves to complex environments." Referring to the tendency in the public schools towards the suppression of the exceptional individual, keeping him down to the level of mediocrity, Prof. O'Shea strongly insists that every pupil should be given an opportunity to achieve the most he can in any direction, and that schools must be organised to minister to the needs of the able pupil as well as of his less fortunate fellows. "To fail to do this is a crime alike against the individual and against society," for society depends largely upon the conservation of the strong.

There is an excellent chapter on the general effect of adjustment on teaching. The educationist must arrange the world for the individual so that he will be brought into correspondence with it in a "certain definite, orderly manner, working in a progressive way" from simple things to closely related and ever more complex things.

The third part of the book deals with the method of attaining adjustment, and is therefore of greatest practical value. Learning in the first stage is "organisation of sense impressions the better to guide reaction," "ascertaining how to conduct one's self toward things". This confers upon the child the power to adapt himself to individual things in the world. The percept is "a complex which in any individual case is constantly changing with increased experience". But while the child is learning the individual he is simultaneously learning the group to which it belongs.

The general idea or concept in its function in adjustment "is a definitely established mode of reacting upon an oft-repeated situation".

The chapters on certain typical senses, the retention and abridgment of experience, the function of conventional language, and on apperception as the essential process give a direct educational application to some of the most recent results of psychological investigation.

The doctrine of Formal Discipline is fully discussed and criticised. On this subject the author's position will not be generally accepted by educationists in this country, although it is in accordance with the trend of opinion and practice in America. "Nothing for mere formal discipline." "The educationist will not put subjects in the curriculum that are designed merely to discipline the mind by formal exercise." "He must cause the individual to react in the school in the ways in which he must act outside." "Good method is simply the attitude of the organism which is most favourable for adjusting itself effectively to a situation."

Such views as these go right in the teeth of the orthodox beliefs of our schools and colleges. Prof. O'Shea has brought many arguments in support of them. These will set many thinking, but will probably convert few.

The book is a valuable contribution to the literature of Education, and should find many readers even outside the teaching profession.

JOHN EDGAR.

What is Meaning? Studies in the Development of Significance. V. WELBY.
London: Macmillan & Co. Pp. xxxi, 321.

The studies in this interesting book gather around the use and abuse of language. The author assails the carelessness with which we employ such means of expression as we have, and the conventions which prohibit attempts to discover more fitting, suggestive and economical modes of writing and speaking. Language is a most precious portion of our inheritance; and it should be the conscious aim of every one to hand it on richer and more precise. Until the whole people is filled with this idea, the present reign of confusion and fallacy must continue, stunting the faculties of the young and leaving the old powerless to declare their deeper feelings. "Expression must overtake the thinker and poet, if they are to open new worlds of truth and beauty."

Not the least fruitful source of error is the use of analogies and metaphors, representing an unscientific view of the world, especially when it is doubtful whether these figures are used as arguments or as literary embellishments. All such figures, however, must be discarded; new metaphors and analogies should be drawn from the best science of the day. Our language should always reflect the fullest and most accurate knowledge we possess. Not only shall we in this way escape much confusion, and the tiresome attempts to unravel verbal fallacies;

but language itself will lead on to the suggestion of further truths.¹ The idea, that there is latent even in language as we have it the promise of much knowledge, is constantly present to the author. Our words signify more than we mean. Man is always greater than he knows.

This conception governs Lady Welby's remarks about Education and Primitive Religion. She attacks the cramping and artificial methods which have so long controlled the schools; and insists that the aim of the teacher is to elicit knowledge, and stimulate the natural interest the child takes in learning. What is said on this subject in the studies, and illustrated in several notes and particularly in a dialogue in the appendix, appears to us specially good and suggestive. As regards Religion, the attempts to explain the elaborate rites and strange beliefs of the primitive mind by dreams and odd occurrences are rejected or at any rate relegated to a secondary place. These cults are expressions of a genuine passion for the eternal and unseen, of an organic response to appeals from the Divine Nature. Hence what seems most grotesque is absurd only in a superficial and relative sense.

Much emphasis is laid throughout this book on the distinction of sense, meaning and significance. These words, often regarded as synonyms, are used to indicate the different stages of development in expressiveness. We cannot pretend to understand the author completely on this point. But the distinction appears to be the following. Meaning belongs to the sphere of deliberate will; the meaning of a word or phrase is the purport it is intended to convey. Below meaning in the scale of expression stands sense. Sense does not explicitly involve the conception of purpose at all. A thing has sense, if it stands as a sign of something for me, whether or not it has received its character as a sign from the will of any one else. Significance, on the other hand, stands above meaning. A thing is significant in so far as it is part of a system, and is therefore involved in all manner of relations beyond those which constitute its intention or meaning. The line between sense and significance is hard to draw. Indeed it labours under the same difficulties as the distinction between denotation and connotation. But perhaps we may say that in the one case we are referring to the more immediate, and in the other to the wider and more remote relations of a thing.

The majority of readers will probably find this book somewhat fanciful in parts, and also obscure in respect of the argument. But they will also find many penetrating criticisms on our use of words and analogies, and on education, an interesting selection of quotations in the notes and appendices, and throughout much that is both stimulating and suggestive.

A. J. JENKINSON.

The Philosophy of Education. By HERMAN HARRELL HORNE, Ph.D., Dartmouth College. The Macmillan Company, 1904.

Starting from the nature of man as seen in the light of biology, physiology, social science, psychology and philosophy, the author of this volume sets himself to evolve a definition of Education which will cover all the complicated facts. "Teaching to-day," as he says, "is passing from the empirical, the experimental, the customary, to the rational and the scientific as its basis." He has here attempted with some

¹An interesting example of this is given in chap. xvii., which contains the 'translation' of part of Dr. Jackson's lectures on the Nervous System.

measure of success to show how the principles of Education are founded on the related natural and mental sciences—what he calls “the essential sciences of man”. The book is “not another manual of practice, but an interpretation,”—in fact there is very little discussion of the methods of ‘teaching’ in its restricted sense. It will be none the less useful on that account, for such a survey of the land has been needed, and should be of undoubted value to those who would enter in to possess it.

Throughout it is not difficult to trace the influence of James, Royce, Baldwin and other recent writers, but it is no discredit to have been influenced by these masters, and the book is not unworthy of their teaching. Dr. Horne has in its pages not only given a lucid exposition of the various aspects of his subject, beginning with the biological and ending with the philosophical, but he has shown that there is a “large and systematic unity” throughout.

The chapters on the sociological aspect of Education are specially valuable because of their interpretation and analysis of the spiritual and social environment of the pupil.

“Education is evolution which has become conscious of itself.” “In the last analysis the school is society shaping itself to its future ends.” As “life is the great fundamental fact” the author begins with a simple biological definition: “Education is the superior adjustment of a human being to his environment”. But this definition he gradually enlarges as he considers the fresh light which the other sciences cast upon the nature of man. In the last section of the book he deals with the philosophic aspect of his subject, and supports the thesis that the environment of man is God. He is now able to formulate his final and somewhat elaborate definition: “Education is the eternal process of superior adjustment of the physically and mentally developed, free, conscious, human being to God, as manifested in the intellectual, emotional and volitional environment of man”.

In Science man's intellect reaches the thought of God in the world; in Art man's emotions come into touch with the feeling of God in the world; and “Volition, as expressed through the will of man, is the plan of God in the world”.

A student at the threshold of the study of Education will find in the volume the stimulus and suggestiveness of a wide outlook.

JOHN EDGAR.

A Study of British Genius. By HAVELOCK ELLIS. London: Hurst & Blackett, 1904. Pp. 300.

This book contains an attempt to illustrate “by a single concrete example of the first importance—the genius of Great Britain—many of the special characteristics of genius generally,” as well as to classify and localise the various types of genius found in these isles. The latter part of this undertaking (which is, however, dealt with first in the book) strikes one as being not altogether sound. The author accepts a great many precarious conclusions from recent writers on British ethnology. One distrusts a good deal of this talk about Brythonic wedges among a Goidelic population, and so on. In one case we find a sheer mistake—the old-fashioned prejudice that “the lowland Scotch are almost identical in racial composition with the northern English”. If the writer had said that the people of the south-eastern counties and an important section of the inhabitants of the burghs were originally identical in race with the northern English, his statement would have been unexception-

able. Again, the way in which Mr. Ellis proceeds to generalise about the psychological characters of his three foci of English genius, *viz.*, the East Anglian, the south-western and that of the Welsh border, seems very risky, while when he descends to estimate the relative genius-producing powers of publicans and tea-merchants his results are rather trifling. In spite of all Mr. Ellis's efforts to obtain full and accurate data and to eliminate sources of error, it must be confessed that we have not sufficient knowledge to enable us to carry on this minute work and pit one county against another and one subsection of the population against the next. All that we can say seems to be that genius is in proportion to the civilisation of the class or society amid which it is found; but this civilisation must not be estimated by purely material standards. Otherwise Scotland would have to be the wealthiest part of the country.

Much more important are the statistics referring to heredity and parentage, health, fertility and duration of life. Most important of all are the results touching the pathology of genius. The extraordinary frequency of the association between outstanding ability and gout seems to point to the nervous character of the disease. The connexion between gout and genius may "be in part due to a tendency of some of the gout-producing influences to be identical with some of the genius-producing influences". Among the latter the author instances the late age of the parents. He regards genius neither as a neurosis (*i.e.*, akin to insanity) nor as a strictly normal variation, but as due to a morbid neurotic strain acting as a "fermentative element" on a robust and vigorous constitution. The insanity which frequently accompanies genius is not the cause but the Nemesis of genius. "The real affinity of genius is with congenital imbecility rather than with insanity." "By means of the *idiots savants*, the wonderful calculators, . . . we may bridge the gulf that divides idiocy from genius."

G. R. T. Ross.

The Ethics of Work and Wealth. By D. C. BANKS. William Blackwood, 1904. Pp. 328.

It is characteristic of the wider interpretation of economics that there seems to be a tendency to depart from the rigorously non-moral attitude of the "classical school". Certain conceptions that the economist must use are borrowed (formerly without acknowledgment) from the moral philosopher, and there is room for a treatise that would expound the points of contact. This may or may not be the purpose of the *Ethics of Work and Wealth*, but it is one that, if designed, has not been realised. The effect of the book is rather to re-think economic statements from the point of view of *Sittlichkeit* rather than *Moralität*. This is done with clearness, a style that is almost too epigrammatic, many interesting allusions to and quotations from standard literature, and in a manner that is often suggestive. The book too is up to date, for it deals with the fiscal question and even Chinese labour! That the latter are considered from the "ethical" point of view is characteristic. But after all the "Ethics" are those of "popular philosophy," and comprise a strange blending of Butler, Spencer and the *obiter dicta* of the unco guid. This eclecticism limits the usefulness of the very suggestive discussion of the Law of Marginal Utility. The criticism of use value seems to turn on the confusion of the object of desire and pleasure (which also appears in some of the articles in the *Dictionary of Political Economy*). There is much of practical interest in the book, as, for instance, the discussion of the moral effect of the stock exchange. Curiously enough the stock exchange is

supposed to be wholly given over to speculation—the citation of 6s. shares (nominal) suggests certain mining ventures that would fall within this category. There is one very curious passage in the book which bears indirectly on that modern King Charles's Head—the fiscal question. The page describing the letter sent by Edward VI. with Willoughby's expedition in 1553 is headed "Edward VI. on Free Trade". This voyage was the foundation of the Russia Company, which for many years possessed (and tried to maintain) not only the monopoly of trade to and from Russia against other Englishmen, but against the rest of Europe.

W. R. SCOTT.

Biographic Clinics (II.). By G. M. GOULD. Philadelphia : P. Blakiston's, Son & Co., 1904. Pp. xiii, 392. Price, \$1.00.

The first instalment of these *Clinics* was reviewed in MIND, xiii., 130 f. The author there dealt with the ill-health of De Quincey, Carlyle, Darwin, Huxley and Browning, as conditioned upon 'eye strain'. The present series discusses the maladies of George Eliot, George Henry Lewes, Wagner, Parkman, Jane Welch Carlyle, Spencer, Whittier, Margaret Fuller Ossoli and Nietzsche. The reception of the first volume by the leading medical journals was, we are told, neither flattering nor encouraging. However that may be, the present reviewer must confess that the favourable impression which he received from the earlier volume has been deepened by his reading of the second. So far as a layman can judge, there seems to be no doubt that Dr. Gould has laid his hand upon a *vera causa* in the etiology of affections that—be it remembered—are by no means confined to men of genius, but are widespread through the general public. No one can read Spencer's *Autobiography* without finding confirmation piled on confirmation of Dr. Gould's theses.

E. B. T.

L'Idée de Relation : Essai de Critique Positive. Par GUSTAVE RODRIGUES. Paris, 1904. Pp. 347.

"*La raison pure est la dernière idole élevée par l'homme à sa propre glorification*" (p. 88), let us, therefore, bring about its fall by submitting the doctrine of its high-priest Kant to a criticism of unprecedented severity (p. 45). With Kant the cloud of metaphysical vapour passes for ever from our understanding, and we see Experience singly and we see it whole as phenomenon bound to phenomenon by means of phenomenon, as the automatic organisation and the spontaneous equilibrium of sensible appearances sufficing to themselves and seeking no support either in spirit or noumenon (p. 342). The affirmation of the universal and necessary, the postulate of intelligibility, was only the first formula of an egoistic ideal seeking to impose itself on the facts. Pure reason is the offspring of moral prejudice, and must be got rid of in the interests of morality itself. After all this it is a little disappointing to read the old familiar story of Kant's formalism and dualism. If Metaphysics could be demolished along with Kant it behoved M. Rodrigues to show, for example, that Hegel is not a metaphysician, or that his essentially antagonistic and negative attitude towards Kant was an impossible one. Admitting at once that M. Rodrigues gets some very healthy exercise out of his Kantian punching-bag, and that his blows would be terrific if they hit anything living, I should like to look at what I take to be his

main contention. It is that, "*L'intelligibilité des choses ne permet pas leur réalité, elle en résulte*" (p. 231). Morality and Science, he assures us, represent attempts at unification which will succeed at some points and fail at others, because things are not necessarily intelligible or otherwise, that is all as it turns out: Truth does not exist, only truths successive and sometimes contradictory. Now, does the frank acceptance of the infinite variety and complexity of the world, the makeshift nature of many hypotheses necessitate the rejection of the belief that reality may ultimately form one rational system? The author tells us that, "*L'ordre se fait automatiquement parce que le désordre est la négation de toute existence et de toute possibilité, parce qu'il exprime l'impuissance de l'adaptation*" (p. 232). Well, surely the idea of a kind of mechanical adjustment of phenomena to one another points to an ultimate system, if of a low order of intelligibility. "*Pour que quelque chose fût, quelle infinité de choses qui ne pouvaient pas être,*" says M. Rodrigues, and it naturally occurs to you to ask him why his universe should exhibit any preference at all for any particular set of phenomena. That the "*habitudes des phénomènes*" were originally only fortunate accidents is simply to say that they are manifestations of a more or less successful adaptation to an underlying system, and their degree of permanence does not affect the general principle of causation which M. Rodrigues so unwarrantably classes among them. He defends phenomenal freedom, it is true, but not quite to the extent of imagining that things happen anyhow, he is only anxious to insist that, if the development of experience is regulated (which we cannot know *à priori*), it is by itself and not by us (p. 260). But why should the regulation of experience be so alien to the reason of man that the latter should be likened to a cuckoo's egg? Surely this is to fall into an odd inversion of the abhorred Kantian dualism, and indeed he directly contradicts any such assumption where he says, "*La raison, c'est le monde intelligible au monde*" (p. 286).

The object pursued, at least in the negative part of the essay, is to resolve the idea of reason into the idea of relation, which, instead of being derived from it, establishes it (p. 32). This being so, how M. Rodrigues can talk of "experience purified from every rational element and reduced to the relations composing it" (p. 263), I do not pretend to understand. Relation is the unity of a duality, schematically expressed by the form, a thing is another thing, A is B. Identity itself is only cognisable if it contradicts itself ideally, if the being which it posits opposes itself. But, on the other hand, heterogeneity only develops itself under the form of homogeneity. Relation is neither identity nor difference, but implies both, it is identity in difference and difference in identity. All this has a very familiar sound, but it is not meant in the bad, old, metaphysical way. The idea must resolve itself into images or it would represent nothing for us. Identity and Contradiction are the two aspects of the fundamental phenomenon-relation. Hence their universality, which is empirical and not logical, and their absolutely indissoluble solidarity. M. Rodrigues has made the discovery that, "*L'espace vide de l'objet est la matière logique comme il est la matière mathématique*" (p. 182). Thus the principle of Identity becomes, A space only contains itself; that of Contradiction, A space does not contain other spaces. In answer to the very obvious objection that we affirm non-spatial notions of qualities and purely internal states to be identical which cannot possibly be translated into extension, M. Rodrigues denies that sensation and feeling in themselves are subjected to the law of Identity, "*La différence entre le conçu et le senti, c'est que ce dernier ne peut jamais être identifié*" (p. 180). Psycho-

logically, of course, the strict principle of Identity can be realised only to a certain extent, but whence could thought derive its standard if that is not operative, however imperfectly, at all stages of intellectual life? And how, on M. Rodrigues' own view that space is the minimum phenomenon, can it be absent from sensation and feeling? Is he not giving to space a Kantian power of elaboration? But, then, why ask these questions, since the Positivist is that being for whom there are no problems and there are no solutions (p. 155). If that had not been so, I might have timidly ventured to ask M. Rodrigues how he explains, "*Ce besoin d'unité absolue indéfiniment poursuivie par la pensée*"; how, from the mere fact that it has become a form of our consciousness and our brain, error can not only be converted into truth, but become ever the truer the more the error is aggravated, as he says is the case with Duty (p. 164); how he can enunciate the principle that, "*la moralité est le propre de qui n'accepte pas la nature, mais la fait*" (p. 150), and yet inveigh against faith because it is a defiance hurled by man against the nature which dominates him (p. 337)?

M. Rodrigues has written an exceedingly full book, and, although I have confined myself here to finding fault with it, there were times when I found myself on the whole in sympathy with the writer, as in his discussion of freedom, and at all times I recognised his sincerity and ability.

DAVID MORRISON.

Spinoza und Schleiermacher. Die Kritische Lösung des von Spinoza hinterlassenen Problems. Von Dr. THEODOR CAMERER. Stuttgart und Berlin, 1903. Pp. 179.

The author of this essay is already well, and favourably, known to students of Spinoza by his previous book on Spinoza's teaching. The present work will enhance his reputation for patient and scholarly investigation. But the results to which he has come, and the collocation of passages through which he has reached them, will undoubtedly prove of much value in the attainment of a sound interpretation of the principles of the system.

The author begins by pointing out that Spinoza's philosophy is vexed by contradictions which cannot, in the form in which the system has been left, be really reconciled. Principles are set down alongside one another, each of them essential to the system, and each logically worked out, which are at the same time mutually contradictory. Dr. Camerer believes that the *lacune* and the contradictory elements which criticism reveals are so much a part of the system that they cannot be removed without destroying its essential character. To get rid of its defects by eliminating or changing some of its elements would also destroy the system itself. This thesis is worked out by showing in great detail the difficulties in Spinoza's conception of God, the central idea of his system. And the conclusion is drawn, that only when the transcendental character which the absolute has in Spinoza's thought, is clearly recognised, and the transcendental unity of opposites in the absolute is shown, will Spinoza's system find its critical completion. And such a completion Camerer believes Spinoza has found in Schleiermacher's system as based upon the absolute identity of opposites.

The detailed character of the discussion on the two steps of the argument makes it impossible to summarise it or to attempt to estimate its cogency. There are some aspects of it however which, in my judgment,

need strengthening. (1) The author seems to me to rely unduly upon the exposition of Spinoza's thought which is to be found in the *Short Treatise*. Interesting and valuable as this Treatise is in casting light upon the development of the Spinozistic system, it cannot be founded upon as an adequate expression of its author's mature opinions. It is strongly tinged with Cartesian and Scholastic phrases and modes of thought, and it displays all the self-contradictoriness and fragmentariness of tentative thinking. On no point can it be fairly taken as indicating the writer's final judgment. (2) I am not disposed to think that the method of bringing together and contrasting the various passages in which Spinoza makes use of the terms, Substance, Attribute, Mode, *Intellectus Dei*, etc., is calculated to cast most light upon his system. The results to be reached in this way are probably more verbal than real. For there is no more reason for estimating Spinoza's study of human life by the definitions which a few abstract terms receive from him than for limiting Euclid's contribution to the study of the properties of space to the few barren definitions with which his treatise opens. (3) The two parts of Dr. Camerer's treatise are but loosely coherent. Schleiermacher's principle of absolute unity may be the logical completion of Spinozism, and the transcendental unity of opposites may be the natural apotheosis of a substance which expresses itself in infinite attributes, but this conclusion demands a much more thorough proof than is here given. In spite of what the author says, it may be maintained that Spinoza's system can be better corrected from within than from without, and that its real difficulties are no greater than are to be found in any other serious effort to unify the different phases of human experience.

R. A. DUFF.

Grundzüge der allgemeinen Ästhetik. Von Dr. STEPHAN WITASEK. Leipzig, 1904. Pp. 402.

This book is avowedly rather a description of æsthetic facts and experiences than an attempt at their scientific explanation, but, since the author considers the method of empirical investigation of psychological data the only one permissible from the nature of the problem, and quite adequate to disprove much that was regarded as profound wisdom in previous æsthetics, it is to be regretted that its utility should, in his hands at least, remain so entirely negative. Thus all previous attempts to explain æsthetic pleasure, from Hegel's appearance of the Idea—at which Dr. Witasek pokes fun—down to Lipps' enrichment of the life of the soul, are to be rejected because they introduce the feeling of value, and he considers himself to have shown that æsthetic pleasure is not due to any feeling of value. This is a hard saying in itself, and I cannot consider the author's effort to exclude thought from the æsthetic attitude completely successful. He has to admit at least the latent influence of the judgment of value in our appreciation of the typical, and he has to allow the great importance for the preadjustment of feeling of the objective elements of any æsthetic presentation. In any case, he has no better explanation to offer that I can find, but contents himself with advising us to prepare an exhaustive repertorium of things favourable to the production of an æsthetic result and see what we can make of it. The æsthetic norm is grounded on normal emotional reaction, and the cultivated taste is standard because it is the product of the crystallisation of the universal subjective conditions.

About two-thirds of the book are devoted to a minute psychological

analysis aiming at laying bare the psychical factors which have a share, great or small, in æsthetic enjoyment, followed by an account of their combination in concrete experience, and all this, although there is debatable matter, is carefully done and extremely interesting. The state of æsthetic appreciation is described as compact of a feeling of pleasure or pain together with the intuition of a presentation in such a manner that the presentation constitutes the psychical pre-requisite of the feeling. In order to become objects of æsthetic appreciation feelings must be made into such presentations, and, while the feeling of æsthetic pleasure itself is always a real feeling, the presentation which it presupposes may be dependent on a judgment of reality, or, as in *Einfühlung*, on a mere assumption. While the æsthetic contemplation of genuine emotions is possible and demonstrable, it calls for an exceptional power of detachment in the spectator. The theory that Art originated in play overlooks the fact that in play the assumptions made awaken feelings which constitute the pleasure of the play, whereas in art these feelings are turned into presentations from the contemplation of which arises æsthetic pleasure. Dr. Witasek discusses the pseudo-æsthetic factors at some length, and is inclined freely to admit the importance of the ethical judgment of value, as is natural in one who finds in the ethical side-issues of art a hint that it may possess biological significance.

DAVID MORRISON.

Der Aufbau der Form beim natürlichen Werden und künstlerischen Schaffen.
I. Teil. Ein neues morphologisch-rhythmisches Grundgesetz. Von K.
WYNEKEN. Dresden, 1904. Pp. 295.

As against modern individualism in Art finding countenance in K. Lange's assertion that science cannot lay down any normal proportions, since the assumption that there are proportions beautiful in themselves is untenable, the author endeavours to show that beauty has its fixed laws and that there is an inward relation between the laws governing natural process and those of artistic creation. He enters upon elaborate and intricate investigations and calculations to prove that the higher forms of Nature and Art are constructed according to a plan based upon consideration for the most striking parts of the form and upon the numbers 4, 5, 6, and especially 5 and 6. Widening the concept *rhythm* so as to embrace the order according to which everything occupying space or time is divided into smaller sections, it is his intention to produce an outline of the Rhythmic of Form, the present work restricting itself to the establishment of a fundamental morphological and rhythmical law resting upon an interpretation of continued geometrical and arithmetical proportions. To take only one element of that law for the sake of clearness, as an example of what the author means: *Bei den höheren Natur- und Kunstformen, seien sie ein-, zwei- oder dreidimensional, kann man zu jedem Gliederungspunkte mindestens zwei andere Gliederungspunkte derselben Form angeben, die mit jenem einen Rhythmus bilden* (p. 226). Turning back to page 216 to see what we are to understand by a *Rhythmus* we find: *Drei oder mehr mathematische Punkte . . . bilden einen Rhythmus, wenn entweder ihre Abscissen oder ihre y-Ordinaten oder ihre z-Ordinaten für sich eine stetige geometrische Proportion oder eine fortschreitende stetige geometrische Proportion bilden.* In this sort of way the author is to establish a scientific knowledge and developed technique of the rhythmical which will furnish a sure criterion of taste and protect the artistic neophyte from aimless fumbling. Moreover, it may yet be possible to explain the fact of the rhythmic plan

of construction as a phenomenon of adaptation, and Rhythmic may form the means for the comprehension of an evolution of that which has form, wide enough to embrace the whole Cosmos, binding together organic and inorganic. Well, I am sure we all wish him luck! His great ingenuity and industry deserve some reward—so does his rather emphatic self-conviction. We certainly should not hail the imposition of any hieratic proportions, but, if the author's conclusions were valid, they might form a scientific groundwork of more or less importance according to the art involved. The idea that science is actually to lay down rules for artistic creation is surely not seriously entertained by the author, who must know that in its highest forms it depends upon such a stirring of the emotional and conative aspects of the soul as always lie a little way the other side of any science the artist or anybody else is consciously possessed of. I hope the author does not regard aesthetics as exhausting its import in the aspect which he has treated.

DAVID MORRISON.

Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur Physiologischen Optik. Von ARTHUR KÖNIG.
Mit einem Vorwort von Th. W. Engelmann. Leipzig, 1903.

The thirty-two papers brought together in this volume are the product of the late Arthur König's researches during the twelve years that he occupied the Chair of Physiological Optics in the University of Berlin. They testify to the indomitable spirit of the man who, in spite of the constitutional weakness of body that brought him to an early grave, could carry through the many laborious investigations and make the many valuable additions to our exact knowledge of the facts of vision which are embodied in the volume. König was a favourite pupil of the great Helmholtz, his bent and training were primarily mathematical and physical, and his work exhibits both the merits and the defects of a mind of this type when it grapples with the complicated problems presented by the sensory processes. The great merit is the extremely careful and exact quantitative determination of many important data. The defects are the ignoring of the complexities of the organ of vision, and a tendency to rely too much upon deductive reasoning. Like Helmholtz, König never attempted to penetrate beyond the retina into the mysteries of that extremely complex mechanism of which it is but the peripheral extremity, and hence the range of problems open to his investigation was a limited one. His excessive reliance upon deductive reasoning appears in his theory that the sensation of blue is excited through the medium of the visual yellow of the rods of the retina. For this suggestion, which is at variance with well-established facts, was a deduction from the single carefully determined fact that the coefficients of absorption of light of different parts of the spectrum by visual yellow form a curve that approximately coincides with the curve representing the sensitivity of the retinal blue-exciting process to the light of the various regions of the spectrum. Probably the most permanently valuable of these researches are, on the one hand, those which determined the three primary colour-processes, red, green and blue, by the careful quantitative examination and comparison of the vision of normal and of colour-blind eyes, and, on the other, those by which König contributed so greatly to the most important recent advance of the physiology of vision, namely the proof that the rods of the retina with their visual purple constitute a separate organ for achromatic vision and one specially adapted for vision in dim light.

W. McD.

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VIII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. Vol. xii., No. 6. **J. E. Creighton.** 'The Standpoint of Experience.' [Attempts, by a method of exclusion, to formulate a view of experience that shall stand the test of criticism as laid down in the history of philosophy.] **F. L. van Beccalaere.** 'St. Thomas's Philosophy of Knowledge.' [Sketches St. Thomas's doctrine of the human soul, the human intellect and the value of human knowledge.] **E. B. McGilvary.** 'Ethics, a Science.' [Ethics is science, not art; descriptive and critical, not normative; at once theoretical and practical. In data and method it resembles science more than philosophy.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. **L. W. Allen.** 'McTaggart's Interpretation of Hegel's Category of Cognition.' Vol. xiii., No. 1. **J. Watson.** 'Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.—I. Demonstration.' **E. Ritchie.** 'The Reality of the Finite in Spinoza's System.' [The dualism which differentiates between an Absolute, and a phenomenal world of manifold appearance having no intrinsic reality, is foreign and adverse to Spinoza's ontology. His theory of being is inextricably bound up with his theory of knowledge.] **A. K. Rogers.** 'Rationality and Belief.' [Attempts to adjust the relative claims of the logical and the extra-logical factors in belief.] Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. Vol. xiii., No. 2. **J. Royce.** 'The Eternal and the Practical.' [Discussion of the place which our acknowledged and indispensable empiristic tendencies ought to occupy in the whole context of our philosophical opinions, and of the share which our practical postulates (ethical undertakings, doctrine of conduct) ought to have in determining our entire view of the universe.] **J. Watson.** 'Aristotle's Posterior Analytics.—II. Induction.' **J. Dewey.** 'The Philosophical Work of Herbert Spencer.' [Social philosophy gave Spencer his fundamental ideas and ideals; biology put these vague and pervasive ideals in something like scientific shape; physical-astronomical speculations furnished the causal machinery for getting the scheme under way, and added to the appearance of scientific definiteness and accuracy.] **H. N. Gardiner.** 'Proceedings of the Third Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Princeton University, December 29-31, 1903.' Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes. Vol. xiii., No. 3. **E. A. Singer.** 'On Mechanical Explanation.' [If the inadequacy of the mechanical ideal cannot be demonstrated from the aspects of nature studied by the biologist, then in no other region of experience can we expect to find such a demonstration. The question of the ultimate success of this ideal remains.] **J. E. Creighton.** 'Purpose as Logical Category.' [The terms 'practical' and 'purpose' are ambiguous; the instrumental view is, logically, individualistic; practical purposes must be referred to the unity of life and experience; the theory creates a dualism between immediate experience

and ideational process; it must rest upon a logical and ontological basis quite different from that which it claims for itself.] **H. H. Bawden.** 'The Meaning of the Psychical.' [Consideration of the psychical in relation to that process of tension in experience which is the condition of consciousness.] **G. Santayana.** 'What is Aesthetics?' [The group of activities we call aesthetic is a motley one, created by certain historic and literary accidents.] Discussions. **T. de Laguna.** 'Evolutionary Method in Ethical Research.' [Critique of Dewey.] **C. A. Strong.** 'Reply to Professor Bakewell.' **C. M. Bakewell.** 'A rejoinder.' Reviews of Books. Summaries of Articles. Notices of New Books. Notes.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW. Vol. x., No. 5. **G. B. Cutten.** 'The Case of John Kinsel.'—I. [First part of detailed account, without theoretical implications, of the development of 'double personality' in a college undergraduate.] **J. F. Hyland.** 'The Distribution of Attention.'—II. [Completion of account of tachistoscopic experiments; choice reactions; reactions to disparate impressions; the mental after-image. Results: the experiments on counting, and those in which reactions with concentration and with attempted distribution of attention were compared, gave no evidence of distribution. "Simultaneous distribution is . . . a psychological impossibility. The duration of the mental after-image easily explains the phenomena . . . ascribed to distribution in tachistoscopic experiments."] **M. Meyer.** 'Some Points of Difference Concerning the Theory of Music.' [Reply to criticism of Dixon (*MIND*, Oct., 1902) and Lippé (*Zeits.*, 1901), with further elaboration of the writer's theory.] Discussion. **C. L. Franklin.** 'An Ill-considered Colour Theory.' [Criticism of von Oppolzer (*Zeits.*, 1902).] Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes. Vol. x., No. 6. **I. W. Riley.** 'The Personal Sources of Christian Science.' [Sketch of the life and personality of Mary Baker Eddy, the founder of Christian Science.] **G. B. Cutten.** 'The Case of John Kinsel.'—II. [Completion of record, and discussion of certain features of the case.] **W. Fite.** 'The Place of Pleasure and Pain in the Functional Psychology.' [Conflict is a condition of consciousness, but specially a condition of pleasure-pain. Pleasure is succeeding, pain is failing, in the process of resolving a conflict.] Discussions. **P. Hughes.** 'Moral Feeling as a Basis of the Psychology of Morals.' [The moral sentiment proper is that which characterises the restraint of an emotive tendency to act, by a purely intellectual activity.] **M. Prince.** 'Professor Strong on the Relation between Mind and Body.' [Argument of the writer's work *The Nature of Mind and Human Automatism* (1885) anticipates Strong's work.] **W. R. Newbold.** 'Professor Hammond on Aristotle's Psychology.' Psychological Literature. New Books. Notes. Vol. xi., No. 1. **R. Dodge.** 'The Participation of Eye Movements in the Visual Perception of Motion.' [There are two types of eye movement concerned: the primary reactive displacement of the line of regard towards an eccentric point of interest, and the true pursuit movement. Neither is of any importance for movement perception.] **B. Sidis.** 'An Enquiry into the Nature of Hallucinations.'—I. [Perceptions are made up of nuclear elements, directly presented, and marginal elements, secondarily presented (not represented). Hallucinations are secondary sensations.] **J. M. Baldwin.** 'The Limits of Pragmatism.' [Pragmatism must give a logical account of reality. Neither member of a genetic dualism (such as logical truth and experienced value) can explain the principle of the process in which the dualism arises: a further genetic process is needed.] Discussion. **W. I. Thomas.** 'The Sexual Element in Sensibility.' [Egoism may go back to the food-struggle, altruism to courtship.] **C. A. Strong.** 'Dr. Morton Prince and Panpsychism.'

Editor's Note. Vol. xi., No. 2. **W. L. Bryan.** 'Theory and Practice.' [The illusions of theory: consistency and precision. The success of theory: concrete science and experience with affairs.] **M. Meyer.** 'On the Attributes of the Sensations.' [Discussion of principles and tabulation of sensations and attributes.] **B. Sidis.** 'An Inquiry into the Nature of Hallucination'—II. [Continued analysis of hallucinations as dissociated secondary percepts.] Discussion. **F. C. French.** 'The Mechanism of Imitation.' [Explanation of imitation in terms of motor associations, either based on instinct or established by purely random activities.] Vol. xi., No. 3. **H. J. Pearce.** 'The Law of Attraction in Relation to Some Visual and Tactual Illusions.' [Experiments designed to reveal the exact relation between primary and secondary stimuli and the effect in perception of the one upon the other.] **W. R. Wright.** 'The Relation between the Vasomotor Waves and Reaction Times.' [The reactions form a curve which agrees closely with the curve of the observer's Traube-Hering waves.] **G. T. Stevens.** 'On the Horopter.' Shorter contributions: **C. L. Herrick.** 'The Logical and Psychological Distinction between the True and the Real.' [The feeling of reality comes from the immediateness of the elements of experience; the judgment of truth is a fluctuating evaluation based on relations known rather than felt.] **G. A. Tawney.** 'The Period of Conversion.' [Character of conversion, and its relation to the adolescent period.] **J. M. Baldwin.** 'The Genetic Progression of Psychic Objects.' [Tentative schema of the series of determinations of objects at the successive stages of cognitive development.] Notes. **M. W. Calkins.** 'On the Attributes of Sensation.'

PSYCHOLOGICAL INDEX FOR 1903. Compiled by **H. C. Warren**, with the co-operation of **G. R. D'Allonne**, **F. G. Bruner** and **C. S. Myers**. [Issued April, 1904: 2,122 titles.]

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xiv., Nos. 3, 4. This double number of the *American Journal* is edited by Profs. Sanford and Titchener as a commemorative number, dedicated to President G. S. Hall on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of his attainment of the philosophical doctorate. It contains twenty-six papers, written by colleagues and former pupils, and has as frontispiece a heliotype of President Hall. We have space only for names and titles. **H. Beaunis.** 'Contribution à la psychologie du rêve.' **A. Kirschmann.** 'Deception and Reality.' **J. H. Hyslop.** 'Binocular Vision and the Problem of Knowledge.' **I. M. Bentley.** 'A Critique of Fusion.' **M. F. Washburn.** 'The Genetic Function of Movement and Organic Sensations for Social Consciousness.' **J. Jastrow.** 'The Status of the Subconscious.' **A. Meyer.** 'An Attempt at Analysis of the Neurotic Constitution.' **G. T. W. Patrick.** 'The Psychology of Football.' **W. H. Burnham.** 'Retroactive Amnesia: Illustrative Cases and a Tentative Explanation.' **J. H. Leuba.** 'The State of Death: An Instance of Internal Adaptation.' **A. F. Chamberlain.** 'Primitive Taste-Words.' **B. Edgell** (communicated by **A. D. Waller**). 'On Time Judgment.' **E. B. Titchener.** 'Class Experiments and Demonstration Apparatus.' **M. Meyer.** 'Experimental Studies in the Psychology of Music.' **O. Kuelpe.** 'Ein Beitrag zur experimentellen Ästhetik.' **A. C. Ellis** and **M. M. Shipe.** 'A Study of the Accuracy of the Present Methods of Testing Fatigue.' **J. A. Bergström.** 'A New Type of Ergograph, with a Discussion of Ergographic Experimentation.' **W. B. Pillsbury.** 'Attention Waves as a Means of Measuring Fatigue.' **G. M. Whipple.** 'Studies in Pitch Discrimination.' **J. McK. Cattell.** 'Statistics of American Psychologists.' **Y. Motoro.** 'A Study of the Conductivity of the Nervous System.' **T. L. Bolton.** 'The Relation of Motor Power to Intelligence.'

gence.' **F. B. Dresslar.** 'Are Chromesthesiae Variable? A Study of an Individual Case.' **E. C. Sanford.** 'On the Guessing of Numbers.' **E. F. Buchner.** 'A Quarter-Century of Psychology in America: 1878-1903.' **L. N. Wilson.** 'Bibliography of the Published Writings of President G. Stanley Hall.'

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. Vol. xiv., April, 1904. **F. Adler.** 'The Problem of Teleology.' ['The notion of end as being bound up with the notion of organism exists in idea only and not in fact; it cannot serve us in the business of explaining nature at all, but only of evaluating it; its principal use must be found . . . in the ethical field.']. **J. G. James.** 'The Ethics of Passive Resistance' ["'Passive Resistance' has no support on ethical lines alone," but "may possess some moral value, such as will always attach to the movements that are carried out with moral seriousness and sense of moral responsibility."]. **W. E. B. Du Bois.** 'The Development of a People.' [A plea for the better education of the American negro.] **C. S. Myers.** 'Is Vivisection Justifiable?' [There are "always some to believe that the Fall of Man comes from the Fruit of Knowledge. These are the real opponents of vivisection."]. **J. H. Leuba.** 'Professor William James's Interpretation of Religious Experience.' [The possibility of spirit-intervention is exaggerated.] **J. H. Muirhead.** 'Wordsworth's Ideal of Early Education.' [Wordsworth disconcerned the too early severance of the child from the objects and events which form the natural stimulus of its growing powers, and disregard of the unity of the child's nature.] **J. C. Murray.** 'What should be the Attitude of Teachers of Philosophy towards Religion?' [In opposition to Prof. Royce the writer maintains that the philosopher should not detach himself from the religious life of the community, especially as that is expressed in philanthropic movements.] **J. Kindon.** 'Byron *versus* Spenser.' [A contrast of Byron's low ideal and rejection of morality with Spenser's high ideal of moral and spiritual beauty.] Book Reviews.

L'ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE (Neuvième Année), edited by Alfred Binet. Paris: Schleicher Frères et Cie, 1903, pp. 666. The first part of this volume consists of original memoirs (pp. 1-252), the second of very full analyses of recent books and articles (pp. 253-508), and the third of a title-bibliography for the year 1902 (with index, etc., pp. 509-666). The memoirs are the following: I. **P. Malapert.** 'Enquête sur le sentiment de la colère chez les enfants.' [A report upon the returns of a questionnaire sent to various teachers regarding the origin, expression, concomitants and effects of anger in children. Incidentally paleness is shown to be a more common "expression" (40 per cent. in the returns) than Darwin, Ribot and Lange allow; perhaps, however, this could not be generalised to other races. Two distinct types of anger are said to emerge—the offensive (Ribot's *colère animale*) and the defensive: in the latter there is no act of attack or destruction, even incipient—the stamping, rapid movements, cries and blows upon inanimate objects are rather instinctive efforts of distraction (from physical pain), than results of hypo- or anæsthesia (Lange). Excessively frequent or grave crises of anger in children are correlated with degenerate heredity, nervous instability, etc.; the cure is to be sought in hygienic measures and rational education.]. II. **B. Bourdon.** 'Sur la distinction des sensations des deux yeux.' [An interesting review of the literature of this subject, to which M. Bourdon has himself largely contributed, and a statement of his position. There is (1) an *objective phenomenon*, showing that the sensations conditioned by corresponding processes in the two retinas may be distinguished; when a luminous

point (on the horopter) is observed first with both eyes, then hidden from one eye, there appears a shadow on that side of the luminous point which corresponds to the veiled eye (on the right for the right eye). (2) *A subjective phenomenon*: a sensation of bluntness, dulness, heaviness, in the veiled eye, a feeling of ease or lightness in the seeing eye: this is absent when the impressions received by the two eyes differ in quality only, not in intensity. Bourdon finds this sensation to be peripherally rather than centrally conditioned; its source is in the muscles or tendons of the eye: "the sensation of heaviness, if caused in the eye that receives the darker or less distinct image, is due to the fact that the muscular apparatus of this eye is, as compared with that of the other eye, in a state of relative depression, hence the effort of fixation is felt more strongly in this eye than in the other. The state of depression, again, is caused by the feebleness of the retinal excitation" (p. 54).] III. **A. Binet.** 'L'écriture pendant les états d'excitation artificielle.' [Under mental excitement, the *amplitude* of writing movements is increased. Binet caused his subjects to write some phrases, then to repeat them, with a change of vowels, e for a, i for e, etc.: the effect was to increase the output of mental energy, and to concentrate it upon the writing movements. The letters were found to be larger, more clearly written, more detached from each other, more impersonal in form, *i.e.*, the writing was less mechanical. The explanation offered is that there occurs a diffuse excitation of the movement area, partly perhaps connected with the more accurate and stronger images, to which the intensified thought gives rise.] IV. 'La mesure de la sensibilité.' V. 'Les simplistes.' VI. 'Les Distraits.' VII. 'Les Interprétateurs.' VIII. 'Influence de l'exercice et de la suggestion sur la position du seuil.' IX. 'Le seuil de la sensation double ne peut pas être fixé scientifiquement.' [These various papers by M. Binet (pp. 79-252) constitute in reality a work by themselves—a study in tactful sensation and interpretation. The conclusions are interesting and occasionally startling. M. Binet takes the reader wholly into his confidence and gives at large the materials on which he has founded. The methods of experimental psychology are still on their trial, and therefore the fullest description of the work of a skilled experimenter is valuable to those who are following after. M. Binet has certainly not erred on the side of restraint. The main theme which runs through the several papers is that the threshold of touch-sensation is the most unstable of quantities. What is tested by the Weber method in asthesiometry is not the sensibility of the subject, but his judgment, his mental character, his ability to interpret the sensations received. The word "sensibility" has been used in two meanings—(1) power of appreciating the objects that surround us, and especially the stimuli that act upon us (Weber's sense); (2) the group of sensations produced in us in consequence of stimuli acting upon our organism (Fechner's)—and these have been confused. Nor have we distinguished properly between tests of the fineness of sensibility—the threshold, initial or differential,—and tests of the accuracy of judgment—the error methods. The application of measure in psychological work does not result in any real measure of sensations or other psychical phenomena as such, its sole value is towards the classification of individuals as to the accuracy of their judgment. It is from the second conception of sensibility, confused with the first, that the errors of method in psychology have arisen; it being thought that sensations themselves could be measured, the subject became of no importance, his rôle automatic, his replies reduced to "yes" and "no," "one" or "two". M. Binet's studies bear especially upon what he calls

"the distinction of tactile sensations" (*Raumsinn*), the ability to distinguish two points at small distances apart on the skin. In his scepticism with regard to the possibility of determining scientifically a minimal threshold, M. Binet claims a forerunner in Tawney (*Phil. Stud.*, xiii.), whose paper is said to contain ideas more revolutionary than their author supposed. Enormous differences were found not only between different persons, but in the same person at different séances: moreover the occurrence of the *Vexirfehler*, two points being felt when one only was applied, was hopelessly inconsistent with the conception of a threshold: it depends, as Tawney saw, on the direction of the attention, pre-perception, etc. Binet's method is to invite the fullest self-analysis from his subjects: he asks them to describe their sensations, and the grounds of their judgment, and he correlates what is said with the numerical facts recorded at the same time. Much practical advice is given as to the choice of an instrument (for a new one *vide p. 106 ff.*), the choice of subjects (avoid the laboratory pupil, seek variety), the choice of experimental method (irregular variations rather than minimal), the importance of the *Vexirfehler* as a mark of mental character, the elaboration of protocols (omit nothing that is said or done), and the ways of avoiding distraction. In the course of his work on asthesiometry Binet was led to distinguish two chief types of mind, with distinct attitudes towards the stimuli presented: they are the *simplistes* and the *interprétateurs*. Incidentally we are given several interesting character studies of individual representatives of these types. The marks of the *simpliste* are that he makes no errors, or almost none, with regard to the single point; and that the threshold for "two points" is both *obtuse* and *distinct*—a line rather than a zone. The reverse is true of the "interpreter". The interrogation of some of the subjects brings out the fact that this difference depends on their attitude towards the sensations actually felt. The standpoint of the "*simpliste*" is objective; when his attention is directed to the sensation rather than to its object, he takes the former simply for what it appears to be. Hence he says "two points" only when he feels two *distinct* points: he says "one point" even for the broad or thick or linear sensation which occurs when the stimuli are at a moderate distance apart: he never confuses the one point with two except through distraction. In the "interpreters," one of whom (p. 209) gives the *reductio ad absurdum* of asthesiometry, we find (1) an extreme lowering of the threshold for double sensation, and (2) a great increase in the number of errors on the single point. Psychologically, the character of this type is that it does not stop at the mere sensation, but regards that as a sign, by which to appreciate the external cause. Whenever there is any acquaintance with the instruments used, e.g., this phenomenon of interpretation is found, and it of course renders the results incomparable with those derived from a subject who is of the *simpliste* type. Mme A—, for example, has reminiscences of a compass-asthesiometer of ten years before, and all her reasonings have reference to this (p. 223 ff.). "The points are two but close together;" "one presses harder than the other," etc. The remarkably correct results and estimates of Marie G., whose threshold is 0·5 cm. on back of hand, and who estimates distances of 5 mm. (ten times) and 1 cm. (eight times) in each case with absolute correctness, are probably to be explained by foreknowledge rather than by hyperesthesia: she was the *femme de chambre* of the laboratory (*vide p. 228*). Under the influence of autosuggestion or of emotion or of external suggestion of any kind, a *simpliste* may in a few séances develop into an interpreter: the standpoint, formerly objective, now becomes subjective. From such

facts as these there is derived the conclusion that threshold determination is scientifically valueless. The paper on "Les Distraits" shows that the Weber method may be used for detecting the influence of various types of distraction.]

J. L. MCINTYRE.

REVUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. Janvier, 1904. The interest of this number centres in the first article, 'La Science et l'Esprit Philosophique,' the tenor of which is this. Auguste Comte and his school regarded Religion as subjective and emotional, whereas Science was to them the grand revealer of objective truth and fact. The increased complexity of facts and laws, revealed by Science since Comte's time, has induced a New Positivism, which transfers Science in its turn to the subjective side, and regards a so-called fact or law of nature as representing chiefly a human mode or present phase of thought. Thus we may attain to consistent thought; and some modes of thought will be found practically advantageous above others; but we do not arrive at any final power of predication of the attributes of external nature *in se*. We have liberty in our scientific thinking; and nature is, in large measure, what man in any particular age chooses to take it to be. The mind does not passively register the facts of nature, as Comte thought: it in a manner makes them by its own activity. The facts and laws of one generation are set aside in the next; the one thing that endures is the activity of the human mind: action is our glory rather than knowledge; research into truth hidden, not contemplation of truth found. All this theory the writer, **M. Georges Michelet**, argues to rest upon a confusion of two different things, the 'scientific spirit,' that is, the labour of research, and 'science' itself, that is, the results achieved by the scientific spirit, or the known truths the possession of which is the reward of research. The scientific spirit is 'free'; it multiplies hypotheses, it varies its methods at will; but Science is not 'free,' it is definite, determined, inexorably fixed by something which is not the mind of man. Nature is not the complaisant ally of our illusions. The last line of this number informs us: "Avec A. Bain l'Ecole anglaise perd son psychologue; avec H. Spencer, son métaphysicien". This total eclipse is not visible in England. Février, 1904. 'Le Problème moral,' by **George Fonsegrive**, is a luminous exposition of the foundations of Ethics; it points out the error of Stoicism: it carries us back to Newman's view of conscience. **Paul Hermant**, 'De la nature de l'émotion,' maintains that every sensation, thought, and act of attention is accompanied by emotion, emotion being our mode of grouping our subconscious states (*états de pénombre*), and every emotion creating in us a special way of regarding the external world. The cerebral location of the higher powers of mind is discussed between **Drs. Surbled** and **Grasset**. 'Méthodes et Concepts,' by **Paul Dupuy**, a remarkable defence of the subjective method in philosophy against the objective, is analysed minutely. There is a letter on the teaching of Thomism in *grands séminaires*. Lastly, here is one view of evolution: "Evolution of an animal species, endowed with a brain of intricate convolutions, which an unconscious selection has rendered more apt than other Primates to react against the causes of destruction that surround it, heat, cold, hunger, ferocity of Carnivora: a species the different families of which kill one another, in order that natural selection may accomplish its work of education, and allow only chosen races to subsist: where some individuals, inferior to others in muscle, but superior in cerebral development, have had recourse to stratagem to subdue their sturdy adversaries, and have put their instincts in fetters by means of

the knaveries called morality, or religion ; where others, better to master the forces of nature, have devised sciences, the sole legitimate object of which is to increase the modicum of physical enjoyments allotted to each representative of the species ; enjoyments, however, which the strongest or shrewdest members monopolise, while the common herd agonises and suffers, waiting for the violent revolution that shall allow them to gorge themselves in their turn : evolution without purpose for the individual, whom chemical actions decompose after some years in which he has known more bitterness than joy ; evolution without finality for the race, the last representatives of which will die of cold and hunger on a frozen planet, where never geologist shall come to disinter their fossil remains" (pp. 207-208).

ARCHIVES DE PSYCHOLOGIE. Tome ii., No. 3. **F. Consoni.** 'La mesure de l'attention chez les enfants faibles d'esprit (phrénasthéniques) : recherches expérimentales.' [The work was done in the laboratory of Prof. de Sanctis, and employs his terminology. The aesthesiometric method gives good results in the study of discriminative tactal attention, static or dynamic. In all but the most serious cases the children show a certain degree of static conative attention ; there may also be indications of dynamic conative attention, rapid enough for practical purposes but narrow in range. Exact relations obtain, in the individual case, between dynamic attention and certain aspects of static attention ; there is also a correspondence between natural and conative attention. General capacity of attention is directly proportional to degree of emotivity and power of inhibition. Normal children evince a greater promptitude of conative adaptation and a higher development (often a wider range) of capacity for dynamic conative attention.] **T. Jonckheere.** 'Notes sur la psychologie des enfants arrières.' [Muscular sense, illusion of weight, movement ; colour sensitivity ; visual memory ; ideas of space and time ; acquisition of languages, reading, mathematics ; lying.] **T. Flournoy.** 'F. W. H. Myers et son œuvre posthume.' [Interesting appreciation of Myers's *Human Personality*.] Recueil de Faits : Documents et Discussions. **D. Baud-Bovy.** 'Le combat des vaches dans les Alpes valaisannes.' [Description of the contest, with psychological notes.] Bibliographie. Publications reçues. Notes diverses. [Necrology of Ernest Murisier.] Tome ii., No. 4. **M. C. Schuyten.** 'Sur les méthodes de mensuration de la fatigue des écoliers.' [Tests of auditory memory of numbers.] **T. Flournoy.** 'Observations de psychologie religieuse.' [Psychological discussion of six 'confessions'.] **H. Zbinden.** 'L'influence de la vie psychique sur la santé.' [Case of auto-suggestion of tumour in the throat, cured by counter-suggestion.] Recueil de Faits : Documents et Discussions. **J. E. David.** 'Observations de psychologie canine : hiérarchie, politesse et vassalité.' **F. Guillermet.** 'Un cas de mensonge infantile.' Bibliographie. Notes diverses. Tome iii., No. 1. **E. Yung.** 'Recherches sur le sens olfactif de l'escargot.' [Careful investigation of *Helix pomatia*.] **E. Claparède.** 'Le mental et le physique d'après L. Busse.' [Plea for retention of parallelism, with consideration of its difficulties.] **A. Lemaitre.** 'Des phénomènes de paramnesia.' [In the case studied, paramnesia consisted in the conscious revival of subconscious perceptions received a short time before, and antedated on their appearance in consciousness.] Recueil de Faits : Documents et Discussions. **A. Elmer.** 'IV^e Conférence suisse pour l'éducation des anormaux : Lucerne, 1903.' Bibliographie. Notes diverses.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PSYCHOLOGIE UND PHYSIOLOGIE DER SINNESORGANE. Bd. xxxii., Heft 2. **B. Fuchs.** 'Ueber die stereoskopische Wirkung der

sogenannten Tapetenbilder.' [Review of experiments of Meyer, Helmholtz, and Becker and Rollett. An exactly drawn pattern will not give the stereoscopic impression, because all double images fuse, and it is only the suppression of unfused double images that can occasion the perception of the third dimension; hence the patterns used by the earlier investigators must have been inexact. Explanation and illustration (by a very striking circle-pattern) of the phenomena.] **K. L. Schaefer** and **A. Guttmann**.

'Ueber die Unterschiedsempfindlichkeit für gleichzeitige Töne.' [Review of experiments of Bosanquet, Stumpf and Krüger. Preliminary experiments with forks and tonometer. Final series, with blown bottles: the absolute sensible discrimination for simultaneous tones is considerably less than that for successive; the line of duality lies in the middle region of the musical scale at 10 to 20 vs.; discrimination is best in the once-accented octave, and decreases with descending pitch of the primary tones.] **H. Piper**. 'Ueber die Abhängigkeit des Reizwertes leuchtender Objekte von ihren Flächen- bzw. Winkelgrösse.' [The stimulus value of an object for the periphery of the dark-adapted retina increases and decreases, not only with the objective light intensity, but also with the surface magnitude of the corresponding retinal image; the brightness sensation in the periphery of the light-adapted retina depends, on the other hand, almost exclusively upon light intensity, and hardly at all upon surface magnitude. This result finds a ready explanation in the von Kries-Parinaud theory of visual sensations.] **J. von Kries**.

'Ueber die Wahrnehmung des Flimmerns durch normale und durch total farbenblinde Personen.' [The normal eye requires a much greater speed of rotation (about three times as great) of the episcotister for the disappearance of flicker than does the totally colour-blind eye. Visual acuity and capacity of temporal discrimination (measured by flicker observations) show a precisely parallel dependence upon illumination: both slowly increase with least intensities of light; at an approximately definite intensity, both suddenly depart from this original form of dependence, and increase much more quickly. These results speak for the author's theory.] Literaturbericht. Bd. xxxii., Heft 3 und 4.

H. Piper. 'Ueber das Helligkeitsverhältnis monokular und binokular ausgelöster Lichtempfindungen: Fortsetzung der Untersuchungen über Dunkeladaptation des Sehorganes.' [For the light-adapted eye, equality of the light intensities observed in monocular and binocular vision means, as a general rule, equality of the corresponding brightness sensations; in dark adaptation, on the other hand, the light intensity monocularly observed must be considerably greater than that binocularly observed, if the two sensations are to appear equal. The paper contains a review of previous literature, and description of apparatus employed in the writer's experiments.] **E. A. McC. Gamble** and **M. W. Calkins**.

'Die reproduzierte Vorstellung beim Wiedererkennen und beim Vergleichen.' [First part of the investigation, dealing with recognition. Recognition does not, as Lehmann maintained, depend upon reproduced ideas. For (1) attendant ideas, that are not only clear but correct, often appear with the consciousness of unfamiliarity; (2) associations that are clear enough to be reproduced do not always occur, even where recognition is well-marked; and (3) introspection declares, as a rule, that the attendant ideas are subsequent to recognition. On the other hand, the statistical method is inadequate to the nature of the recognitive process itself; it cannot decide between the theories of organic sensation and quality of familiarity; though the results indicate that the feelings of tension and relief play a considerable part. The feeling of unfamiliarity is a clear and positive conscious content, and not the mere absence of

familiarity ; its relative poverty of associations may be explained, in part, as due to the (teleological) concentration of attention upon the unfamiliar content itself.] **P. Schultz.** 'Gehirn und Seele.' [A discussion of the relation of brain and mind in the light of Kantian principles, and more especially of the works of Cohen and Stadler. The author seeks to show that the whole aim of the *Kr. d. reinen Vern.*, was to furnish an adequate basis for Newton's mathematical natural philosophy, and that Kant at the same time determined the share that philosophy has, alongside of mathematics, in such a natural science. He defines the relation of brain and mind as a temporal psychophysical parallelism. Psychology can never be a science ; but the physiologist may have recourse to psychology where exact procedure is impossible. Cause and purpose, causality and freedom, are not antithetical concepts, but disparate and mutually supplementary.] **A. Bernstein.** 'Ueber eine einfache Methode zur Untersuchung der Merkfähigkeit resp. des Gedächtnisses bei Geisteskranken.' [Exposure of geometrical figures, and their subsequent selection from memory on a table of similar figures.] Literaturbericht. Bd. xxxii., Heft 5. **S. Exner** and **J. Pollak.** 'Beitrag zur Resonanztheorie der Tonempfindungen.' [Experiments with forks and telephone. The difference of half a wave-length, which recurs periodically in a train of tone waves, produces a sensation, not to be distinguished from the sensation produced by beats. A train of tone waves, in which these phase differences occur with sufficient rapidity, gives rise to a tonal sensation of lower intensity than the same train of waves when free from phase differences. The auditory impression caused by a train of tone waves in which the phase differences occur sinks in intensity, not only when the elongation of its vibrations is reduced, but also when the number of phase differences in the time unit is increased. This reduction of intensity may be carried to inaudibility of the tone. All four results accord with the theory of resonance or sympathetic vibration, but have not so far been explained by alternative theories.] **A. Guttmann.** 'Blickrichtung und Grössenschätzung.' [Experiments with lines and circles to test Zoth's hypothesis that the estimation of magnitude depends upon direction of gaze. Distances and objects of this kind, seen under otherwise similar conditions, and estimated as magnitudes, appear at a distance of 25 to 236 cm. from the eye 3·5 to 3·66 times smaller when elevated 40° above the horizontal plane of regard than when viewed directly in this plane itself.] Literaturbericht. Bd. xxxii., Heft 6. **C. Rieger.** 'Ueber Muskelzustände.' — II. **G. Schaefer.** 'Wie verhalten sich die Helmholtz'schen Grundfarben zur Weite der Pupille ?' [The fundamental colours as such produce no marked pupillomotor effects.] Literaturbericht. Bd. xxxiii., Heft 1 und 2. **A. Meinong.** 'Bemerkungen ueber den Farbenkörper und das Mischungsgesetz.' [There is no such thing as psychological colour mixture : only physical and physiological. Psychical data are, however, embodied in the laws of colour mixture, which are propositions concerning the relations between points of a correctly constructed psychological colour schema. In strictness, there is but one law of colour mixture : the quantity involved is originally, in every case, the product of light intensity and period of illumination. The law appears in complete purity only in the case of physiological mixture, and then probably only in one instance, that of binocular colour mixture.] **O. Rosenbach.** 'Das Tick-tack der Uhr in akustischer und sprachphysiologischer Beziehung.' [The difference between the tick and the tock of a clock is constant, the one being bright and sharp, the other dull and long drawn out : the difference is due to the mode of production of the two sounds. We say tick-tock and not tock-tick because the *i-*

sound has a higher value for consciousness than the *o*-sound.] **T. Ziehen.** 'Erkenntnistheoretische Auseinandersetzungen.'—II. [Discussion of Schuppe and naive realism.] Literaturbericht. Bd. xxxii., Heft 3. **E. A. McC. Gamble** and **M. W. Calkins.** 'Ueber die Bedeutung von Wortvorstellungen für die Unterscheidung von Qualitäten sukzessiver Reize.' [Experiments with scents, colours and greys. There is no evidence that the phonetic name-image plays any part in the recognition of simple stimuli. On the other hand, the word helps to induce a consciousness of difference in cases where no objective difference exists.] **E. P. Braunstein.** 'Beitrag zur Lehre des intermittierenden Lichtreizes der gesunden und kranken Retina.'—I. Literaturbericht. Bd. xxxii., Heft 4. **E. P. Braunstein.** 'Beitrag zur Lehre des intermittierenden Lichtreizes der gesunden und kranken Retina.'—II. [(1) Filehne's phenomenon is affected not only by eye movement but also by the composition of the visual field. (2) Marbe's law that increase of the average general brightness furthers the fusion of sensations is confirmed. (3) Marbe's law that equal duration of intermittence corresponds approximately to equal stimulus difference is not confirmed. (4) Decrease of the difference between two successive intermittent stimuli furthers fusion. (5) In low light and with adequate adaptation, the sensitivity of the centre of the retina to intermittent light is greatly reduced, that of the periphery increased. In good light, these conditions are reversed. (6) With stimuli compounded of a colour and a brightness, the highest number of intermittences is required for the fusion of yellow; then follow red, green, blue. (7) In cases of retinal disease and of turbidity of the refractive media, the S. D. diminishes in direct proportion to the progress of the disorder. In low light, the S. D. falls lower for the disease than for the normal eye; its reduction is not proportional to the reduction of the illumination. (8) In hemeralopia with normal acuity, the S. D. falls only in low light; in hemeralopia with reduced acuity, it is poor even in good light. The reason is probably to be sought in disturbance of adaptation. (9) Von Kries' theory is borne out by the writer's experiments.] **M. Meyer.** 'Zur Theorie japanischer Musik.' [Analysis of three compositions, on the basis of the author's psychological theory of music.] Literaturbericht. Einladung zu einem Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie in Giessen, vom 18. bis 20. April, 1904. Bd. xxxii., Heft 5. **E. Ritter von Oppolzer.** 'Grundzüge einer Farben-theorie.'—n. [Gives a theory of one-dimensional visual sensations (the totally colour-blind system).] **H. Frey.** 'Weitere Untersuchungen über die Schalleitung in Schädel.' Literaturbericht.

ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK. Bd. cxxii., Heft 1. **Prof. Dr. O. Schneider.** 'Die schöpferische Kraft des Kindes (Schluss).' [Continues and concludes a series of observations going to prove the development of human faculty in anticipation of experience. Dr. Schneider makes no reference to the theory of inherited racial experience.] **L. William Stern.** 'Der zweite Hauptsatz der Energetik und das Lebensproblem (Schluss).' [After having shown in a former article that given quantities of energy coexisting at different levels within the same sphere motion would continue irrespective of the absolute amounts involved, the writer proceeds to apply this result to the particular case of life which the present theory of entropy threatens with ultimate extinction. To begin with, Weber and Fechner's law proves that vital activity may become so adapted to its environment as to respond to very much feebler stimulations than those by which it was originally excited. Again the discoveries of Hering and others point to an interpretation of evolution in the sense of a continual diminution in

the amount of energy required for the support of psychical manifestations. And if it is objected that after all life depends for its existence on protoplasm, which again can only exist within a certain relatively narrow range of temperatures—the answer is that the immanent teleology of the universe which created protoplasm as a means for the realisation of life is not restricted to that means, and will doubtless, when the occasion arises, secure the same end by other instrumentalities.] **Johannes Volkelt.** ‘Beiträge zur Analyse des Bewusstseins (Schluss).’ [The feelings produced by works of art are not, like the things which excite them, unreal, but perfectly real so far as they go. They are, however, as a rule, less intense than the feelings we should experience in witnessing, say, an actual tragedy; and they also differ qualitatively, being more disinterested. In general the more or less vigorous resuscitation of feeling depends on the ‘certainty of possibility,’ a form of consciousness which has hitherto been neglected, but which may be used for the solution of various psychological problems, otherwise inexplicable. In conclusion it is observed that pleasure and pain are not convertible with feeling, but are experiences accompanying every form of consciousness. Deduct these from feeling (or emotion) and it is not true to say, as Stumpf does, that nothing remains but an intellectual element. Count in volition and even so the analysis is not exhaustive. There remains an intimate consciousness of myself, realised in a particular direction, as the very essence of the feeling.] **Prof. Richard Wahle.** ‘Beiträge zur Theorie der Interpretation philosophischer Werke.’ [Maintains against Jodl that Spinoza was a naturalist, positivist, and atheist.] **Max Isserlin.** ‘Eine neue “Lösung des Raumproblems.”’ [Begins a criticism on E. von Cyon’s recent attempt to show that our perceptions of space originate in the structure of the semicircular canals.] **Rudolf Eisler.** ‘Prolegomena zu einer philosophischen Psychologie.’ [All forms of mentality should be studied in reference to the self and viewed as its realisations.] **Prof. Rob. Wihan.** ‘Zur Feststellung des Begriffes der Wahrheit.’ [The notion of truth implies the existence of an external reality discoverable by us.] Bd. cxxii., Heft 2. **Max Isserlin.** ‘Eine neue Lösung des Raumproblems (Schluss).’ [Von Cyon’s explanation of the perception of space leaves Kant’s theory unshaken. It assumes the existence of space as something which we perceive by means of the semicircular canals, and totally fails to account for the axioms of geometry.] **H. Kosuth.** ‘Einige Bemerkungen zu Haeckels Welträtseln.’ [Haeckel’s whole philosophy is vitiated by his disregard of the fact that the laws of nature have their origin in the mind. The real riddle begins where he ends. It is: What is that which thought constitutes into a world of objects, concepts and laws?] **Dr. Kristian B. R. Aars.** ‘Zur Bestimmung des Verhältnisses zwischen Erkenntnisstheorie und Psychologie.’ [Kant’s criticism when consistently carried through leads to solipsism. And the admission of other minds coexisting with our own implies the objective existence of causation and of time.] **Prof. W. v. Tschisch.** ‘Das Grundgesetz des Lebens.’ [The distinctive attribute of living as compared with non-living matter is its unlimited power of attraction and assimilation. There is a fixed point at which the affinities of inorganic matter are saturated. Life is never saturated, but increases for ever, if supplied with nutriment, first by individual growth and then by reproduction. (Prof. v. Tschisch omits to notice that this assimilative power is limited by the amount of energy, especially solar energy, supplied from without.)] **W. Fickler.** ‘Unter welchen philosophischen Voraussetzungen hat sich bei Hegel die Werthschätzung des Staates entwickelt, und wie ist diese zu beurtheilen?’ [A general sketch of Hegel’s philosophy in its relation to the sciences of

human nature, with an accompaniment of hostile criticism. His doctrine of a perpetual flux ought to have debarred him from constructing a system. The theory of continuous progress is inconsistent with the facts of history.] **Dr. H. Reichel.** 'Darstellung und Kritik von J. S. Mill's Theorie der induktiven Methode.' [The first half of an analysis of Mill's theory of induction.]

RIVISTA FILOSOFICA. Anno v., vol. vi., Fasc. v., November-December, 1903. **F. Bonatelli.** 'Le categorie psicologiche.' [The current tripartite division of mental phenomena under Feeling, Cognition and Volition is unacceptable, as it classes Sensation under Feeling, and Appetite under Volition, whereas they are distinct from, and co-ordinate with, them. Therefore we must count five categories of mentality, neither more nor fewer.] **R. Nazzari.** 'L'uomo di Genio per gli psichiatri e gli antropologi.' [An entertaining exposure of the unerical, arbitrary and inconsistent methods by which Lombroso and his followers attempt to show that genius is a result of disease or degeneracy.] **O. Nazari.** 'La concezione del mondo secondo il Bhagavadgita.' **A. Gnesotto.** 'Nota sul canone del Metodo indiretto di Differenza di J. S. Mill.' [Discusses two different emendations proposed by Bonatelli and Masci respectively to Mill's Canon for the Joint Method of Agreement and Difference; and proposes a third emendation, substituting 'the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances *agree*' for 'the circumstances in which they *differ*'.] Rassegna Bibliografica, etc. Anno vi., vol. vii., Fasc. i., January-February, 1904. **A. Faggi.** 'H. Spencer e il suo sistema filosofico.' [Herbert Spencer is remarkable for the consistency with which he adhered to the same principles through life. He may even be reproached with too great consistency in adhering to the obsolete social philosophy of his youth. But it is a mistake to suppose that the main conceptions of his cosmic philosophy have been superseded.] **C. Cantoni.** 'Un capitolo d'introduzione alla *Critica della Ragion pura* di E. Kant.' [A chapter from a new edition of the author's work on Kant. It is a mistake to regard the second edition of the *Kritik d. r. Vernunft* as a timid or interested recantation of a more idealistic view. On the contrary it represents Kant's genuine opinion rather better than the first; at the same time there is less difference between the two editions than Schopenhauer imagines.] **E. Juvalta.** 'La dottrina delle due Etiche di H. Spencer (Esposizione).' [An exposition preparatory to a criticism of Spencer's method of distinguishing between Absolute and Relative Ethics.] **G. Vidari.** 'Di alcune recenti pubblicazioni di filosofia morale.' [Contains among other criticisms an interesting reply to Salvadori's recent presentation of Spence's ethical system as a conciliation of the spiritualist or ideal with the utilitarian point of view.] Rassegna Bibliografica, etc. Anno vi., vol. vii., Fasc. ii., March-April, 1904. **V. Alemanni.** 'Dell'odierno concetto della "Storia della Filosofia".' [It is a mistake to look on the various systems of philosophy simply as abstract expressions of the soul of a race or nation at a given epoch. Each system is determined to a considerable extent by earlier speculations, by contemporary religion and science, and by the personality of its author. And systems of thought sometimes mould the age more than they are moulded by it.] **R. Nazzari.** 'L'Argomento di Sant'Anselmo d'Aosta.' [Rebuts some criticisms directed against Anselm's ontological proof of theism, but admits its generally unsatisfactory character.] **A. Aliotta.** 'Psicologia della Credenza.' [Belief is neither an association of ideas nor an act of the will, but rests on an ultimate intuition of reality.] **E. Juvalta.** 'La dottrina delle due Etiche di H. Spencer.—Parte II.' [Sociological fatalism merely accounts for the

ethical rules accepted at any given time, but offers no standard of perfection by which they can be tested and improved. 'Pragmatism' justifies right conduct in the abstract, but leaves its concrete content undetermined.] **A. Manzari.** 'Nota Estetica.' [A sense of the ludicrous arises from the perception of slight physical or social abnormalities.] Rassegna Bibliografica, etc.

REVISTA DI FILOSOFIA E SCIENZE AFFINI. Anno vi., vol. i. N. 1-2, January-February, 1904. **G. Salvadori.** 'Erberto Spencer.' [A brief personal sketch.] **G. Marchesini.** 'La metafisica di Erberto Spencer.' [An adverse criticism of Spencer's agnosticism, written from what is called in Italy the positivist point of view. What Spencer said of Comte may be applied to himself; true or false his system has produced a great effect on other minds, exercising a healthy stimulation even on those who reject its fundamental principles.] **G. Tarozzi.** 'La sintesi di Erberto Spencer.' [The nineteenth century is eminently the historical century, and Spencer's synthesis means history projected into an explanation of the universe.] **E. Troilo.** 'La dottrina della conoscenza.' [As against Kantian idealism, Spencer initiated the true psychological method, but continued to isolate the mind far too much from objective reality.] **P. Orano.** 'Erberto Spencer.' [Spencer's name is inseparably linked with the final victory of science over religion.] **C. Ranzoli.** 'La fortuna di Herbert Spencer in Italia.' [Nowhere has Spencer's philosophy gained so many adhesions as in Italy. Yet up to 1870 he was almost unknown there. The work of political unification had to be completed before a system so alien to the old spiritualist traditions could be studied. Among other influences the Hegelian School at Naples considerably facilitated its reception.] **A. Crespi.** 'La religione nella filosofia di Erberto Spencer.' [Spencer does not account satisfactorily for the origin of religion; he does not trace its evolution as he ought; and he gives it too great a place in the final constitution of belief.] **G. Santini.** 'E. Spencer e G. D. Romagnosi.' [Traces some rather superficial analogies between Spencer's ethics and those of the Italian jurist named.] **F. Momigliano.** 'Le idee estetiche di Erberto Spencer.' [Æsthetic emotion is not aroused by the contemplation of extinct utilities. Æsthetic education has more than a mere recreative value and helps to maintain the highest ethical ideals. Hellenism has its rights as well as Americanism. (One's general impression from all these tributes is that the Italian admirers of Herbert Spencer are disposed to crown him with flowers and lead him out of the city.)] Rassegna di filosofia scientifica, etc.

IX.—CORRESPONDENCE.

TO THE EDITOR OF "MIND".

SIR,—While I appreciate the courteous tone of Mr. Norman Smith's review of my book *Why the Mind has a Body* in the last number of this journal, and thank him sincerely for the kind words of commendation with which it opens and closes, I cannot admit either that he has adequately stated the scope of the book or that his account of my views is in all respects accurate.

The book makes two claims which I think should have been brought out clearly. The first is that *panpsychism enables us to explain the relation of mind and body, at least in its main outlines*. This claim shrinks, in Mr. Smith's account, to a "metaphysical restatement of the parallelist theory," upon which he cannot enter for lack of space. That the view in question is that of Paulsen and Stout, and not merely a private hypothesis of my own, in no wise appears. The second claim of the book is that *panpsychism enables us to adjust the controversy between parallelism and interactionism, by showing that the former is consistent with the efficiency of mind*. Of this claim—surely a rather important one, if it be true—Mr. Smith makes no mention whatever.

The inaccuracies of which I complain are, I am sure, wholly unintentional, and doubtless due in large part to my own defects of statement; nevertheless, I think it my duty to rectify them. And I shall allow myself, in doing so, to discuss certain of my reviewer's criticisms which I am unable to accept.

I do not, as Mr. Smith says, attempt to "prove . . . that brain-fatigue affects attention and all the higher powers of mind," nor do I suppose that Wundt and Ward deny this to be so; but I argue that the fact is inconceivable except on the assumption that attention and the "higher powers of mind," and not merely sensations and images, have cerebral correlates. How is a toxic agent like alcohol or chloroform to affect the "higher powers of mind," unless there be portions or aspects of the brain-process which go on when these powers go on and stop when these powers stop? Those who reply that the powers are dependent on sensations and images, and that it is the correlates of these that go on and stop, do not seem to me to realise the dilemma in which they place themselves by this answer. Either they are committed to a purely sensationalist theory of the higher powers which in effect nullifies their exception from the universal rule, or to the exact degree to which they attribute to them a life separate from the life of sensations and images they fly in the face of the facts. If I fail to discuss Wundt's arguments for a limitation of the correlation, it is because this would at once involve analysis of the "higher powers of mind," analysis of what Mr. Smith calls the "higher unity of the mental life"—matters which I have reserved (the latter expressly, in a passage, p. 355, which Mr. Smith does not seem to have noticed, the former by implication, see pp. 52, 53) for treatment in a later work. But I may say that my contention would *not* be that the "higher powers" and the "unity of our mental life," conceived as Mr. Smith seems to conceive them, have correlates on the physical side—an opinion which might indeed lead to the assumption of a *Seelpunkt* in the brain—but that when these features of mind are conceived in such a way as to make them incapable of having physical correlates they are misconceived. I should not think of admitting that mind and matter are "complete opposites," nor do I conceive (with deference to Mr. Smith's contrary opinion) that Dr. Ward has finally established that fact in his Gifford Lectures.

Mr. Smith has misunderstood me when he says that I "contend that

as it [the principle of the conservation of energy] is an induction from experience ' . . . it cannot be argued without fallacy that where physical events are accompanied by consciousness it must hold good just the same ' ". What I say is that if the principle of conservation is an induction from experience, then this follows ; I do not commit myself at this point as to whether the principle of conservation is an induction from experience or in some sense a law of thought. I say moreover that the argument from the principle of conservation remains inconclusive " so long as the relations of mind and matter are conceived in ordinary dualistic terms ". It should be carefully borne in mind that I am engaged throughout this section in attempting to estimate the exact value of the ordinary arguments for parallelism on an artificial assumption (the assumption underlying, it is true, almost all contemporary treatment of the problem) : that mind and matter may possibly be two co-equal realities. The first step in metaphysics dissipates such a notion, and deprives us of our chief if not only ground for questioning the universal validity of the principle of conservation.

The misunderstanding just referred to has led Mr. Smith to suppose—since I later argue that the qualitative likeness and quantitative equivalence between cause and effect which are the basis of the principle of the conservation of energy constitute in some measure a rational bond between them—that I do not perceive the fundamental identity of the argument from the principle of conservation and that from the nature of the causal relation, and that my treatment of the two is not self-consistent. He denies moreover that the qualitative and quantitative relations between cause and effect constitute a rational connexion in the sense of Hume. On this point I confess that I have been somewhat impressed by Mr. Smith's criticisms. But I may point out that Hume's arguments are founded partly on the distinctness of cause and effect ("Every effect is a distinct event from its cause"), partly on their qualitative unlikeness (as where he argues that we could not know from the phenomenal qualities of bread that it would nourish). Now, if my words on page 149 are ambiguous and regrettable, appearing as they do to indicate a desire on my part to take up against Hume the cause of epistemological rationalism in its full extent, I think I make it plain on page 151 that my intention is not to question the validity of the former argument or to maintain that we could foresee in advance of experience either that a cause must have an effect at all or that it must have one connected with it by qualitative and quantitative relations ; but to point out that the latter argument has since Hume's day, through the progress of molecular physics, lost its force, and that cause and effect do not now appear to us so "loose and separate," their relation such a bare juxtaposition of different things, as they appeared to him. Whether the qualitative and quantitative relations constitute a rational bond in the strict sense is another question, but the fact that Hume pointed to the supposed absence of qualitative likeness in proof of his view would seem to show that he was himself not altogether clear on the subject, and must be my excuse in case I have erred.

My chief concern, however, was not so much to maintain the existence of a rational connexion, as to refute the pretensions of those (of whom Mr. Smith seems to be one) who would draw from the absence of a rational connexion, if it be absent, the conclusion that causal relations between mental and physical events are exactly as intelligible and acceptable as the causal relations of physical events *inter se*. Even if it be not a necessity of thought, experience at least informs us that qualitative and quantitative relations are characteristic of causal connexions outside the body. These relations enable us in some sense to pass in thought from the cause to

the effect, they make the connexion between the two in a manner *plain*. Causal connexions between mental and physical events are not so much unthinkable as destitute of this sort of plainness. If it be true in any sense that we cannot "pass in thought from the physics of the brain to the facts of consciousness," then in that sense it is true that we *can* pass in thought from one physical event to another. The current plea that purely physical causation is just as unintelligible as causation between physical and mental is really an extravagance. It rests on the superstitious notion that there is something mysterious in the causal relation, an inner kernel or essence upon which experience throws no light; instead of experience yielding (if we could but exhaust its possibilities, make all the possible perceptions in the case actual) all there is to be known about the relation. I cannot acquit Mr. Smith of holding this anti-Humian view. He says that equivalence is "merely an empirical datum or sign enabling us to determine with greater certainty which sequences we may name causal," but that it "yields no real insight into the actual nature of the causal connexion". How does this differ from the notion of a 'real tie'? Fancy the causal relation to have an "actual nature" into which experience "yields no real insight," and purely physical and (if I may so say) physico-mental causation are in this respect of course exactly on a par. But grant that causation is just what we find it in experience to be and no more, and the possibility of establishing equivalences in most cases of physical causation is a reason, and a strong reason, for doubting the legitimacy of a view which would make it forever impossible to establish equivalences in the case of brain-events. Two further considerations come in to clinch the argument. (1) Causal connexions *without* equivalence are merely uniform sequences, and uniform sequences between mental events and brain-events are obvious facts on any view. (2) With the first step in metaphysics matter disappears as a possible agency working from without upon consciousness, and the doubt above referred to becomes a certainty.

I object to Mr. Smith's statement that my metaphysical theory "rests upon the assumption that all experience is purely subjective". I hold all experience to be purely subjective (that is, mental, and the mind that of the individual) in its existence and felt quality, but not in its significance. And it seems to me a serious misrepresentation when Mr. Smith says that I offer as a sufficient proof of this merely the facts of colour-blindness. I believe those facts *to be* a sufficient proof, for if in perception we directly apprehend the qualities of independently existing objects it should be impossible for any one ever to apprehend them as other than they are, and the theory of a diseased form of direct apprehension really will not work. Mr. Smith says, "The incapacity of a man colour-blind to see the colour another man sees is no proof that he would not if he could see". But he can see; a man colour-blind is not blind; only he sees objects as they are not, which should be impossible if vision is a direct apprehension of things without the mind. The misrepresentation to which I refer consists, however, in suggesting that my view of the subjectivity of experience in the sense defined is based on a bare reference to the facts of colour-blindness, when in fact it is elaborately justified in the long chapter on the nature of the Physical World. Nor can I feel that Mr. Smith has correctly stated the "general argument" of that chapter when he summarises it in the words, "that our perceptions are subjective because they vary not only with the object but with the retinal impression and the brain-state". Even in this form I hold that the argument proves the subjectivity of our perceptions in the sense defined. For, to be objective, they must vary solely with the object. The least admixture of variation with anything else in so far

adulterates their objectivity with a subjective element. But my argument really is that our perceptions are shown by the facts of physiological psychology *not to vary with the object at all*, but to vary immediately solely with the brain-state. That the brain-state is itself subjective, *i.e.*, simply another (possible) perception, in no way diminishes the force of this striking fact. How I can immediately perceive an extra-bodily object by means of a perception which varies directly solely with a brain-event, I wish Mr. Smith would explain.

Mr. Smith says that my method of escaping solipsism is "high-handed". My thesis is that everybody's method of escaping solipsism is high-handed. Nobody does it either by experience of other minds or by sound reasoning from facts about his own, as I have sufficiently shown (pp. 217, 218), but solely by the aid of an instinct of transcendence which leads us all to help ourselves liberally, in a thousand ways, to extra-mental realities to which we have no strict logical right. Mr. Smith's suspicion that this doctrine of a transcending instinct is an after-thought, made necessary by my erroneous view of the "essential immanence" of consciousness (I do not like the phrase, since it seems to imply cognitive immanence), is not in accord with the fact. The doctrine is the logical 'other side' of a theory which, as Mr. Smith perceives, derives its inspiration from Hume. Readers not so convinced as Mr. Smith that "Hume has failed" will find additional data as to how I conceive the working of this instinct in my reply to Prof. Bakewell in the *Philosophical Review* for May, 1904, and in an article in the *Journal of Philosophy* for 12th May, 1904, entitled 'A Naturalistic Theory of the Reference of Thought to Reality'.

I am, Sir, yours, etc.,
C. A. STRONG.

ON A SUPPOSED QUOTATION FROM KANT.

DEAR MR. EDITOR,—In the April number of MIND (p. 220), the sentence "The understanding makes Nature, but does not create it" is ascribed to Kant. Might I ask whether Mr. Underhill, or any other of your readers, could give me the reference to the passage in Kant where it occurs? The phrase has been repeatedly quoted as Kant's during the last twenty years, and I fear I have made use of it myself. But I have recently searched in vain for it throughout Kant's works, and have begun to suspect that the epigram was made in Oxford. At least, Green is the earliest writer to whom I can trace it; and I should be glad to be set right as to its origin. The strange thing is that Green gives the passage in German: "'Macht zwar Verstand die Natur, aber er schafft sie nicht.' The understanding 'makes' Nature, but out of a material which it does not make" (*Prolegomena*, §11; MIND, 1882, p. 9). The nearest thing to this which I have myself found in Kant is in the first edition of the *Kritik*, (pp. 126-127): "Der Verstand . . . ist selbst die Gesetzgebung für die Natur, d. i. ohne Verstand würde es überall nicht Natur . . . geben. . . . Der Verstand ist selbst der Quell der Gesetze der Natur, und mithin der formalen Einheit der Natur." Is it possible that the rather curious phrase quoted by Green can have been taken from some other source than Kant, or even set down by Green himself as an epigrammatical statement of Kant's doctrine, and then—its origin forgotten—have got mixed up with extracts from Kant's own writings? On this question it is useless to speculate, as some of your readers may perhaps be able to show that the sentence is really a quotation from Kant himself.

Yours faithfully,
W. R. SORLEY.